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Abstract!
The transformation of China’s economy since 1978 is one of the most profound economic 
transformations in history. Among the most important dimensions of China’s transformation is the 
way rapid economic growth drove energy consumption. All economic activity depends in one way or 
another upon energy but there is now overwhelming evidence that much of the way we use energy 
has undesirable externalities, including potentially destabilising effects on the earth’s climate system. 
China is already the world’s largest energy user and prospects for future economic growth and 
therefore energy consumption remain strong. China’s energy use is therefore a critical area of 
analysis. The thesis addresses three core questions. Why has China’s energy consumption grown so 
rapidly since 2002? Is China’s economy peculiar in its huge and rapidly growing energy consumption 
or does it conform to the experience of other countries when they were at similar stages of 
development? What are the implications for China’s energy future? Input-Output Analysis (IOA) and 
Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA) are employed to isolate energy relationships with rural and 
urban household consumption, government expenditure, investment, trade and production. Data 
from the 2002 IO table (122 sectors) and the 2007 IO table (135 sectors), China’s energy statistical 
yearbooks and a variety of supplementary sources are used. One key contribution of the thesis is to 
place analysis of energy use in the context of China’s broad economic development, drawing on 
economic growth literature to do so. The second central contribution in contrast to existing literature 
is extensive interpretation of results. The results indicate China’s very rapid energy use growth 
between 2002 and 2005 may have been a temporary effect linked to China’s WTO membership. 
China’s manufacturing export boom beginning in 2002 drove a large portion of the energy use 
growth, while energy-saving technological improvements declined between 2002-2005. Longer-term 
drivers are urbanisation, increasing household consumption, and resumption of policy- as well as 
market-driven energy saving technological progress. Technological progress has been most evident 
in traded goods sectors, especially importing sectors. A shift to petroleum rather than coal-based 
energy was observed. The 12th Five Year Plan calls for significantly slower energy use growth. The 
analysis suggests implementing changes required to meet energy-use targets will be challenging. In 
particular, the plan calls for a substantial reduction in investment growth and a shift in production 
toward services that has so far been elusive. China’s energy future carries very important strategic 
implications. Hundreds of millions of Chinese are now aspiring to higher standards of living, inevitably 
requiring ever more supplies of energy. Understanding the drivers of China’s energy-use growth is 
crucial if it is to be managed so as to ameliorate the problems associated with energy use while still 
ensuring the Chinese people can realize their aspirations toward a healthier, more comfortable and 
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Chapter(1. Introduction(
The transformation of China’s economy since 1978 is one of the most profound 
economic transformations in history. Among the most important dimensions of 
China’s transformation is the way rapid economic growth drove energy 
consumption.  
The relationship between energy use and economic activity is never constant, 
especially in a country such as China, undergoing rapid economic transformation 
including major technological and structural changes. On the technological side, 
the amount and type of energy used for production is changing rapidly. On the 
structural side, what is produced and consumed in China is also changing 
dramatically. Analysing energy in the Chinese economy needs to account explicitly 
for these transformations. 
In this context, the thesis attempts to answer the questions: 
• Why has China’s consumption of energy grown so rapidly since 2002? 
• Is China’s economy peculiar in its huge and rapidly-growing consumption of 
energy or does it conform with the experiences of other countries when they 
were at similar stages of economic development? 
• What are the implications for China’s energy future? 
A central objective of the thesis is to analyse the impact of the economic 
transformation in China on the relationship between China’s energy use and 
economic growth, especially since 2002. The thesis draws on the economic growth 
and stages of development literature to explain China’s economic transformation 
and contextualises that transformation with reference to the experiences of already 
developed countries. It aims to fill a gap in the literature on China’s energy use 
created by insufficient attention to the impact of structural transformation on the 
relationship between economic growth and energy use, exacerbated by a shift in 
scholarly attention from energy use to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 
around 2005. Input-Output Analysis (IOA) and Structural Decomposition Analysis 
(SDA) are employed to isolate energy relationships with rural and urban household 
consumption, government expenditure, investment, trade and production. Data 
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from the 2002 IO table (122 sectors) and the 2007 IO table (135 sectors), China’s 
energy statistical yearbooks and a variety of supplementary sources are used. One 
key contribution of the thesis is to place analysis of energy use in the context of 
China’s broad economic development, drawing on economic growth literature to 
do so. A second central contribution in contrast to existing literature is extensive 
interpretation of results. 
Probably the main reason China is such an exciting subject to study is the pace, 
scale and impact of the changes it is presently undergoing. In his imagery-rich 
description of being one of the first passengers on board China’s CRH380A (the 
new high-speed rail connection between Beijing and Shanghai) Simon Winchester 
wrote, “for those of us who look on China from afar, the changes are dramatic and 
obvious. But, for the Chinese themselves, proud of their so ancient lineage and 
their cherished customs and traditions, they are surely experiencing change at 
such a rate that some can barely know who they are” (Winchester 2011). Pre-
industrial China is still a matter of living memory for some Chinese. In such a 
dynamic context understanding why China consumes as much energy as it does, 
and drawing sensible lessons about China’s energy future and its impacts on the 
world require a broad historical perspective as well as in-depth analysis. 
Economic activity is inescapably linked to the ‘consumption’ of energy. This 
inescapability is a consequence of the first law of thermodynamics, a statement of 
the principle of conservation of energy (Planck 1945): “during an interaction 
between a system and its surroundings, the [change] in energy [experienced] by the 
system must be exactly equal to the [change] in energy [experienced] by the 
surroundings” (Cengel and Boles 1989). Because the change in energy of a system 
occurs either as heat or as work, all work involves a change in energy. But what a 
physicist would call a change in energy, an economist would call a consumption of 
energy,2 with the corollary that all work involves a consumption of energy (in an 
economic sense). Since economic activity is inevitably linked to energy use, the 
nature of that link merits understanding.  
                                                
2 In physics, a change of energy may involve the change of state from potential energy stored in fossil 
fuels such as coal, to a combination of heat, work and other forms of energy that maintain the total 
quantity of energy. In an economic sense, the value of the coal has been used to create something 
else of value, thus the physical change of energy can be described as a consumption of energy 
despite the total amount of energy existing being maintained. 
 3 
Adapting Christian (2009), the history of human use of energy has four chapters: 
the palaeolithic, agrarian, fossil-fuel and renewable-energy eras.3 During the 
palaeolithic era, the principle method of getting energy was foraging and the main 
use of energy was feeding oneself. Around 11,000 years ago humans entered the 
agrarian era with the establishment of farming methods: an energy bonanza that 
“could support perhaps 50 times as many people as foraging” (Christian 2009). The 
main use for energy remained feeding, but during the agrarian era more populous 
settlements were able to generate a small energy surplus that could support a 
fraction of the population as ‘elites’ and allowed employment in crafts and other 
specialisations.  The small energy surpluses generated during the agrarian era 
facilitated the capital accumulation that was a necessary condition for moving into 
the third chapter of energy use.  
Two hundred years ago humans stumbled on a second energy bonanza in fossil 
fuels. The transition to an energy-economy based on fossil fuels was a critical part 
of a broader convergence of economic, technological and social changes 
collectively known as the industrial revolution. Birnie (1930) describes the industrial 
revolution as the beginning of a series of technological progressions and 
adaptations that centred on efforts to use energy (usually stored in wood or coal) to 
turn wheels and drive machinery. From that point, humans were able to use energy 
to do work without the direct involvement of their own physical labour. Thus 
economic growth and energy use are not only inevitably related, but the 
relationship is inevitably changing – sometimes radically so. 
In each of the first three chapters of humanity’s energy-story, the relationship 
between the energy use and the economy was radically transformed. Economists 
who study fields in which population dynamics are important (such as fisheries) will 
be familiar with the logistics-curve, or S-curve originally proposed by Verhulst 
(Cramer 2003) that describes population growth. The population dynamics 
described by a logistics-curve begins from a low population with accelerating 
growth, up to an inflection point where growth begins to slow and eventually stops. 
One example of a mechanism by which populations can be constrained at the 
upper limit of the S-curve was identified by Thomas Malthus when he wrote, “the 
                                                
3 Christian identifies only three eras: the palaeolithic, agrarian and modern. It is my belief 
that we are currently in a transition stage into a fourth energy era, namely a renewable-
energy era, thus the separation of the modern era into the fossil-fuel and renewable-energy 
eras. 
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power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce 
subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the 
human race” (Malthus 1798). Human ability to extract resources acted as a limit to 
population growth throughout both the palaeolithic and the agrarian eras. The 
sheer amount of energy unlocked in fossil fuels has shifted the energy constraint on 
population so far that it has not been binding for 200 years. 
The ‘big history’4 of energy offers several points that provide a helpful context for 
studying the relationship between China’s economy and energy use in recent 
years. Firstly, that economic activity is inescapably linked to energy consumption. 
Secondly, that historically, economic transformation and development have 
entailed fundamental changes to the relationship between economic activity and 
energy consumption. Thirdly, the fossil-fuel era is the period in which per-capita 
energy supply has grown at the most tremendous rate. But this is not the end of 
history as far as energy and the economy are concerned; we are already moving 
out of the fossil-fuel era with its dependence on finite energy-stocks and embarking 
on a renewable-energy era that once more embraces energy-flows. 
The increasingly apparent limits of the third chapter the big history of energy has 
inspired a great deal of concern regarding sustainability.5 The writings of Malthus 
have been subjected to repeated revivals over recent decades, most forcefully in 
response to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and more recently due to concern 
about the impact of global GHG emissions (largely due to combustion of fossil fuels 
for energy) on the earth’s climate system. We are entering a fourth chapter in the 
history of human energy use: the renewable energy era. The changes during this 
transition may be in many ways as profound as the changes between earlier 
chapters of that story. 
In China, where economic growth over the past thirty years has lifted more people 
out of poverty in a shorter time than any in any other place at any other time in 
history, the fear that energy will become a binding constraint on continued 
economic growth is now a major driver of national policy decisions. That same fear 
is also a powerful influence in global geopolitics, including the Sino-US relationship 
and China’s relations with its Asian neighbours, with Africa, Eastern Europe, the 
                                                
4 ‘Big history’ is a recent field of history that begins with the Big Bang and moves up to the 
present day (Christian, Big History Project 2011). 
5 Lackner & Sachs (2005) provide an overview of these concerns. 
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Middle East, Western Asia and Australia. China’s growing demand for energy (and 
other minerals) is now also responsible for a major structural transition of the 
Australian economy and there are indications that several energy-rich African 
states are being similarly impacted (Hurst 2012).  
‘Energy’ may constrain growth in two critical ways. First, because all economic 
activity depends in one way or another upon energy, supply shortfalls or 
unexpectedly high prices can dramatically constrain production. Second, there is 
now overwhelming evidence that much of the way we use energy has undesirable 
externalities, including with potentially destabilising effects on the earth’s climate 
system, but also other forms of localised pollution and in China’s case, 
considerable health concerns. Destabilisation of the earth’s climate certainly falls 
into the category of a potentially binding constraint on economic growth. 
The importance of energy to economic growth coupled with a tendency to view 
matters such as economic growth in national terms has led to concepts such as 
‘energy independence’ and ‘energy security’. Energy independence is generally 
taken to mean the ability of a country to supply its energy needs through its 
domestic resource endowments, see for example Obama (2009). Energy security is 
a less exacting ambition, meaning the ability of a country to have reasonable 
assurance of access to sufficient energy supplies such that energy would not 
constrain economic growth, see for example The White House (2012). These 
ambitions are rooted in a supply-side conception of energy use. This is the same 
cognitive framework that underpins the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, where 
each signatory is obliged to report (and in the case of Annex B countries, limit) 
GHG emissions occurring within its borders, but no country is obliged to report or 
limit the GHG emissions generated elsewhere in supplying that nation’s 
consumption. 
China’s energy consumption has come under particular scrutiny in recent years. In 
the politics of climate change, opponents of action in countries such as Australia or 
the United States often point to China as dwarfing their own nation’s contributions 
to GHG emissions therefore rendering their own efforts futile, for example Bolt 
(2011). The argument is based on supply-side concepts of energy-use that 
disregards demand-side concepts of embodied GHG emissions. Meanwhile, the 
shift to Asia of the global economy including China’s economic transformation has 
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profound implications for all economies. For instance, supplying China with the raw 
materials required to meet its demand for energy is currently forcing a major 
adjustment in the Australian economy amongst many others. For these reasons, 
and others, studying the relationship between economic growth and energy 
remains a matter of priority. 
 
The rest of this chapter provides the context of China’s energy use, introduces 
some of the factors that confound analysis of the energy – economic growth 
relationship, sets out the approach to the problem taken in the thesis, outlines the 
structure of the thesis and identifies some of its main contributions. As is often the 
way, to answer these questions many preliminary questions will be raised, and 
many more will follow. The first such question is just how much energy is China 
consuming? 
Energy'use'in'China:'recent'trends'
On 20 July 2010 the International Energy Agency (IEA) announced that preliminary 
data showed that China was the “world’s largest energy user” (IEA 2010). The IEA 
noted that China’s energy demand7 had doubled over the decade to 2010 and that 
prospects for future growth were strong, given China’s low per-capita energy 
consumption relative to the OECD average.  
China’s energy use grew rapidly after 2001 to occupy top position by 2009 (IEA 
2010). Figure 1.1 shows that China’s energy use took almost thirty years to double, 
from just under 400 mtoe in 1970 to just over 1,000 mtoe in 2001. China’s energy-
use next doubled three times faster: almost passing 2,000 mtoe in 2007, by which 
time China was consuming more energy than the entire European Union.8 
                                                
7 See the “Energy Statistics Manual” (IEA 2005) for a guide to terminology and concepts. 
8 An important caveat is the data excludes ‘natural’ energy use, thus some of the growth in 
energy use is more accurately a substitution from unmeasured ‘natural’ energy use to 
measured, industrialised energy use. 
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Figure 1.1: Total energy use (China and other countries) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
 
While China’s energy use is large in national terms, its per capita energy use is low 
in comparison to many other countries. Figure 1.2 shows China’s energy 
consumption per capita in comparison with that of other countries plotted against 
GDP per capita. The data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
and include 157 reporting countries or regions over the period 1980 to 2007. Some 
countries with very high energy-use per capita have been omitted, including 
Kuwait, Qatar, Iceland, The United Arab Emirates, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Bahrain. The values for GDP per capita are the World Bank’s purchasing power 
parity (PPP) values, using constant 2005 levels. China appears as the red circles, 
while most other countries are grey. It is immediately obvious from Figure 1.2 that 
both China’s energy use per capita and China’s GDP per capita are relatively low. It 
is also clear that at higher income levels there is greater diversity of energy use per 
capita, with Hong Kong, Ireland and Japan achieving high levels of GDP per capita 
with low levels of energy use, and the United States, Canada and Australia 
exhibiting similar levels of income but much higher levels of energy use.   
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Figure 1.2: Energy per capita vs GDP per capita (157 countries and regions, 
1980-2007) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
  
It is an open question as to whether China will end up with energy use per capita 
similar to that of Japan (low) or the United States (high). The simple trend line, 
shown in Figure 1.2, projecting China’s average growth of energy use per capita 
forward to a point where its GDP per capita reaches PPP$40,000, would result in a 
level of energy use per capita very similar to the current level of the United States. If 
that were to occur, China’s total energy use would increase by more than five times 
(assuming no population growth). This would occur within 20 years if China’s GDP 
were to continue to grow at double-digit rates. Even if China’s future growth occurs 
at the lower rates (around 6 to 8 per cent) most economists expect, the energy 
demand will be very large. Whether such demand for energy is within the earth’s 
tolerable limits is uncertain. These issues underline the interest here in 





There is an abundance of research analysing the link between economic growth 
and energy consumption, but despite all the attention this relationship has received 
over the decades the framework for thinking about and understanding it is still 
inadequate. We lack a theory that satisfactorily relates energy use to economic 
growth in the context of rapidly changing economic structure. Part of the problem 
is explained by Bill Adams of PNC: “the underlying assumption of most models is 
that relationships in the future will be the same as relationships in the past. In China 
that is often not the case” (Orlik 2011). There are a number of factors that confound 
the study of the relationship between energy use and economic growth in China, 
some of which are raised here. 
The'Kuznets'curve'for'energy'intensity'
One contender for a theory relating energy use to economic growth, while 
accommodating a changing economic structure, is the Kuznets curve for energy 
intensity. In a landmark 1960 study Energy in the American Economy, Schurr and 
colleagues documented a striking historical phenomenon:  
that over the period 1880-1955 the relationship between the 
consumption of energy… and growth of gross national product 
(GNP) in the United States had been characterized by two 
distinctly different long-term trends, separated roughly by World 
War I. Before World War I the consumption of energy relative to 
GNP had been generally rising while after the war it had 
persistently declined (Schurr 1984, 409). 
The observation is depicted in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3: United States energy intensity (1880-1980) 
 
Source: Data estimated from Schurr (1984) 
 
A similar trend has been observed repeatedly in other countries (see Figure 1.4) 
leading to the hypothesis that a Kuznets curve for energy-intensity exists as a result 
of the economic development process. An important caveat here is that the 
Kuznets curve9 appears to break down if traditional biomass consumption is 
included. Including traditional fuels, energy intensity appears to decline from an 
initial peak (Stern 2011). Further, cross-country analyses typically fail to 
demonstrate strong adherence to such a model. For example, Lenzen et al (2006) 
conclude that their data do “not support the existence of a single, uniform cross-
country relationship between energy requirements and household expenditure.” 
Additionally, the Kuznets curve is only an approximate description of empirical 
observations and is not, itself, a theoretical explanation for those observations. 
                                                
9 So named after Simon Kuznets 1955 observation of rising then falling income inequality in 
a cross-section of countries plotted against time (McKay et al. 2010)  
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Figure 1.4: Energy intensity: UK, USA, Germany, France, Japan (1840-1990) 
 
Source: Data estimated from McKay and Song (2009) 
 
For Schurr, explaining the initial rise in energy intensity was relatively simple: the 
change from a predominantly labour-based economy to a predominantly industrial 
and machine-based economy necessitated the increasing use of fossil fuels. It was 
the opposing trend that required a less intuitive explanation. The starting point for 
Schurr’s search to explain these opposing trends was the hypothesis that two 
factors likely caused the post-war decline in energy intensity: technological change 
and the “changing composition of national output toward lighter manufacturing 
industries and services that, on average, used less energy per unit of output than 
the heavy industries that had been more dominant in the past”, or structural 
change.  
An approximate Kuznets’ curve for energy intensity in China also exists, though it is 
complicated by China’s history of central planning. Figure 1.5 shows the energy 
intensity of the Chinese economy from 1952. The Great Leap Forward, which 
began in 1958 and continued until 1961 stands out as the fist peak – a major 
deviation from trend. As soon as the Great Leap Forward ended, China’s energy 
intensity reverted to its long-term trend, resuming its upward trajectory in 1967. The 
final peak energy intensity occurred in 1977, the year after Mao Zedong’s death 
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and the beginning of China’s transition toward an open, market-based economy. 
From then on, the energy intensity of the Chinese economy fell every year until 
2002 (Figures 1.5 and 1.6). 
Figure 1.5: Energy intensity of the Chinese economy (1952-2009) 
 
Source:  
Red: China Energy Databook (Fridley and Aden 2008, 4B.2) 
Blue: World Bank World Development Indicators (2011), normalised: 1980=398.55 
 
Figure 1.6: Energy intensity of the Chinese economy (2000-2007) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2011) 
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Explaining the increase in China’s energy intensity between 2002 and 2004 is 
essential to understanding China’s post-2000 energy boom. A strict Kuznets curve 
framework is not sufficient to this task, and such a framework should not be used 
as a strict guide in this analysis. 
Lewisian'Turning'Point' '
China’s economy is currently in a period of structural evolution such that the 
relationship between energy consumption and economic growth is changing with 
uncertain outcome. One driver of structural change in China that complicates the 
relationship between energy and economic growth may be characterised by the 
Lewis model of transition to labour scarcity. In 2006 Ross Garnaut and Ligang 
Song wrote:  
China has reached (or is fast approaching) the turning point in its 
economic development, at which ‘surplus’ labour from agricultural 
employment in the countryside ceases to be available to drive the 
growth of the modern economy; so that labour becomes scarce 
and valuable; forcing large real wage increases and real exchange 
rate appreciation; which generate structural change towards more 
capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated industrial 
structure at the relative expense of labour-intensive 
manufacturing and agriculture; and changes fundamentally the 
character of China’s interaction with the international economy. 
(Garnaut and Song 2006, 2) 
In 2010 Garnaut presented new evidence that China was progressing through a 
‘turning period’ and elaborated the implications of associated structural changes. 
Those implications include a shift in comparative advantage away from labour-
intensive products toward “more capital-intensive and technologically 
sophisticated products” (Garnaut 2010). 
Athukorala et al. (2009) point to widespread concerns that China’s “easy phase of 
economic transition fuelled by surplus labour is rapidly coming to an end”. They 
explain that the concern is based on rapid increases in wages in China’s coastal 
urban areas and reports of labour scarcity in the business press (see for example 
Bloomberg (2010), Barboza (2010) or Bradsher (2011)), a process that has only 
accelerated since 2009 according to recent reports of competition for workers 
amongst China’s provinces (Lu 2011). 
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Cai Fang and others identify one apparent consequence of the disparity in rising 
coastal wages, which they refer to as “flying geese within borders” (Cai, Wang and 
Yue 2009). The flying geese model was introduced as a method of explaining how 
Japan might be able to catch up to more technologically advanced countries in the 
West in the 1960s. It later came to be used to interpret the development 
experiences of the East Asian ‘tiger’ economies. Applied to China’s provinces, it 
predicts a process of industrial transfer across regions as a consequence of 
changing comparative advantages: as unskilled wages in coastal provinces rise, 
industries that rely on unskilled labour shift to lower-wage provinces, while the 
higher wage provinces experience booms in other industries based on their new 
comparative advantage (likely to be service sector industries given China’s rate of 
producing university graduates).  
There is strong debate as to whether China is in fact undergoing such a Lewisian 
transition as described by Garnaut. Meng and Bai (2007) and Golley and Meng 
(2011) argue that China’s transition through a Lewisian turning point is difficult to 
establish based on systematic statistical evidence and that labor market factors 
such as China’s hukou10 system may create the illusion of a Lewisian turning point, 
with symptoms of rising wages even though there are still many unskilled workers 
that could be made available given certain policy changes.  
Regardless of the labour market dynamics, wages for low-skilled work in China, 
especially coastal, urban China, are increasing. As wages rise, production patterns 
adjust; as factor prices rebalance, comparative advantage evolves and trade 
patterns are affected; and as households become richer, consumption patterns 
change. These changes to consumption, production and trade patterns all point to 
a dynamic relationship between energy use and economic growth that complicates 
analysis. The vastness of China and its peculiar internal migration laws further 
complicate the relationship. How this period of transition affects energy use will 
depend on a wide variety of factors including labour market frictions such as the 
hukou system, relative prices of factors such land, resources, capital and labour, 
and trade issues.  
                                                
10 The Hukou system is a residential permit system that controls population movement 
within China (Liu 2005). 
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WTO'membership'
A further complication and source of structural change is China’s relatively recent 
participation in the WTO. As China continues to open up to global market forces 
and the importance of the private sector within China’s overall economy increases, 
production in China has moved toward its natural comparative advantages. China’s 
economy shifted to take advantage of abundant cheap labour with a resulting 
boom in manufacturing sectors. The consequent adjustments to China’s 
production patterns have further altered the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth. 
Central'planning'
Finally, the relationship between energy and economic growth is complicated in 
China due to the government’s attempt to guide the structure of the economy 
through the implementation of successive national economic plans. Since the sixth 
five-year plan beginning in 1981, China has placed heavy emphasis on energy 
conservation, expressed in terms of reducing national energy-intensity.  
It has become abundantly clear that China’s central government considers the 
possibility of energy acting as a binding constraint on growth as a matter of highest 
concern. All twelve of the five-year plans, beginning with the first, in 1953, have 
incorporated an energy component, but the approach and urgency has changed 
over the years (Yuan and Zuo 2011). The first ten of these plans, covering the years 
1953 to 2005, included explicit coal production targets, while the sixth to the tenth 
(1981 to 2005) also incorporated a total energy production target. Since the sixth 
plan a major component of the energy section has been to focus on improving 
energy efficiency, rather than expanding energy production. Five of the last seven 
plans included specific targets for reducing national energy intensity, the ratio of 
total energy consumption to total GDP (see Table 1.1). 
The eleventh and twelfth plans represent a shift in the thinking of the Chinese 
government as the new generation of leaders under Hu Jintao have sought to 
establish their mark on China’s development. The urgency and detail of the energy 
section of the eleventh and twelfth five-year plans are far beyond those of earlier 
plans. To appreciate the government’s determination to influence the use of energy 
in the economy we need to consider in some detail the eleventh and twelfth plans.  
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Table 1.1: Energy targets in China's Five Year Plans 
Sixth Plan 1981-85 Energy intensity cut by 2.6 to 3. 5 per cent by 1985 
Seventh Plan 1986-90 Energy intensity cut from 1.29 tce to 1.14 tce by 1990 
Eighth Plan 1991-95 Energy intensity cut from 0.93 to 0.85 by 1995 
Ninth Plan 1996-00 No explicit target 
Tenth Plan 2001-05 No explicit target 
Eleventh Plan 2006-10 Energy intensity to decrease 20 per cent by 2010 
Twelfth Plan 2011-15 Energy intensity to decrease 16 per cent by 2015 
Source: Yuan and Zuo (2011) 
 
On 19 March, 2006 Ma Kai, Minister of the National Development and Reform 
Commission announced that the Fourth Session of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had approved its eleventh five 
year plan.  The plan had two key concepts: “the scientific concept of development” 
and “building a socialist harmonious society” (K. Ma 2006).  Ma announced that 
China’s annual GDP growth was expected to average 7.5 percent during the 
eleventh plan period (2006-2010), so that GDP would reach 26.1 trillion RMB 
(19,270 RMB per capita) (US$3.2 trillion and US$2,400 respectively, using 
expected market exchange rate values). 
The “quality” of economic growth was to be improved, the service industry was to 
increase as a proportion of total GDP and the use of resources was to become 
more efficient. Specifically, energy consumption per unit of GDP was to be lowered 
by 20 per cent. This was to happen while 45 million people moved from rural to 
urban environments during the five year period, raising the urbanization rate to 47 
per cent. 
Ma proclaimed,  
To realize the above-mentioned great prospects, we should stick 
to the guidance of the Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important 
thoughts of “Three Represents”, adhere to the Scientific Concept 
of Development for the guidance of economic and social 
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development, maintain stable and fast economic growth, improve 
independent innovation capacity, accelerate the transformation of 
economic growth mode, promote economic restructuring and 
balanced development of urban and rural areas, enhance the 
building of a harmonious society, and continue deepening reform 
and opening-up. (K. Ma 2006) 
According to the State Council of China (2007), development was to be promoted 
through six strategies. The first was to expand domestic demand (primarily 
household consumption) and shift away from investment and export-driven growth. 
The second was to “optimize industrial structure”. Ma observed that the secondary 
industry accounted for 47.3 per cent of China’s GDP, while the services industry 
had fallen from 41.7 per cent in 2002 to 40.3 per cent in 2006. The conclusion 
China’s leaders drew was that the economic structure increased the pressure on 
resources and the environment. The third was to improve the environmental and 
resource efficiency of its economy. China’s leaders perceived an “increasingly 
prominent contradiction between economic growth and resources and environment 
constraints” (State Council of China 2007). The remaining strategies were 
enhancing innovation, deepening reform, and “relying on the people-centered 
approach” (State Council of China 2007). A number of specific numerical targets 
were also announced for the period 2006-2010. Those that are pertinent include: 
• GDP to grow by 7.5 per cent annually, from 18.2 trillion RMB in 2005 to 26.1 
trillion RMB in 2010 
• GDP per capita to increase 6.6 per cent 
• Service sector to increase from 40.4 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 43.3 per 
cent in 2010 
• Population to increase from 1.30756 billion in 2005 to 1.36 billion in 2010 
• Energy consumption per unit of GDP down 20 per cent in five years 
• 45 million rural labourers transferred to non-agricultural sectors  (Xinhua 
2006) 
The plan identifies a number of strategies to meet its energy target: 
While advancing the work of saving energy and reducing 
emissions, the Chinese government depends on structural 
adjustment as the fundamental approach, on scientific and 
technological advances as the key, on improved administrations 
as a crucial measure, on the strengthening of law enforcement as 
an important guarantee, on the deepening of the reform as an 
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internal motive force, and on public participation as the social 
foundation. (State Council of China 2007) 
Structural adjustment is identified as a central strategy to meeting the energy 
targets. Of the five strategies identified by the State Council it explains structural 
adjustment thus: 
The major reasons for low efficiency of energy utilization for a long 
time have been the extensive mode of economic growth and a 
high proportion of high energy-consuming industries in China. The 
country will put the transformation of the development pattern 
and the adjustment of the industrial structure and of the internal 
structures of industries in the key place for the energy-
conservation strategy, and work hard to bring into being a pattern 
of economic development with ‘low input, low consumption, less 
emission and high efficiency.’ China will accelerate the 
optimization and upgrading of its industrial structure, make 
energetic efforts to develop high- and new-tech industries and the 
service trades, set strict limits on the development of high energy- 
material- and water-consuming industries, and eliminate 
industries with backward productivity, so as to fundamentally 
change the pattern of economic development and put in place an 
energy-saving industrial system on an early date. (State Council of 
China 2007) 
Irrespective of the contribution of each of these various strategies, we can see from 
Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 how successful China has been in surpassing its key 
targets.  
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Figure 1.7: Eleventh Five-Year Plan GDP targets versus actual 
 
GDP is measured in trillions of current valued RMB 
GDP per capita is measured in thousands of current valued RMB 
Source: NBSC (2011) 
 
Figure 1.8: Eleventh Five-Year Plan energy intensity targets versus actual 
 
Source: NBSC (2011) 
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China surpassed its per capita income target within months of it being announced. 
Similarly, the five-year goal for total GDP was easily met within three years. The 
services share of GDP is also on track to surpass the target level. Figure 1.8 shows 
that, according to China’s official data at least, the targeted reduction in energy 
intensity has also been surpassed two years ahead of schedule.  
The eleventh plan included a strong focus on energy intensity, setting out 
apparently ambitious goals that have, according to China’s official data, been 
surpassed (see Figure 1.8). The emphasis on efficiency was already a major break 
from the focus in previous plans. The above policy-related discussion 
demonstrates the extent to which China’s central government influence over the 
economy can complicate the analysis of the relationship between economic growth 
and energy use. 
In 2011, China announced the twelfth five-year plan, which has been described as 
“likely to go down in history as one of China’s boldest strategic initiatives” (Roach 
2011). The twelfth plan covers the years 2011-2015. In considering implications of 
the analysis of the thesis for China’s energy future, the twelfth Five-Year Plan offers 
an important benchmark scenario. 
Under the twelfth Five-Year Plan China has set a target of reaching GDP per capita 
levels of US$10,000 by 2020 (Dickinson 2011). The twelfth plan describes an 
ambition of substantially restructuring the economy. There are four main foci of the 
transformation planned: 
1. Domestic-led consumption to replace export-led consumption 
2. A balance between exports, imports and domestic consumption to replace 
export reliance 
3. Domestic innovation to avert a reliance on imported technology 
4. Low-carbon based energy, materials and industrial system (Dickinson 2011). 
Except for the use of domestic innovation as a substitute for imported technology, 
these strategies have considerable implications for analyzing the relationship 
between energy and economic growth in China. They also provide a useful base 




The complicating factors discussed above interact in ways that are not easy to 
predict so that the net effect on the energy-economic growth relationship is difficult 
to untangle. Consequently, existing frameworks that attempt to explain the overall 
relationship between energy use and economic growth are inadequate. The thesis 
adopts a different approach: it treats the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth as the aggregate of several relationships, namely energy use with 
production, consumption, investment and trade. 
In an open economy trade allows the relationship between energy-use and 
production to be determined independently of the relationship between energy-use 
and consumption. This can be demonstrated with a simple two-country, two-good, 
two-period example (Table 1.2).  
Country A has a lower income than country B, with a GDP of 10 in period 1 
compared with 20 for country B, but has a faster growth rate reaching a GDP of 20 
by period 2, while country B reaches a GDP of 30. The stage of economic 
development of country A is also reflected in the consumption profiles. In the first 
period, 70 per cent of country A’s consumption is of the energy-intensive product 
(this can be thought of as manufactured goods, for example), but in the second 
period this proportion falls to 60 per cent. On the production side, however, 
country A is a completely specialised economy, producing only the energy-
intensive product. Country B produces only the amount of energy-intensive 
produce required to satisfy its demand for that product above what can be 
imported from country A. The rest of country B’s output is focused on the non-
energy intensive product (this can be thought of as services, for example). 
There is no debt allowed in this example, so as each country grows, both their 
production and consumption remain balanced. Yet the energy requirement for 
goods produced in each country is not equal to the energy requirement for goods 
consumed in each country. In country A, energy used for production is initially 50 
units and grows to 100 units, but energy used for consumption is only 38 units, 
growing to 68 units. While GDP doubles, and energy use for production doubles, 
energy use for consumption increases by only 80 per cent. This is because country 
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A is a net exporter of embodied energy (and increasingly so). The energy used for 
goods consumed in a country is referred to as embodied energy. Calculating 
embodied energy in real-world examples relies upon input-output analysis (IOA) 
and is the basis for much of the thesis. 
Clearly studying the relationship between energy and economic growth requires 
separate analysis for the relationship between energy and production and the 
relationship between energy and consumption. However, consumption itself is not 
a homogenous category. The basic macroeconomic identity,
, states that total output is equivalent to household consumption, plus government 
expenditure, plus investments, plus exports, minus imports. Input-Output (IO) 
tables are structured in a manner that accords with that identity, so that through 
IOA we can find intensity coefficients for output of any sector to total or sector-
specific consumption of any or all of the expenditure categories on the right hand 
side of the identity. To perfectly match China’s IO tables, the consumption identity 
can be slightly modified: , where is urban 
household consumption, is rural household consumption and  is changes in 
inventories.  
This thesis separates the components of this basic macroeconomic identity into 
four components, with separate chapters dedicated to studying the relationship 
between energy and each of those four components. The four are (1) production, 
(2) rural, urban and government consumption, (3) investment, and (4) exports and 
imports. Although changes in inventories appear in the data, there will be no 
discussion of its determinants or relationship to energy use since it generally 
amounts to a small contribution with no trend. Rural and urban household 
consumption and government consumption are treated together since they are all 
categories of final consumption. While government consumption is not described 
by the same theoretical determinants, it is of relatively small importance to energy 
demand in China and does not need to be dealt with in its own chapter. Given the 
logic of IOA, we might wish to describe government as simply another firm offering 
services to households. However, the structure of IO tables does not facilitate this 
type of analysis. The IO tables provide data regarding government purchases from 
all sectors but do not include data regarding government sales to any sectors: both 
are necessary for IOA. Government is therefore best treated with household 
consumption as an additional, separately determined form of consumption. Since 
Y ≡ C +G + I + X −M
Y ≡ CUH +CRH +G + I + ci + X −M CUH
CRH ci
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rural and urban households are not completely equivalent and yet are sensibly 
grouped together, there is a precedent for grouping expenditure categories in the 
analysis. Investment and trade are sufficiently distinct from other forms of final 
expenditure that they do deserve separate chapters. 
Table 1.2: 2x2x2 model: energy for consumption and production with trade 
Period 1 
Consumption    Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Country A 7 3 10 
Country B 12 8 20 
World 19 11 30 
Production    Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Country A 10 0 10 
Country B 9 11 20 
World 19 11 30 
 
Period 2 
Consumption    Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Country A 12 8 20 
Country B 15 15 30 
World 27 23 50 
Production    Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Country A 20 0 20 
Country B 7 23 30 
World 27 23 50 
 
Energy-use  
Country A    Period 1 Period 2 Growth 
Energy for production 50 100 2.0 
Energy for consumption 38 68 1.8 
Country B 
   
Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Energy for production 56 58 1.0 
Energy for consumption 68 90 1.3 
World    Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Energy-use 106 158 1.5 
Net energy embodied in 
exports (country A) 
   
Energy Intensive Non-Energy Intensive Total 
Period 1 15 -3 12 
Period 2 40 -8 32 
Note: Energy-intensive good requires 5 units of energy to produce 




The relationship of energy use to production, consumption and trade informs the 
structure of the thesis: one chapter is devoted to analyzing each of these 
relationships separately. Because the methodologies employed in each chapter 
overlap, a separate chapter, Chapter 2, is devoted specifically to methodological 
issues. Chapter 2 provides justification for the methodologies used, places the 
approach within the context of the existing literature and provides a treatment of 
essential technical issues. It introduces some of the major technical challenges 
faced when performing the analysis and justifies how these challenges have been 
dealt with. The key contributions of Chapter 2 are to present a method of 
disaggregating IO tables in order to minimize aggregation bias, and generating 
compatible IO tables for China in the years 2002 and 2007 that facilitate the 
analysis in the thesis. 
Chapter 3 deals with the relationship between energy use and economic output. 
The key contribution of Chapter 3 is to quantify on an annual basis from 1995 to 
2007 the relative importance of technological, structural and quantity effects on the 
production side, in relation to their impact on energy use in China. Chapter 3 also 
places China’s economic output in the context of the stages-of-growth literature 
and draws implications for China’s energy future. 
Chapter 4 deals with energy use and domestic consumption and is the first of the 
three chapters that rely on the concept of embodied energy. The main contribution 
of the chapter is to quantify the impact on China’s energy use of changes to the 
consumption patterns of rural households, urban households and government 
consumption between 2002 and 2007. By analyzing China’s household and 
government consumption trends in relation to the experience of developed 
countries at similar stages of development, Chapter 4 draws implications of the 
relationship between energy use and consumption given possible future 
consumption patterns in China, assuming that certain features of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan come to fruition. 
Chapter 5 deals with energy use and investment. The main contribution of Chapter 
5 is to calculate the energy embodied in investment in China and to identify which 
sectors were the most important drivers of energy embodied in investment 
between 2002 and 2007. The analysis provides a foundation for considering the 
 25 
implications for China’s energy future of possible investment patterns under 
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. 
Chapter 6 deals with energy use and international trade. The main contribution of 
Chapter 6 is to quantify the impact on energy embodied in trade due to 
technological progress in China and changes to China’s trade patterns between 
2002 and 2007. The chapter also identifies a difference in the energy efficiency 
gains in traded sectors relative to non-traded sectors that may have important 
policy implications. 
Each of the four analytical chapters (Chapters 3 to 6) follow a similar structure. 
They all begin with a conceptualization of how energy is used in each dimension of 
economic activity. Each chapter then provides a description of the recent history of 
the relationship before laying out a set of propositions that logically justify analysis 
of the relationship premised upon structural change. Those propositions are tested 
and the relative impact on energy use due to structural change, economic growth, 
population growth and technological progress is decomposed. 
Each chapter concludes by considering the implications of the results for issues 
that have been identified as important, such as implications for China’s strategic 
directions outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan.  
The final chapter draws the arguments of previous chapters into a single analysis of 
the nature and causes of recent changes in the relationship between energy 
consumption and economic growth in China’s economy. It draws on the results of 
previous chapters and identifies the key themes resulting from the analysis to 





Understanding the way rapid and transformative economic growth has driven 
energy consumption yields a surprising early challenge: measuring ‘energy use’ is 
not at all as simple as it may seem. Energy itself can only be observed indirectly by 
its effect on the material, but it can be quantified in a plethora of units: jules, watts, 
British thermal units (BTUs), calories, tons of oil equivalent (TOE), tons of coal 
equivalent (TCE, often ‘standard coal equivalent’, SCE, in China). Worse, as energy 
is not actually a tangible substance and according to the law of conservation of 
energy, the total amount of energy in a system remains constant over time, we do 
not ‘use up’ or deplete the total amount of energy available at all. Rather, we 
transform the ‘state’ of energy, from one state to another. In physics, energy can 
exist in several states, often characterised as either potential or kinetic: elastic, 
thermal, electrical, electromagnetic, radiant, nuclear, chemical, sound, mechanical 
and luminous. In an economic context, ‘using’ energy usually relates to the 
transformation of potential energy, stored in some fuel (such as the chemical 
energy stored in coal) into some other form of energy that people find useful or 
derive utility from directly (such as the kinetic energy of a turbine, the electrical 
energy delivered to the electric grid, or the heat energy that warms a home). While 
the energy is not depleted the coal (in this case) is, so the concept of ‘using’ the 
coal is often equated with the concept of ‘using’ the energy stored in the coal. 
While this is not entirely precise, it is sufficient for present purposes.  
Some Chinese energy data is reported as an index of total energy, while other data 
is reported for 18 different fuels: raw coal, cleaned coal, other washed coal, coke, 
coke oven gas, other gas, other coking products, crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, 
diesel oil, fuel oil, LPG, refinery gas, other petroleum products, natural gas, heat 
and electricity (NBSC, 2011). The substitutability between these fuels depends 
upon the use to which they are put. With current technology, washed coal is not a 
good substitute for gasoline in the transport sector, but makes a good substitute 
for oil in the production of electricity (notwithstanding greenhouse gas and other 
environmental or mining safety concerns). However, in general, this thesis is less 
interested in questions of which fuel is used and more interested in questions of 




the nature of the specific analysis, fuel consumption will be aggregated to either a 
single energy index or an index of four fuels: coal, oil and natural gas, coke, and 
non-thermal electric and heat power. The specific conversions relevant to China’s 
data are discussed elsewhere.  
One more distinction is helpful from the perspective of economic analysis: the 
distinction between primary and secondary energy. Primary energy is either 
“extracted or captured directly from natural resources” (IEA, 2005) while secondary 
energy commodities include “all energy commodities which are not primary but are 
produced from primary commodities” (IEA, 2005). Electricity can be either primary 
or secondary energy: electricity generated from solar, hydro, wind or geothermal is 
considered primary since it is captured directly from nature, while electricity 
generated from coal, oil, gas or nuclear is considered secondary since it is 
produced from primary energy sources. 
Settling on a concept of what energy is, what it means to use energy, and how this 
will be measured is clearly the first step toward the aim of the thesis: to 
characterise and understand the relationship between China’s economic growth 
and energy use in recent years. Here the objective is to settle on the most 
appropriate characterisations of ‘energy use’ as well as the most appropriate 
methodologies to study each of these relationships in an economy undergoing 
major economic transformation. The selection of techniques draws on existing 
literature. Although the main relationships analysed are somewhat different, this 
chapter addresses the major methodological questions concerning all of them 
together. This approach is chosen, rather than the alternative approach of 
addressing the methodological issues of each relationship in turn, since there exist 
significant commonality and similarities in the methodologies that are appropriate 
to their study.  
The chapter offers an essential treatment of the techniques used throughout this 
thesis: decomposition analysis and input-output analysis. A substantial body of 
theoretical literature has developed around the techniques adopted here, focusing 
on resolving various data and empirical challenges. Some of the more pertinent 
data and empirical issues that have presented challenges to this thesis and those 





There are two main ways in which energy use is characterised throughout the 
thesis. Chapter 1 suggested a number of reasons for studying the determinants of 
energy use in China, each of which might require different characterisations of 
energy use. It showed that energy has a different relationship with production than 
it does with consumption, investment or trade. These different relationships are 
require different conceptions of energy use. The difference centres on the concepts 
of direct verse embodied energy use. 
Direct energy-use is usually referred to as ‘final energy consumption’ in statistical 
reports and literature that disregards the concept of embodied energy. Final energy 
consumption is defined by the IEA as energy that is used for any purpose other 
than fuel conversion or transformation into other forms of energy (IEA, 2005). In the 
context of economics, the language used to describe energy is often much less 
precise than in the context of physics. Energy ‘used for any purpose other than fuel 
conversion or transformation into other forms of energy’ includes, for example, 
households’ use of electricity to turn on a light, even though from a physicist’s 
perspective that involves the transformation of electrical energy into a combination 
of heat and luminous energy. Direct energy use, or final energy consumption also 
includes the burning of coke in blast furnaces to produce steel. From the 
physicist’s perspective this involves the transformation of the potential chemical 
energy in the coke into heat energy that performs the work of changing the state of 
the components of steel. From the economist’s perspective the fuel (coke) is used 
and the steel is produced. But direct energy use excludes the burning of coal to 
produce electricity. From the physicist’s perspective this involves the 
transformation of the potential chemical energy in coal into heat energy that (in a 
steam turbine system) is then converted into the kinetic energy of moving steam, 
and a moving turbine before being converted into the electrical energy that is sent 
to the grid. From the economist’s perspective it involves the transformation of a 
primary energy source (coal) into a secondary energy source (electricity).  
Embodied, or indirect energy consumption is explained as “the amount of energy 
required to deliver a product to final demand” (Miller & Blair, 2009). In the case of a 
cotton shirt, the embodied energy includes the energy used by: the factory that 




cotton; the firms that produced the fertilizer and equipment used by the farmers; 
the firms that produced the equipment used by the factory and designers; transport 
to get the shirts to market; advertising and retailing firms; the builders who built the 
retail outlet where the shirt was sold; and so on. The concept of embodied energy 
use is substantially different from that of direct energy use. This method of 
characterising energy use is far removed from the physicist’s characterisation, but 
is the best method for the purpose of conceptualising the economic relationship 
between energy use and final consumption. 
Determining which concept should be used depends upon the questions being 
asked. Direct energy consumption is the appropriate concept if we wish to know 
how much energy will be consumed in a particular country during a given time 
period. This is important for many matters including those relating to climate 
change commitments, national energy security concerns, local energy supply 
decisions, and geopolitical questions. Embedded energy consumption is 
appropriate if we wish to know how much energy is required to satisfy the demand 
by a particular group (such as urban households) or for a particular process (such 
as construction of buildings). This is important for analysis of long-term demand 
issues, identifying energy-intensive behaviour and generating awareness of 
responsibility for issues related to energy consumption such as GHG emissions. 
In studying the relationship between energy and production, energy use is 
characterised as direct energy use. This forms the foundation of Chapter 3. In 
studying the relationship between energy and consumption, investment and trade, 
energy use is characterised by indirect, or embodied energy use. This forms the 
foundations of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The choice of how to characterise energy use 
also informs the choice of method for studying the relationships between energy 
use and production, consumption and trade. This choice is the subject of the next 
section. 
Method,selection,
Chapter 1 established this thesis as an inquiry into the nature of the recent 
relationship between China’s economic growth and energy use. There have, over 
recent decades, been many studies of the nature and causes of energy use in 




of three traditions: regression analysis, economic model building, or decomposition 
analysis. The rest of this section provides a brief review of these traditions with 
reference to some of the studies employing each. The techniques used in this 
thesis are all part of the decomposition analysis tradition for reasons that will be 
discussed below. 
Regression,analysis,
Regression analysis of energy use in economics typically attempts to find 
correlations between time series data of energy use and GDP. One common 
approach since the seminal work of Kraft and Kraft (1978) is to look for Granger 
causality in an attempt to determine whether energy consumption leads to 
increased wealth and output or increased wealth and output lead to higher levels of 
energy consumption, or each causes the other. Granger causality tests have 
become a staple of the energy economics literature (see, for instance: Zhang and 
Cheng (2009); Yuan et al. (2008); and Al-Iriani (2006)). However, Stern (2011) argues 
that this body of literature is largely inconclusive. One of the problems with the 
Granger causality approach is a lack of theoretical foundations. 
A second strand of the regression analysis tradition is the environmental Kuznets 
curve (EKC) approach. Evidence that energy-intensity in a country went through an 
early stage of rising as the economy expanded, then eventually peaked and 
subsequently declined dates to the transformative work of Schurr (1960) already 
discussed in Chapter 1. The EKC became much more widely used after Grossman 
and Krueger’s work on the relationship between economic growth and the 
environment (Grossman & Krueger, 1994). Although much of that work focuses on 
environmental pollutants rather than energy-intensity, the link between GHG 
emissions and energy consumption ensures overlap between the bodies of 
literature.  
While there is no doubt that much useful information has been, and can still be, 
gleaned from this type of study, they all share one particular characteristic that 
makes the method unsuitable for the present study. Regression analyses of these 
types assume a constant relationship between the regressor and the explanatory 
variables. But the second premise of this thesis (after the premise that a 




relationship between energy and the economy is not constant, and it is the nature 
of the change in that relationship that is under investigation.  
Analyses in the regression analysis tradition also have a tendency to focus on final 
energy consumption (Wang et al. (2010); Wang and Chandler (2009); Ma and Stern 
(2008); Steenhof (2006); and Phylipsen et al. (2002)). The previous section, 
discussing the appropriate characterisations of energy, emphasised the importance 
of analysing embodied energy when considering the relationships of energy use 
with consumption, investment and trade. Calculating embodied energy has 
particular data requirements (discussed below) that pose insurmountable 
challenges to techniques based on the use of high-frequency data. Regression 
analysis is therefore not an appropriate method to use for this investigation.  
Model,building,
A second widely-used approach to energy analysis is model building. This 
approach essentially involves sets of simultaneous equations that are defined with 
reference to economic theory and usually calibrated with reference to statistical 
analysis. The pioneering effort to establish economic models that incorporated 
intermediate energy demand was made by Hudson and Jorgenson in 1974 (Rose & 
Chen, 1991). Since that paper, there have been numerous studies employing 
flexible function form models based on the KLEM approach of Hudson and 
Jorgenson (1974). Rose and Chen provide the following appraisal of the approach: 
The resulting parameters yield elasticity measures that are 
invaluable in policy simulation modeling, but are of less 
importance in structural analysis, or the study of the broad set of 
considerations that reflect more permanent changes in the 
production system. These include, for example, changes in the 
mix of outputs, changes in the geographic origins and 
destinations of goods, and changes in technology. (Rose & Chen, 
1991, pp. 2-3) 
Interpreting changes in energy use in China during the current period of 
fundamental economic reform requires a method that can accommodate structural 
changes, including significant changes to the production system and to 
consumption patterns. The KLEM modelling approach developed by Hudson and 
Jorgenson (1974), while being a powerful method for forecasting and simulation 
models is not the best approach for analysing the changing relationship between 




the relationship between energy and consumption under conditions of changing 
consumer preferences (Rose & Chen, 1991).  
A second form of economic modelling is computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
modelling. Much CGE work was pioneered by the Monash Group. Mai, Adams and 
Dixon (2009) applied their model to China’s demand for energy. The Monash group 
have produced numerous studies using CGE analysis of China’s economy (for 
example Mai, Dixon and Rimmer 2010). Grossman and Krueger applied CGE 
models to environmental issues in their studies of the environmental impacts of 
NAFTA (Grossman & Krueger, 1991). The G-Cubed model built by McKibbin has 
been used to study the relationship between economic growth and energy use (and 
GHG emissions) (McKibbin, 2006). While analysis using CGE models has a number 
of strengths, their applicability, as with any tool, depends on the objectives of the 
practitioner. CGE models emphasise the role of prices in determining outcomes, 
which is not the focus of this thesis. In addition, the results tend to be presented in 
the form of, “the change in price of x has caused demand for coal to change by 
$10 billion dollars a year…” (Layman, 2004). To the extent that the approach lends 
itself to the present study, the benefits that can be gleaned from a CGE approach 
are not sufficiently greater than those that can be achieved at far less cost using 
the much simpler approach discussed below: decomposition analysis. Applying the 
principle of Occam’s Razor, the simpler approach is preferred.  
Decomposition,analysis,
In a case of convergent evolution of knowledge, two different and separate bodies 
of literature were faced with essentially the same challenge and developed 
essentially the same mechanism for resolving it. The result is a fragmented body of 
literature with an illogical etymology. The largest terminological frustration is likely 
the distinction between structural decomposition analysis (SDA) and index number 
analysis (INA) or index decomposition analysis (IDA). Methodologically, there is no 
distinction; but SDA involves the decomposition of changes between two input-
output tables, whereas INA and IDA do not.  
Skolka (1989) defined structural decomposition analysis (SDA) as “a method of 
distinguishing major shifts within an economy by means of comparative static 
changes in key sets of parameters”. Rose and Casler (1996) provide another useful 




components”. The specification that the object to be split into its components be 
an identity in the mathematical sense of the word is important and one of the major 
points of diversion from statistical estimation techniques.  
SDA was first applied to the study of energy-related questions as a means of 
measuring change in embodied energy (Rose & Casler, 1996). Due to limitations in 
the ability to collect data it was necessarily a comparative static exercise (the 
compilation of input-output tables is a challenging task for statistical agencies: in 
China, detailed IO tables are published only for every fifth year).  
Chenery and Clark (1959) observe that, “an estimate of the future demand for 
electric power cannot be made very adequately from a partial-equilibrium study of 
the existing power market alone but must also take into account the probable 
changes in output of the power-using industries.” The importance of ‘taking into 
account the probable changes in output of the power-using industries’ led to the 
creation of input-output analysis (IOA), developed by Wassily Leontief (Baumol & 
ten Raa, 2002). Leontief led the construction of the first input-output tables, which 
were for the United States in the years 1919 and 1929, published in 1936 (United 
Nations, 1999). Not withstanding certain limitations, the most frequently raised of 
which relates to price assumptions, explained by Christ (1955), IOA is the best 
available tool for calculating embodied energy, which for reasons already 
discussed, is central to two of the relationships that are the focus of this thesis: 
those between energy and consumption and energy and trade. SDA, which is 
essentially the comparison of two or more input output tables, allows us to 
distinguish the change in energy use associated with changes in the quantity, 
pattern and energy intensity of components of final demand, including 
consumption, investment and trade. As China, has experienced, and continues to 
experience, major structural changes, these distinctions are central to an 
understanding of the relationship between economic growth and energy use.  
Chenery and Syrquin were amongst the early pioneers of the method (Rose & 
Casler, 1996). They employed SDA to study the relationship between factors of 
production (labour, capital and natural resources) and their use in different sectors 
of the economy. An early version of SDA was used to study Japan’s remarkable 
industrialization and modernization (Chenery, Shishido, & Watanabe, 1962) and use 




change dates to Myers and Nakamura (1978). Ang and Zhang (2000) survey an 
additional 123 papers published prior to 2000 using the technique for energy 
analysis. 
Within the tradition of decomposition analysis there are two main approaches: 
index number analysis (INA) and structural decomposition analysis (SDA) (Hoekstra 
& van den Bergh, 2003). SDA is a very useful tool for studying the relationships of 
energy with consumption and trade because it is able to work smoothly with the 
embodied-energy characterisation of energy use, however, energy use in 
production is best characterised as direct energy consumption. There is no need to 
rely on IO tables that are only published every five years since the less data-
intensive form of decomposition analysis (INA), using direct energy consumption 
data published on an annual basis, is preferred. 
These two techniques are complementary. Employing them both provides a more 
complete exploration of the nature and determinants of all three principal 
relationships of interest: those of energy with production, consumption, investment 
and trade.   
Decomposition,analysis,in,energy,and,environment,studies,
Two excellent summaries of the literature applying decomposition analysis to 
energy and environmental issues exist: Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2002) and 
Ang and Zhang (2000). SDA has been applied to environmental issues since 
Leontief and Ford (1972) (Hoekstra & van den Bergh, 2002).  Skolka (1989) 
formalised the technique by presenting the first complete set of structural 
decomposition equations. The method has been improved and refined over the two 
decades since then. Decomposition of aggregate energy intensity came to be 
treated as an index number problem when Boyd, Hanson and Sterner first 
observed the similarity with earlier work in economics using index numbers to 
decompose the value of output of some composite commodity into price and 
quantity effects (Boyd, Hanson, & Sterner, 1988). Index number theory was 
developed in response to the challenge of finding a way to study empirical changes 
within the framework of economic theory: “the index-number problem arises 
whenever we want a quantitative expression for a complex that is made up of 
individual measurements for which no common physical unit exists” (Frisch, 1936). 




is an analogous problem since there is no physical unit of economic structure, 
aggregate energy intensity or changes in aggregate output.  
The literature reviewed by Ang and Zhang (2000) includes papers that use IDA. 
They find that of the 51 papers published before 1995, almost all focus on industrial 
energy demand analysis, while the 73 papers published between 1995 and 2000 
had a wider focus, many of which included analysis of energy-related GHG 
emissions. In his excellent paper on method selection for IDA, Ang (2004) reports 
that (by 2004) there were over 200 papers published using the technique. He 
identifies five application areas: “(a) energy demand and supply, (b) energy-related 
gas emissions, (c) material flows and dematerialization, (d) national energy 
efficiency trend monitoring, and (e) cross-country comparisons.”  
The literature reviewed by Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2002) includes papers that 
use SDA. They find 27 papers published since Leontief and Ford’s 1972 paper that 
introduced the technique to energy analysis. About a third of the papers using SDA 
analyze GHG emissions, while the remainder focus on energy consumption.  
The number of decomposition studies focusing on energy use or pollution 
emissions has grown considerably over the past decade. Peters (2008) argues that 
the body of literature that advocates consumption-based national GHG emission 
inventories that has recently developed is a response to perceived shortcomings in 
the international response to climate change. These studies all employ SDA 
techniques. The consumption-based approach favoured for some GHG emissions 
analyses is based on the same logic of ‘embedded factors’ that underpins the 
decision to use IO SDA in the analysis of the relationships of consumption, 
investment and trade with energy use in the present thesis.  
Guan et al (2008) use a similar approach to study Chinese GHG emissions from 
1980 to 2030. They use nine IO tables with 18 sectors, covering the period from 
1981 to 2002. They find that changes in per capita consumption volume have an 
overwhelming impact on GHG emissions, while changes in production structure, 
consumption patterns and population effects also cause upward pressure on 
emissions. Efficiency changes were the only source of restraint in GHG emission 




Peters et al. (2007) provide one of the highest resolution studies of China by sector 
of any existing SDA to date. They use IO tables from 1992, 1997 and 2002 with 97 
sectors. Their more detailed study finds that changes in the production structure 
reduces China’s GHG emissions by 11 per cent over the 10-year period.  
Guan et al (2009) use IO tables for 2002 and 2005 at the 42 sector classification 
level. The results of their study are broadly similar to results of their previous 
studies in emphasising the roles of per capita consumption growth in driving up 
embodied emissions and technological change in constraining embodied 
emissions. 
The most comprehensive study using SDA to study China’s energy use is Lin 
(1996). Lin uses hybrid IO tables of China from 1981 and 1987 and a Laspeyres 
index decomposition. The initial decomposition reveals the energy effects of 
changes in final demand and production technology. An entire chapter is then 
dedicated to closer inspection of each of these areas of change. Lin identifies the 
iron and steel industry as one of the most important contributing industries to 
consumption of energy in China, with a separate chapter dedicated to a case study 
of this industry. To the author’s knowledge, no study since Lin has provided an 
equally comprehensive structural decomposition analysis of energy consumption in 
China.  
Houghton (1995) provides a similarly comprehensive study of the relationship 
between energy and economic structure in Japan. It applied SDA to the Japanese 
economy in the period 1973-1991 and found that the majority of Japan’s much 
heralded ‘decoupling’ of energy from economic growth was due to two factors: “a 
round of installation of energy-saving technologies that followed the first energy 
price shock in 1973” and a change in Japan’s comparative advantage due to rapid 
price changes. By decomposing Japan’s energy consumption into component 
parts, Houghton found that the growth in residential consumption had become the 
main driver of energy demand, whereas previously energy demand had been driven 
by the increased energy needs of the manufacturing sector. He further found that 
much of the change in industry was due to changes in a few industries: iron and 
steel, aluminum and smelting, cement and the pulp and paper industries.  
Many of the other studies decomposing changes in China’s energy demand into 




The focus of most such studies is to test a particular form of SDA or to update the 
literature when new data becomes available. Consequently, many studies stop 
short after determining the relative importance of structural versus intensity effects 
without providing substantial in-depth discussion of the implications of their 
findings. For instance, Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (1999) provide a very rigorous 
SDA with an application to China’s energy intensity. Although the SDA is carried 
out with particular attention to a number of methodological issues arising, the 
implications of the study are given almost no attention. Almost the entire 
discussion of results occurs in the conclusion: 
between 1987 and 1992, technical change accounted for most of 
the fall in the energy-GDP ratio. Structural change actually 
increased the use of energy, while the increased import of some 
energy-intensive goods had the opposite effect. The results are 
somewhat different for electric power, where the trend toward 
increased electrification of the economy resulted in an increase in 
the electricity-GDP ratio. (Garbaccio, Ho, & Jorgenson, 1999, p. 
18).  
An exception to this generalization is Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Yue (2000). The 
study has three objectives:  
1. To measure and analyse structural change in China’s manufacturing sector 
(1985-2000),  
2. To highlight which industries experienced the greatest change, and  
3. To explain the reasons for those changes.  
A recent contribution to the literature on China’s economy applying IO SDA is Minx 
et al. (2011). To the author’s knowledge, Minx et al. (2011) offer the first use of 
China’s full 2007 IO table in an SDA framework. Their focus is on GHG emissions 
rather than energy use, and they use different SDA techniques to those employed 
in the thesis. The broad findings of their analysis are roughly consistent with the 
results of the analysis here, although they do not discuss energy use in their 
conclusions at all, making direct comparisons difficult. While Minx et al. (2011) 
appear to offer the most up to date IOA of the Chinese economy, the discussion of 
their results is limited. 
While it is irrefutable that decomposition analysis is a widely regarded tool for 
energy analysis, there appears to be a focus on generating basic results while 




discussion of the results of the analysis is, therefore, a contribution of this thesis. 
Before discussing results, however, a number of theoretical issues associated with 
decomposition analysis must be considered.  
Theoretical,issues,
As shown above, two distinct bodies of literature focusing on decomposition 
analysis have developed. According to Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2002) the 
earlier of the two has origins in index number analysis (INA) predating Fisher (1922), 
an early seminal text in the field. The second of the two (SDA) has been applied to 
environmental issues since Leontief and Ford (1972). The first paper to set out the 
differences in method between index number analysis (INA) and structural 
decomposition analysis (SDA) was Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2003). They 
describe the techniques thus: 
The main difference between the two decomposition methods 
rests on the model being used. SDA uses the input-output 
framework while IDA uses only aggregate sector information… 
The economic input-output model in SDA is based on input-
output coefficients and final demand per sector. IDA, on the other 
hand, uses the output per sector for the economic 
decomposition. Both methods can analyze an intensity measure, 
ie a measure of the sector’s indicator use per unit of output 
(Hoekstra & van den Bergh, 2003, p. 41). 
Other than the use of IO tables, the two methods are quite similar. This section 
therefore begins with an appraisal of the use of IO tables in preparation for their use 
with SDA. The next part introduces the basic approach of decomposition and 
discusses a variety of theoretical issues that must be considered. Empirical 
application gives rise to a second set of issues that need to be addressed. These 
are discussed, and justification for how each is dealt with in the thesis is provided 
in the final part of the chapter. 
Input,Output,Analysis,(IOA),
The details of IOA are widely known and readily available so only a very brief 
outline is presented here. The most comprehensive explanation of IOA can be 
found in Miller and Blair: Input Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions, first 
published in 1985 and updated in a second edition in 2009. A brief introduction can 
be obtained from many mathematics for economists texts, for example, Hoy et al. 




Input-Output tables are arranged as an  matrix of intermediate transactions,
, an  dimensional matrix of final demands, , and an  dimensional vector 
of total outputs, , where  is the number of sectors in the economy and  is the 
number of different final consumer groups. In the template table below, there are 
four sectors, and one consumer group:  
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IO tables report output either in physical units or monetary value. Each row of the 
IO table represents the value (or quantity) of output from that row’s sector sold to 
every other sector and to final consumers. The final value of each row (total output) 
is the sum of sales to all other sectors and consumers, thus we can express the IO 





where each equation corresponds to row of the IO table. Grouping the terms of 
the equation above into sales to producers, sales to consumers, and total output, 
these equations can be summarised in matrix algebra by the following single 
equation: , where 
 (2.4) 
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Each element of ,  represents the amount of output from sector  used by 
sector .  
Dividing each element  by the total output of sector , converts the intermediate 
transactions matrix into a matrix of technical coefficients: 
, where , such that  (2.5) 
The following steps are standard in IOA: 
Beginning with:  
Substitute for :  
Rearrange:  .  
Factorise:  .  
Pre-multiply both sides by :   
Simplify:     
Rearrange: .  










Equation (2.14) maps the relation between total output of each sector and final 
demand for each sector. is referred to as the ‘Leontief Matrix’, and is “a matrix of 
sector-to-sector multipliers, , relating final demand in sector  to output in sector
” (Miller & Blair, 2009). 1 
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Relating final demand in sector  to output in sector , where sector is the 
production of energy, is precisely the objective EIOA.  
In general energy input-output typically determines the total 
amount of energy required to deliver a product to final demand, 
both directly as the energy consumed by an industry’s production 
process and indirectly as the energy embodied in that industry’s 
inputs. In engineering parlance, calculating this total energy 
requirement is the result of what is often called a process 
analysis… This process analysis traces inputs back to primary 
resources; the first round of energy inputs is the direct energy 
requirement; subsequent rounds of energy inputs comprise the 
indirect energy requirement. The sum of direct and all indirect 
energy requirements comprise the total energy requirement. 
(Miller & Blair, 2009, p. 401) 
Owing to the oil crises of the 1970s, and the more recent concerns about climate 
change, IOA has been frequently applied to questions of energy use. The body of 
literature that developed around these problems discovered early on that special 
complications arise in applying IOA to energy analysis. The most fundamental issue 
involves units of measurement. Each cell of an IO table, , generally and most 
usefully, represents the value in monetary terms of the transaction between two 
sectors. One reason a value approach is preferred is that the alternative, 
representing transactions in physical units, would require an IO table with sufficient 
sectoral resolution such that every sector produced just one product. Data 
collection would be a much more significant challenge than it already is. A second 
reason is that physical units of different products (and services) are not readily 
comparable. The value approach is generally much preferred. However, in energy 
analysis, researchers are often concerned precisely with questions of physical 
quantity. 
One approach to convert value transactions into physical transactions would 
simply be to divide by price. Such an approach would be very convenient, but 
unfortunately is not feasible for several reasons. One major reason is that different 
sectors often (and in China, this is always the case) pay different prices for energy 
resources. Creating separate energy price indices for each sector would be a 






The preferred approach is to construct a hybrid unit IO table (Bullard & Herendeen, 
1975). In this approach, energy transactions are measured in physical units (such 
as Petajoules, PJ), and non-energy transactions are measured in value units. We 
begin by constructing a new IO table according to the following template: 
  Purchasing sectors   















Z-e PJ / PJ PJ / $ PJ PJ 
Z-ne $ / PJ $ / $ $ $ 
Value added $ $   
X PJ $   
 
To consider specifically the energy content of each sector, a process analogous to 
the general IO analysis is required. Instead of beginning with the equation  
(2.4), the starting point is the equation , where is a matrix of inter-
industry energy flows, is a vector of energy consumed directly as a final-use 
product, is a vector of total energy consumption. Following the same matrix 
algebra steps as the general IO process above leads to the equation:  
 (2.15) 
where  remains the vector of total energy consumption,  is a matrix of total 
energy requirements and  remains the matrix of final demands (Miller & Blair, 
2009). 
 is a hybrid Leontief inverse matrix, and can be written: . Multiplying by  
(the hybrid units version of ) delivers the final result: the total energy requirements 
matrix in physical units.  
Decomposition,analysis,
The objective of decomposition analysis is to isolate the change in a variable 
according to the changes of its parts. Take the simple identity: . Given a 
change in ,it must be the case that either there was a change in , a change in 
, or both. This can be summarised as: . Assuming both initial and final 
Z + f = x
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data for each of the three variables were available, the decomposition analysis 
would be trivial. In general, such data is not available. 
Consider the following situation, based on Miller and Blair (2009) with some 
generalisation in terminology. This time, assume the starting equation is . 
There still exists both initial and final data for each of the three variables, so
 and , where the superscript refers to the time period, are known. 
Let . Substituting for  and for , results in .  
“The task is to decompose the total change in outputs into changes in the various 












Both are valid decompositions. In the first decomposition, the change in is 
expressed as a function of a change in weighted by the initial value of and a 
change in weighted by the final value of . Conversely, in the second 
decomposition the change in is expressed as a function of a change in
weighted by the final value of and a change in weighted by the initial value of .  
Two decomposition forms that have been widely used are the Laspeyres index and 
the Paasche index (Ang & Zhang, 2000). The Laspeyres index decomposition uses 
original year weights: 
x = yz
x1 = y1z1 x0 = y0z0
Δx = x1 − x0 y1z1 x1 y0z0 x0 Δx = y1z1 − y0z0
Δx = y1z1 − y0z0
= y1 z0 + Δz( )− y1 − Δy( )z0
= y1z0 + y1Δz − y1z0 + Δyz0
= Δyz0 + y1Δz
Δx = y1z1 − y0z0
= y0 + Δy( )z1 − y0 z1 − Δz( )
= y0z1 + Δyz1 − y0z1 + y0Δz




















All four decomposition forms are mathematically equivalent, so it cannot be said 
there exists a unique decomposition. The problem is that the different forms give 
different results when applied to actual data. In a celebrated search for the ‘best’ 
price index, Irving Fisher identified 134 different decomposition forms based on 
changes in nominal price and quantity (Fisher, 1922). Fisher showed that many of 
these forms were less desirable than others and nominated one, the geometric 
mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices (now known as the ‘Fisher ideal 
index’), as the best (Boyd & Roop, 2004).  
The theoretical basis for selecting one form over another turns out to be quite 
weak. Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) reveal the extent of this problem. They prove 
that the number of equivalent decompositions of the same form is equal to , 
where  is the number of factors into which a change is decomposed2. They point 
out that since the problem has been widely known for a long time, it was surprising 
that there did not exist many attempts to resolve it. According to Dietzenbacher 
and Los, most authors traditionally avoided the problem either by choosing one of 
the decomposition forms identified above, reporting both Laspeyres and Paasche, 
or reporting some average or mid-point weighted index. 
                                                
2 The four cases examined so far include two cases of one form and two cases of another 
form, where the two forms are distinguished by an ‘interaction’ term: . 
Δx = y1z1 − y0z0
= y0 + Δy( ) z0 + Δz( )− y0z0
= y0z0 + Δy( )z0 + Δy( ) Δz( )+ y0 Δz( )− y0z0
= Δy( )z0 + y0 Δz( )+ Δy( ) Δz( )
Δx = y1z1 − y0z0
= y1z1 − y1 − Δy( ) z1 − Δz( )
= y1z1 − y1z1 + y1 Δz( )+ Δy( )z1 − Δy( ) Δz( )








This study will use a form of the Divisia index for the reasons given in the next 
section. The Divisia Index is defined as a “weighted sum of growth rates, where the 
weights are the components share in total value” (Hulten, 1973). The Divisia index 
was first proposed by the French economist, Divisia (1926). The following 
explanation of the Divisia index is included because the Divisia index is most 
preferred, although the final form of the indiex is more intuitive than the explanation 
of how to arrive there. The explanation is based on Diewert (1988). The early work 
in index numbers in the field of economics in the beginning of the 20th century was 
mostly on price indices, so the terminology is usually related to quantity and prices. 
Since the index generalises, this explanation abandons the original terminology and 
applies a general terminology. 
Let yi t( ) and zi t( ) , i∈{1,...,n}  be functions of continuous time and let x at time t
be the value x t( ) = yi t( )zi t( )i=1
N∑ . Assume x t( )  is differentiable.  













Dividing both sides of the equation by Y t( ) ⋅Z t( ) = yi t( )zi t( )i=1
N∑ , and letting the 
time derivative be signified by a dash: ′α = dαdt , we arrive after some manipulation 
at 
 (2.32) 
Divisia defines Y t( )  and Z t( ) as solutions to: 























Y t( ) =
Zi t( ) ′Yi t( )
Y t( ) ⋅Z t( )i=1
N∑ ′Z t( )Z t( ) =
Yi t( ) ′Zi t( )





By the early 1990s, studies using the Divisia Index became more popular, with 
approximately equal number using the Divisia and Laspeyres Indexes, the Paasche 
Index having largely ceased to be used (Ang B. , 2004).  
Choosing,a,decomposition,form,
Since there can be an infinite number of [decomposition] methods 
and it is not possible to try all of them out, it would be helpful if 
some meaningful criteria can be used to determine the ‘preferred’ 
method or set of results. (Ang & Lee, 1994, p. 88) 
Much of the most useful recent work on selection criteria for decomposition 
methods and comparison of different techniques has been done by Ang and his 
colleagues. Other work on method selection is not at the frontier. For instance 
Greening et al. (1997) compare six different methods, but all six methods have a 
residual term, meaning they are not perfect in decomposition and so should not be 
used. The problem of residual terms was identified by Ang and Choi (1997).  
Ang, Liu and Chew (2003) consider a number of perfect3 decomposition methods 
that have been proposed by researchers. The merits of these various approaches 
are comprehensively assessed by Ang (2004). He determines that decomposition 
based on the Divisia Index, and using a logarithmic mean weighting system is the 
most preferred method. In particular, it is perfect in decomposition (the results 
contain no residual), passes the factor reversal test and time reversal test, has the 
additive property in logs and retains the same form irrespective of the number of 
factors used in the decomposition. There is also symmetry between the additive 
and multiplicative forms of indexing change over time and it is consistent in 
aggregation. Finally, the weighting system based on a logarithmic-mean 
overcomes a problem that earlier papers had encountered using arithmetic-mean 
weights, namely computational problems when zero values were encountered. 
Ang refers to this decomposition as the Log-Mean Divisia Index 1 (LMDI1). 
Although Ang introduces an LMDI2, it is subsequently determined that the second 
version has no significant advantages over the original, but suffers from more 
complicated equations. From here on, the thesis will drop the numeric demarcation 
and simply refer to the LMDI1 as the LMDI. The additive version is introduced in 
Ang and Choi (1997), while the multiplicative version is introduced in Ang and Liu 
(2001). Since Ang (2004), a wide agreement has developed that the Logarithmic-
                                                




mean Divisia Index (LMDI) is the most preferred method of decomposition, though 
Dietzenbacher argues in favour of the average of the Laspeyres and Paasche 
indexes (Dietzenbacher & Los, 2000). Selection between the additive and 
multiplicative forms has no bearing beyond interpretation and so is generally 
considered a matter of author preference. 
Logarithmic+Mean+Divisia+Index+(LMDI):+additive+and+multiplicative+versions+
Sato (1976) proposed the logarithmic mean for use in decomposition analysis as 
“the ideal log-change index number”. The log-mean of two values, x and y is 
defined by L x, y( ) = x − y( ) ln x y( ) , where x and y are non-equal positive 
numbers. If x and y are EiT and Ei0 , the total energy component of sector i in time 
period T and 0 respectively, we have  
 (2.34) 
The following summary is from Ang (2005). We begin withV , the object of the 
decomposition. Further, we nominate an identity, such that the terms on the right 
hand side, x1, x2... , are the decomposition factors of the object variable: 
 (2.35) 
In energy decomposition analysis, the decomposition factors are commonly such 
things as structural change, change in total output, and change in energy intensity. 
Additive(LMDI(
The additive LMDI approach begins with the following identity, assuming k
decomposition factors: 
 (2.36) 
ΔVtot and ΔVx1,2,…k represent the total change in the object variable over the two 
periods, and the change due to each of the three decomposition factors 
respectively. The value of the kth  decomposition factor is determined by: 
L EiT ,Ei0( ) = Ei
T − Ei0( )
ln EiT( )− ln Ei0( )
V = Vi
i
∑ = x1,i , x2,i , x3,,i
i
∑










Dtot and Dx1,2,…,k represent the total change in the object variable over the two 
periods, and the change due to each of the k decomposition factors respectively. 
The value off the kth  decomposition factor is determined by: 
 (2.39) 
Both the additive and multiplicative versions are theoretically sound, and the results 
are readily interchangeable. Selecting between them becomes a question of 
application. Hoekstra and van den Bergh (2002) find that most practitioners favour 
the additive approach, which decomposes the relative difference of an indicator. 
Reasons are rarely given for such decisions, but ease of interpretation seems a 
likely factor.  
While some people may find results of the sort, “technological effects caused a 
reduction of xmillion tce drop in energy consumption”, such a result implies undue 
faith in the precision of statistics. Further, the very large numbers used in energy 
data (hundreds of millions of tons of coal or oil equivalent, quadrillion BTUs) are 
non-intuitive. Comparing the relative importance of various effects also becomes a 
challenge for the reader who cannot be expected to know whether 15 quadrillion 
BTUs is contextually a large number. For those reasons, results describing 
percentage changes and relative growth rates are easier to interpret, communicate 
and compare. Further, in analysing Chinese energy consumption, there is greater 















V 0 = Dx1Dx2…Dxk
Dxk = exp
ViT −Vi0( )
lnViT − lnVi0( )
VT −V 0( )
























expressed in terms of relative growth rates. For these reasons, relative growth rates 
are favoured in the thesis. 
Decomposing relative growth rates is the purview of the multiplicative 
decomposition, therefore, the thesis predominately applies the multiplicative LMDI 
method. However the concluding chapter (Chapter 7) compares the relative 
importance of the different relationships of energy use with consumption, 
investment and trade: not just their relative growth rates, but also their relative size. 
That chapter requires that results be presented according to the additive 
decomposition. Because the results are readily interchangeable this poses no 
challenge. The next section looks at some of the empirical challenges associated 
with this method, and how they are dealt with here. 
Data,and,empirical,issues,
According to Miller and Blair, “among the most formidable challenges in using 
input-output analysis in practice is assembling the detailed basic data needed to 
construct input-output tables characterizing the economic area of interest” (Miller & 
Blair, 2009). They devote an entire chapter (Chapter 4) to data collection 
challenges.  
IOA:,the,fundamental,equation,
The first step in performing EIO-SDA is to construct the data sets required for the 
EIOA formulas outlined above. The principal equation to solve is: 
 





where is the total energy coefficients matrix which solves the equation:  
(total energy consumption equals alpha times final consumption), is the total 
energy consumption per unit of output for each sector4. It is constructed from the 
direct energy requirements matrix and the vector of total outputs. is the 
                                                
4 See Appendix B: Notes on matrix algebra (points 3 & 5) for an explanation of this equation  
α = Gxˆ−1 I − A( )−1
α xˆ = G I − A( )−1
α g = αf
Gxˆ−1




Leontief inverted matrix, . The first term of the rearranged equation, , is the 
total energy requirements matrix. It tells us how much energy is used, in total, due 
to final consumption of each sector. Estimating the value of  for both 2002 and 
2007 is the principal objective of the first part of this chapter. The second part is 
devoted to a discussion of the results, in particular, the determinants of differences 
between the 2002 and 2007 results. 
Three principal data sets are required to satisfy the above method: the direct 
energy requirements matrix, , the vector of total output, , and the Leontief 
matrix, . Construction of these three datasets such that separate years are 
comparable is a somewhat involved process. This section outlines step by step the 
process that has delivered the data used in this study. The first part focuses on the 
direct energy requirements matrix ( ). The second part focuses on ensuring all 
data tables, including  and the two IO tables (2002 and 2007) represent 
consistent sectoral aggregations. 
Direct,energy,requirements,matrix,(G),
The direct energy requirements matrix, , is an dimensional matrix, where
is the number of primary energy sectors and is the total number of sectors (either 
producing or consuming) in the economy. It is defined as , with each element,
representing the total amount of energy of type consumed directly by 
economic sector .  
The data sources used in the construction of the direct energy requirements matrix 
for 2002 and 2007 are:  
• The China Energy Statistical Yearbook (hereafter CESY) 2005 Table 4-2: 
Energy balance of China – 2002 (physical quantity) (NBSC, 2005) 
• CESY2005 Table 5-3: Final energy consumption by industrial sector – 2002 
(physical quantity) (NBSC, 2005) 
• CESY2008 Table 4-2: Energy balance of China – 2007 (Physical quantity) 
(NBSC, 2011) 
• CESY2008 Table 5-2: Final energy consumption by industrial sector – 2007 
(Physical quantity) (NBSC, 2011) 
• Peters, Weber and Liu (Construction of Chinese energy and emissions 
inventory, 2006) 
While the original data forms a pair of matrices:  (where ) it is 
















matrices: . The rationale and procedure for this conversion are explained 
below. 
Fuel,aggregation,
Combining the energy balance and final energy consumption tables produces a 
table quantifying the consumption of 20 fuels by 44 economic sectors plus five final 
‘consumers’: rural households, urban households, imports, exports, and changes in 
inventories (a total of 49 fuel consuming categories). The fuel consumption is 
measured in physical quantities for both 2002 and 2007. For the direct energy 
requirements matrix to be usable in IOA, the fuel categories need to correspond to 
the primary energy sectors identified in China’s IO tables: coal; petroleum and 
natural gas; coke; and electric and heat power. The 20 fuels are aggregated 
according to the mapping in Table 2.1 to produce a table of 49 consumers of 4 
fuels.  
Table 2.1: Mapping of fuel sources to China's primary energy sectors 
Primary energy sectors Fuel sources  
Mining and washing of coal Raw coal 
Cleaned coal 
Other washed coal 
Briquettes 








Other petroleum products 
Natural gas 
Coking Coke 
Coke oven gas 
Other coking products 
Production and supply of electric power 








Since the energy content of one ton of raw coal is not equivalent to the energy 
content of one ton of diesel oil (for example), to aggregate the consumption of 
different fuels it is necessary to express the consumption of each fuel in consistent 
and comparable energy units. To convert the physical quantity of each fuel type 
into consistent units of energy (petajouls), the net calorific values (NCV) identified 
by Peters, Weber and Liu (2006) are adopted. It is assumed that NCVs of each fuel 
type did not change between 2002 and 2007 so the same values are used 
throughout the time period of the study.  
Loss, non-energy use and transformations are accounted for following the 
approach outlined in Peters, Weber and Liu (2006).  
The result is a table (sheet-E in the files: Direct energy requirements matrix 200x – 
G 44+5x4, 200x={2002,2007}) quantifying in consistent units the direct energy 
consumption of 20 fuel types by 44 sectors and 5 consumers in 2002 and a 
comparable table for 2007. Aggregating fuel types according to the schedule in 
Table 2.1 is now a simple matter of performing the appropriate additions. The final 
results are presented in sheet-G of the files.5  
To use the constructed direct energy requirements matrices in conjunction with 
China’s IO tables, the 44 sectors and 5 consumers must correspond to sectors and 
consumers in the IO tables. Unfortunately the 2002 and 2007 IO tables themselves 
have non-corresponding sectors, with the 2002 IO table being constructed for 122 
sectors while the 2007 table has 135. Before a correspondence between and the 
IO tables is established, there should be a sectoral correspondence between the 
2002 and 2007 IO tables themselves. 
Correspondence,between,2002A2007,
Ensuring a one-to-one sectoral correspondence for each data table is essential. 
The direct energy requirements matrix ( ) and corresponding IO table must be 
expressed in comparable terms in order to estimate the total energy requirements 
matrix ( ), and must be comparable to in order to perform the SDA 
and make meaningful comparisons over time. Mapping the tables into a compatible 
                                                
5 The files containing original data and all manipulations outlined in this section are available 
under the following file names: 
Direct energy requirements matrix 2002 – G 44+5x4 
Direct energy requirements matrix 2007 – G 44+5x4 
G
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sectoral aggregation has been done according to the schedule identified in 
Appendix A. 
Aggregation,versus,disaggregation,
There is an extensive body of literature employing SDA to study changes in the 
relationship between energy and the economy. According to Lenzen (2011, p. 73), 
“analysts carrying out input-output analyses of environmental issues are often 
plagued by environmental and input-output data existing in different classifications, 
with environmentally sensitive sectors sometimes being aggregated in the 
economic input-output database.” He explains that there are essentially two 
alternative responses this misalignment: aggregation, “which entails an undesirable 
loss of information” or disaggregation “based on fragmentary information” (Lenzen, 
2011). Lenzen shows that it is almost always preferable to choose disaggregation.  
The effect of aggregation bias can be seen in the results many energy-IO studies. 
Most studies find that technological change is the main factor exerting downwards 
influence on the energy intensity of the economy while there is disagreement 
between studies as to how much change in energy intensity can be attributed to 
structural change. This disagreement generally rests on the level of sectoral 
aggregation upon which the different studies were based. Where a sector from one 
year corresponds to multiple sectors from the other year, creating a one-to-one 
correspondence involves a choice between aggregating the data of the second 
table or disaggregating the data of the first table. Garbaccio et al. explain that  
in general, for a given level of aggregation, any subsector 
reallocation of production cannot be discerned from technical 
change. The level of aggregation is thus of crucial importance in 
separating technical and structural factors in changes in the 
energy-output ratio. (Garbaccio, Ho, & Jorgenson, 1999, p. 3) 
Huang (1993) for instance used a Divisia index SDA to study changes in China’s 
energy consumption from 1980 to 1988. The study finds 73 to 87 per cent of the 
decline in energy intensity was due to technical change, although only six industrial 
sectors were studied so the opportunity to observe structural change is limited. 
Sinton and Levine  (1994) use a Laspeyres index to study changes from 1980 to 
1990. They find that 58 to 85 per cent of energy savings were due to technical 
change. They use a variety of measures ranging from 11 to 267 sectors, though 




The most comprehensive study of China’s energy consumption to date is Lin 
(1996). Lin uses IO tables aggregated to 18 sectors and performs SDA with a 
Laspeyres index approach. He finds that all of the energy savings were due to 
technical change. China’s demand shift from 1981 to 1987 led to an 80 per cent 
increase in energy consumption (75 per cent through embodied energy, 5 per cent 
through increased direct consumption), while the impact of changes in 
consumption patterns was estimated as having a marginally positive impact on 
energy consumption.  
Garbaccio et al. (1999) use SDA on 29 sectors between 1987 and 1992 and find 
that technical change within sectors accounted for most of the fall in the energy-
output ratio, while structural change actually increased the use of energy. 
With one exception, when creating a correspondence between IO tables in this 
thesis, data from the more aggregated table has been disaggregated to match the 
finer data set. That is, there is a preference for disaggregation over aggregation. In 
general, this has involved disaggregating the 2002 IO table to match the 2007 
sectoral composition, although there are eight sectors from the 2007 table that 
have been disaggregated to match the 2002 definitions.  
This approach is more involved than aggregating the more detailed sectors to 
match the more general composition but is chosen because the implicit 
assumptions better reflect reality. The reason can best be explained through an 
example. The 2002 sector: ‘manufacture of other specialised machinery’ (36065)6, 
corresponds to three sectors in the 2007 table: ‘manufacture of special purpose 
machinery for mining, metallurgy and construction’ (069); ‘manufacture of special 
purpose machinery for chemical industry, processing of timber and non-metals’ 
(070) and ‘manufacture of other special purpose machinery’ (072). Special purpose 
machinery for mining, metallurgy and construction, as well as ‘other’ special 
purpose machinery are all used as inputs in the extraction of ‘coal’ (006) and ‘oil 
and natural gas’ (007), but special purpose machinery for the chemical industry is 
not used by those sectors at all. Aggregating the three sectors would carry the 
implication that buying sectors, such as the coal, oil and natural gas extraction 
sectors, used these three sectors in equal proportions. The aggregating approach 
sacrifices a lot of information present in the IO tables.  
                                                
6 The number in parentheses is the sector identification number. China’s 2002 IO table uses 




Rather than assuming aggregated sectors are always consumed in equal 
proportions, the disaggregation approach requires the assumption that a 
purchasing sector retains fixed proportions of the disaggregated inputs from 2002 
to 2007. In the example given above, the coal extracting sector (006) purchased 
22,900 million RMB worth of special purpose machinery for mining, metallurgy and 
construction (069) and 2,204 million RMB worth of other special purpose machinery 
(072) in 2007 (there were no purchases from (070)). Of these three sectors, the coal 
extracting sector (006) made purchases totalling 251,041 million RMB in the 
following proportions: 069: 91 per cent; 070: 0 per cent; 072: 9 per cent. In 2002 
the coal extracting sector (06007) made purchases totalling 53,872 million RMB of 
‘other specialised machinery’ (36065). Assuming the proportions of purchases of 
specialised machinery remained constant across specialised machinery for mining, 
metallurgy and construction; chemical industry, processing of timber and non-
metals; and ‘other’ from 2002 to 2007, we can conclude that the 2002 purchases 
were in the following amounts: 069: 49,142 million RMB; 070: 0 RMB; 072: 4,730 
million RMB.  
The process discussed above involves disaggregating sales of a single output to a 
single sector into sales of multiple outputs to a single sector. The opposite scenario 
must also be dealt with – disaggregating purchases of one sector’s products by a 
single producing sector into purchases by multiple sectors. The process is 
equivalent. 
In this study, only one sector is aggregated: ‘loading, unloading, portage and other 
transport services’ (102) from the 2007 IO table. This sector is embedded in each of 
the transport sectors in the 2002 table and cannot be isolated. It is assumed that 
each of the transport sectors in 2007 used these services in equal intensities (that 
is, equal expenditure on transport services per unit of output). Sales of transport 
services to other sectors of the economy (row 102) have been proportionately 
distributed among the other ten transport sector rows, supplementing the amount 
by which those sectors sell to the economy. Similarly, purchases made by the 
transport services sector (column 102) have been proportionately distributed 
among the other ten transport sector columns, increasing the value of purchases of 




The result is an IO table with 142 sectors, for both 2002 and 2007.7 
Disaggregation,of,G,
Constructing corresponding direct energy requirements matrices involves 
essentially the same mathematical process but the implicit assumption is different 
since is expressed in physical units, not prices. The implicit assumption made to 
disaggregate  to is that the more finely classified sectors corresponding 
to a single, less finely classified sector are each faced with the same prices for a 
given fuel type.  
For example, “Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery & Water 
Conservancy” is treated as a single sector in China’s energy data tables, but 
corresponds to six sectors in China’s IO tables (see Appendix A). In 2002 the 
sector directly consumed 338.05PJ of coal products. The RMB expenditure (in 
2002 prices) of each of those sectors in 2002 on output from the ‘coal mining and 
washing’ sector can be seen in Table 2.2.  From the table, we can also see the 
share of agricultural expenditure on coal due to each of the six sub-sectors.  
Table 2.2: Agricultural expenditure on coal (2002) 
Sector Expenditure on coal  (10,000RMB, 2002 values) 
Share of total 
Farming 861,402 59.6% 
Forestry 34,260 2.4% 
Timber and bamboo 30.562 2.1% 
Animal husbandry 396,258 27.4% 
Fisheries 66,276 4.6% 
Services in support of 
agriculture 55735 
3.9% 
Total 1,444,493  
Source: NBSC (Input-Output Tables of China, 2002) 
 
If the assumption that each of these sub-sectors faces the same price for coal is 
valid, the share of the sector’s total expenditure on coal is equivalent to the share 
of the physical quantity of coal consumed. We can take the shares identified in 
Table 2.2 and multiply them by the physical quantity of coal consumed by the 
                                                
7 All calculations involved in establishing a one-to-one correspondence between sectors in 
the 2002 and 2007 IO tables are contained in the file Appendix – IO disaggregations. Where 






entire agricultural sector to determine the physical quantity consumed by each 
sub-sector. This process has been repeated for each fuel type and each sector 
requiring disaggregation to create a one-to-one correspondence between the 
direct energy requirements matrix and the IO table for each year. The calculations 
are contained in the file: Direct energy requirements matrix 2007 & 2002 – G 142x4.  
Zero,values,
Ang and Liu (2007) separate zero value problems for SDA into two types: Type I 
problems are those where the energy use for a particular sector goes from zero to 
zero across the comparison periods (that is, a particular energy source was not 
used in a sector in both years). This is the most common type of zero value 
problem. Type II problems are defined as “from/to a zero to/from a positive value” 
(that is, when an energy source is introduced or ceases to be used). 
The equation for calculating the log-mean is the source of the problem in SDA. The 
log-mean of two numbers is given by 
 (2.42) 
A type II problem, where one of the numbers has a zero value the natural logarithm 
is undefined, so the log-mean cannot be calculated. This problem can be resolved 
by adding a very small number to all zero values (in this case, 1×10−20 was used). 
However, this approach does not resolve type I problems where both values are 
zero, since the denominator becomes zero and the log-mean becomes 
indeterminate. Type I problems are essentially unresolvable. They are the source of 
minor errors in several of the results in the thesis where the SDA estimates results 
that diverge from the actual result by up to 4 per cent. Such errors are always 
reported.  
Inflation,
IO tables summarise the value of sales from supplying industries to purchasing 
industries. Typically, as is the case in China’s IO tables, the values are measured in 
current value local currency units. To make meaningful comparisons over time, 
units must be converted to constant currency units. If IO tables of two separate 
years were compared without converting the currency to constant units, an 
L X,Y( ) =
X −Y( )




observed change (for example, technical coefficients) would partially reflect a 
change in the value of the units due to inflation. It would then be impossible to 
determine how much of the change in a technical coefficient was due to the 
quantity effect and how much was due to the price effect (Dietzenbacher & Hoen, 
1998). To express two IO tables in constant prices, one table must be adjusted. 
There are several methods of adjusting IO tables to account for inflation. A brief 
discussion of two of the most important is presented here with an explanation for 
the choice of method made.  
Double,deflation,method,
The double deflation method is a widely used method of adjusting IO tables for 
inflation. It is outlined in the United Nations handbook of input-output table 
compilation and analysis (United Nations, 1999). Using this method, output from 
each sector is deflated by that sector’s price index. The method used in this study 
is a simplified version of the comprehensive double deflation method outlined by 
the UN (1999).  
Chinese,price,index,data,
Although China’s entire IO tables are not available in constant prices, China 
statistical yearbooks publish price index data that correspond to almost all sectors. 
Several tables must be combined to achieve this. The Chinese data leave some 
gaps, particularly in the services sectors, but most sectors are covered. Despite the 
shortcomings, using this data is preferable to relying on alternative estimation 
techniques such as the RAS method, based upon a much smaller set of data. This 
section outlines the sources from which price indices have been drawn. 
Agricultural price indices for 2003 to 2006 are from Table 9-9: Indices of Producers’ 
Prices for Farm Products (NBSC, 2007) while the 2007 indices are from Table 8-9: 
Producers Price Indices for Farm Products (NBSC, 2009). 
Price indices for manufacturing sectors for 2003 to 2006 are from Table 9-16: Ex-
Factory Price Indices of Industrial Products by Sector (NBSC, 2007) while the 2007 
indices are from Table 8-12 Producer Price Indices for Manufacture Goods by 
Sector (NBSC, 2009).  
The retail price indices come from Table 8-7: Retail Price Indices by Category of 




Price indices for transport, communication services, dining out, real estate, leasing, 
tourism, household services, education, health care, and cultural and recreational 
articles for 2003-2006 are from Table 9-6: Consumer Price Indices by Category and 
Region (NBSC, 2007) while the 2007 indices are from Table 8-3: Consumer Price 
Indices by Category (NBSC, 2008). 
Price indices for construction are from Tables 9-14 (NBSC, 2005), 9-15 (NBSC, 
2006), 9-15 (NBSC, 2007), 8-16 (NBSC, 2008) and 8-16 (NBSC, 2009), all titled 
Price Indices for Investment in Fixed Assets by Region. 
China does not publish sectoral level price index data for the following sectors: 
services in support of agriculture, hotel accommodation, financial services, 
insurance, business services, specialised and other technical services, scientific 
research, geological surveys, water conservation and management, management 
of environmental resources and public facilities, public safety and social welfare 
and public management and social organization. Prices for these service industry 
sectors are assumed to rise at the same rate as the overall consumer price index. 
Order,of,processes,
Inflation adjustments have been made after disaggregation of sectors to ensure 
consistent one-to-one correspondences across all data tables, but before 
performing the IOA. In some cases where a single sector has been split into 
multiple sectors, the resulting sectors are not all affected equally by inflation. This 
creates a situation where the inflation adjusted total output value of a 
disaggregated sector does not necessarily equal the sum of all purchases of that 
sector. A judgment is required as to whether to retain the adjusted total output 
value as it links to the original data, or substitute a value based on the actual sum 
of adjusted sales. In the present study the value is linked to the original total output 
value rather than the sum of the adjusted parts.  
Whether to adjust raw data and perform IOA and SDA on the adjusted data, or to 
perform the IOA on raw data first and adjust the results to facilitate the SDA is 
worthy of consideration as each alternative will give somewhat different results.  
In the thesis IOA and SDA is always made on already adjusted data. The rationale 
for this approach is that performing analysis on less detailed data will obscure 




recover the full level of detail. If the adjustments are valid, the maximum information 
is obtained by adjusting the data first. Conversely, if the adjustments are not valid 
they should not be performed at all.   
Leontieff,inverse,
The Leontief Inverse Matrix, , can be interpreted as a matrix of total input 
coefficients, where is an estimate of the total amount of output from sector  
required to produce 1 RMB worth of sector . It includes sector product that is 
used in the production process of the inputs to sector  as well as the amount 
used in the production of those factors ad infinitum. Constructing a standard 
Leontief inverse matrix is relatively straightforward. The only data required are the 
relevant input-output tables. In this case, the two tables used were: 
Input Output Tables of China 2007 (NBSC, 2007) 
Input Output Tables of China 2002 (NBSC, 2002) 
 
The  matrix is constructed by dividing each element of the IO table by its column 
sum. A separate sheet in Excel has been used to supply the identity matrix,  and 
a third sheet to calculate . The resulting matrix is adjusted by adding 
to each cell. This is a common method in IOA to ensure the matrix is not 
singular by removing all zero values and replacing them with a very small value. 
The impact on results is minimal, however, it allows the matrix to be inverted, which 
is the final step in creating the Leontief inverse matrix.  
Conclusion,
This chapter has explained the most appropriate characterisations of ‘energy use’. 
It has identified decomposition analysis as the most appropriate method for 
studying each of the key energy-economy relationships (energy with production, 
consumption and trade) in the Chinese context. The main data sources that the 
thesis has relied on were outlined, indicating where and how each data source is 
used.  
Decomposition analysis involves a variety of theoretical and empirical challenges, 
which have also been discussed, and the approach to dealing with each of these 
has been explained and justified. Most of the theoretical discussion occurred in the 












the next chapter, Chapter 3 does not employ IOA. The only methodological 
difference that results is that SDA is performed on time series that are not IO 
tables. It means that only direct energy intensity can be measured, rather than 
embodied energy intensity, the merits of which will be discussed in Chapter 3. It is 
hoped that by explaining and justifying the methodological detail of the thesis, this 
chapter may also serve as a useful aid for practitioners seeking to apply IOA and 
SDA techniques, especially in the context of analysing China’s energy use. 
The key contribution of this chapter is the creation of compatible data sets that 
enable energy SDA between the years 2002 and 2007 for China without sacrificing 
accuracy by creating substantial aggregation bias. This chapter lays the foundation 





The majority of direct energy use is for the purpose of production. The fact that the 
IEA was able to report China as the world’s largest energy user is largely a 
consequence of China being the world’s largest producer of manufactured goods. 
This Chapter investigates changes to the relationship between economic output 
and energy use in China. In some sense this is the first stage of the energy flow in a 
modern economy: energy begins in its various forms in the environment, is 
captured by humans and converted into usable forms (such as electricity), then 
converted by firms into products. The last step of the energy flow is when the 
products that embody energy are used by consumers; that step will be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters. 
How much energy is needed for production depends largely on the technologies 
used, the choices about what is produced, and how much is produced in 
aggregate.  The State Council of China (2007) identified structural transformation as 
one of the key strategies for reducing the energy intensity of China’s economy. This 
chapter therefore pays particular attention to the extent to which structural change 
has affected energy use in China. It examines how China’s recent experience fits 
with the general story of changing production patterns during the process of 
economic growth and provides some measure of the extent of structural change in 
Chinese production. Then, using the index decomposition analysis introduced in 
Chapter 2, the impact of the changing structure of China’s production on energy 
use is quantified, along with the impact of energy intensity at the sectoral level, the 
impact of population growth, and the impact of China’s rapidly expanding output 
per capita. The final part of the chapter presents some hypotheses as to what 
caused the specific changes to the production side of China’s economy that have 
had such dramatic impacts on energy use over the last decade. 
Energy/use*in*production*
What is meant by energy use in production? This refers to all energy, both primary 
and secondary, used as a factor of production by firms producing goods or 
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services. This definition excludes the transformation of primary energy into 
secondary energy forms but includes that energy when it is converted into a non-
energy product.  
Figure 3.1: Basic energy flow diagram 
 
In the basic energy flow diagram presented in Figure 3.1, energy use in production 
is represented by the yellow arrows. It is easily observed that the transformation of 
primary energy into secondary energy (such as the burning of coal to produce 
electricity) is an energy transformation, not a supply-side use of energy. Final 
energy consumption is defined by the International Energy Agency as “deliveries of 
[energy] commodities to consumers for activities that are not fuel conversion or 
transformation activities” (IEA, 2005, p. 27). In Figure 3.1, final energy consumption 
includes the flows represented by both the yellow and blue arrows.  
Justification*for*supply/side*focus*
There are at least four reasons to study energy use for production. First, producers 
account for the majority of final energy consumption, so understanding patterns of 
energy-use for production is a large component of an understanding of the patterns 
of total final energy use. Second, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, energy use for 
production and energy embodied in consumption are at least partly independent in 
an open economy because of both energy trade and trade in goods that embody 
energy. Energy use for production depends on an additional set of determinants 
from energy use for consumption. It therefore makes sense to study the two 
























and can be either energy-saving or energy-using: the nature of technological 
progress (a supply-side issue) is integral to the relationship between energy and 
economic growth. Finally, it is also a fact that signatories to the Kyoto Protocol are 
obliged to report GHG emissions on a direct emission basis that is largely 
dependent upon energy-use for production, so climate change concerns also 
motivate a study of energy-use for production. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, that the determinants of energy demand as a factor of 
production should be different from those of energy demand as a consumption 
good (or an embodied component of consumption goods) is clear from 
international trade theory. Factor demand depends upon technology, prices and 
aggregate demand. To determine a home country’s factor demand in an open 
economy, the relevant aggregate demand is global aggregate demand; the relevant 
prices are home and world prices; and the relevant technology is home country 
technology. In contrast, domestic consumption (including embodied consumption) 
is determined by home country aggregate demand, home and world technology, 
and home and world prices (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006). Since their determinants 
are different, there is justification to study energy-use for production separately 
from energy-use for consumption. 
Dominance)of)the)supply)side)in)final)energy)consumption)
The overwhelming majority of final energy consumption in China is energy use for 
production, as evidenced by China’s national energy balance sheets (NBSC, 2009). 
A template for China’s energy balance sheets is provided in Table 3.1. The 
correspondence with Figure 3.1 can be seen clearly. The first section: ‘total primary 
energy supply’, corresponds to the top-left bubble of the energy flow diagram: 
‘primary energy supply’. The second section of the energy balance sheet: 
‘transformations’, corresponds with the lower-left bubble: ‘transformation into 
secondary energy commodities’. And the third section of the balance sheet: ‘total 
final consumption’, corresponds with both the ‘transformation into non-energy 
products’ and the ‘domestic consumption’ bubbles in the energy flow diagram.   
China’s total final consumption from 1980 to 2008 is depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Statistical difference is excluded because it is not an actual user of energy but a 
record of reporting inaccuracies. Energy-use for production accounted for 80 per 
cent of total final energy consumption in 1980, rising to almost 90 per cent by 
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1996. That China’s total final energy-use is related primarily to domestic production 
is clear from the figure. 
Table 3.1: China's energy balance sheet template 
Flow Fuel type 




Recovery of energy 
Imports 
Chinese airplanes & ships refuelling abroad 
Exports 
Foreign airplanes & ships refuelling in China 
Stock changes 













Total Final Consumption 





Transport, storage, postal & telecommunications 
services 







Note: Fuel type is left blank. Chinese statistics list up to18 different fuel types, listed in 
Chapter 2. 
Source: NBSC (2009) 
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Figure 3.2: Total final energy consumption by user-group (1980-2008) 
Source: NBSC (2008, pp. 5-27) 
 
Energy*and*production*during*economic*transformation*
Central to this thesis are the following propositions: (1) the relationship between 
energy and economic output is not constant; (2) as economies develop, the 
production structure changes; (3) China has experienced a fundamental 
transformation in production over the past 30 years; and (4) the fundamental 
transformation in production experienced by China over the past 30 years has 
substantially altered the energy-economy relationship. 
Evidence that the relationship between energy and economic output is not 
constant has been provided in Chapter 1. That the production structure changes as 
economies develop has been demonstrated in literature dating back to Adam 
Smith, who considered structural change as part of the necessary process through 
which the wealth of nations grew: 
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As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency 
and luxury, so the industry which procures the former, must 
necessarily be prior to that which ministers to the latter. The 
cultivation and improvement of the country, therefore, which 
affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to the increase of 
the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency and 
luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is 
over and above the maintenance of the cultivators, that 
constitutes the subsistence of the town, which can therefore 
increase only with the increase of the surplus produce (Smith, 
1776, p. 272). 
A central concept of much of the growth and development literature is that 
economic development progresses through roughly definable stages. Lewis (1954) 
considered modernisation to be the process of rebalancing between the ‘capitalist’ 
sector and the ‘subsistence’ sector. Rostow (1960) developed an explicit list of five 
sequential phases that he hypothesised economies passed through as they 
develop. Economists have since backed away from such explicitly demarked 
stages, but the underlying concept is still evident (see for example, Garnaut and 
Song (2006)).  
One of the earliest attempts to quantify structural change in economic growth was 
by Simon Kuznets (1957), who divided the economy into agricultural sectors, the 
manufacturing sectors (including mining and construction) and the services 
sectors. Kuznets studied 59 countries, which he divided into seven groups 
according to per capita income. He showed that of the richest two groups, in no 
country did agriculture account for greater than 30 per cent of GNP, while in the 
poorest group, agriculture accounted for more than half of GNP in 9 of the 13 
countries. Similarly, of the richest two groups, the manufacturing sectors 
accounted for at least 30 per cent of GNP in 11 of 13 countries, while only one of 
the 12 poorest countries derived greater than 30 per cent of GNP from the 
manufacturing sectors. Finally, the services sectors accounted for greater than 40 
per cent of GNP in ten of the 13 richest countries and in only one of the 12 poorest.  
These observations provided some of the first statistical evidence in support of 
arguments that economic growth was associated with structural change. Kuznets 
later went on to show that similar observations could be made for stages of 
economic growth within a country by doing state-by-state comparisons within the 
United States (Kuznets, 1958). By 1960, Chenery was able to describe these 
observations as ‘well established’.  Chenery described the process of 
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industrialisation as involving three key structural changes to the economy: “a rise in 
the relative importance of manufacturing industry; a change in the composition of 
industrial output; and changes in production techniques and sources of supply for 
individual commodities” (Chenery, 1960). Chenery used cross-sectional data of 38 
countries in the period 1950-56 to estimate the relationship between GDP per 
capita and the sectoral distribution of the economy. Figure 3.3 is a reconstruction 
of the results of Chenery’s analysis, converted from log to linear scale.  It gives 
clear support for the statement that the structure of production changes as an 
economy develops.  
Figure 3.3: Share of major sectors in national product 
 
Source: Adapted from Chenery (1960) 
 
By 1973, the expansion of the services industry had been observed as a main 
characteristic of modern economic growth. Rapid structural change was described 
as a principal characteristic of economic growth, the major aspects of which 
included “the shift away from agricultural pursuits and, recently, away from industry 
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to services” (Kuznets, 1973). The observation has continued to be supported by 
subsequent data, such that Angus Maddison could declare that in the past two 
centuries, “rapid technical change, structural transformation, and rising per capita 
incomes were the norm” (Maddison, 1998). 
The centrality of structural change in economic growth has important implications 
for our understanding of the relationship between energy and the economy. In his 
book, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) Ricardo’s 
explanation of the gains to be made from trade by following the strategy of 
comparative advantage implicitly acknowledged different production functions for 
different products (in different countries). The different productive sectors each 
have different needs for energy as a factor of production, so as their relative 
importance in the economy changes, the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth must also change. 
Divergence in factor intensities relating to energy specifically was elaborated by 
Schurr, who devoted a large portion of his seminal study of energy in the US 
economy to consumption patterns according to sectors (Schurr, 1960). This 
concept is crucial to establishing the proposition that the relationship between 
energy use and economic output is dependent upon the production structure.  
Other authors have advanced this proposition more recently. For example, Song 
and Sheng write 
… when economic growth makes a country cross certain 
economic development stages, the adjustment in production 
technique and consumption pattern can lead to structural 
changes in energy demand. For example, when a country grows 
from a farming society into an industrialised society, it is expected 
that capital and energy-intensive industrial production will 
substitute for primary products or labour-intensive production and 
thereby generate a large demand for energy. (Song & Sheng, 
2007, p. 238) 
An illustrative numerical example can articulate this point. Table 3.2 shows three 
sectors, each with a different energy intensity: $1 worth of agricultural product 
requires two units of energy, while the equivalent value of manufacturing sector 
product requires four units of energy, and the equivalent value of services sector 
product requires just one unit of energy. The example includes three different 
industrial structures:  
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1. 60 per cent agriculture: 40 per cent manufacturing 
2. 30 per cent agriculture: 60 per cent manufacturing: 10 per cent services 
3. 10 per cent agriculture: 40 per cent manufacturing: 50 per cent services 
and three different levels of economic development: GDP = $10, $50, $100. 





Energy use given GDP = 




















































The amount of energy used by each given industrial structure and each level of 
development is given in the bottom row. Reading across the ‘totals’ row, if 
industrial structure remains constant, the energy intensity of the economy remains 
constant and total energy use increases with GDP. Reading down the ‘totals’ row, 
it is clear that the second economic structure is the most energy intensive, while 
the third structure is the least energy intensive. This illustration exhibits the Kuznets 
curve for energy intensity and reveals how structural change in an economy 
(changes in what is produced) can impact the relationship between economic 
growth and energy use. Thus establishing the proposition that the relationship 
between energy and economic growth is not constant.  
The next section examines evidence that China has undergone a fundamental 
supply-side economic transformation over the past 30 years and that this 




China’s White Paper on the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics 
(State Council Information Office, 2011) provides an overview of China’s reform 
program from a legislative perspective. The changes spurred by ongoing reforms in 
China, especially following the 1978 Party Congress and even more so in the lead 
up to, and immediately after WTO membership, have been transformational. 
However, it remains to be formally established that China’s production 
transformation is observable in Chinese production data. The characteristics of 
China’s production transformation of interest in this thesis are the scale of output, 
the structure of output, and the technology used. That is, how much is produced, 
what is produced, and how much input (particularly of energy) is required per unit 
of production. 
On one level China’s gross output values, presented in Figure 3.4 establish that China is 
undergoing an economic transformation. It is clear that while there was some expansion of 
industry through the 1970s, the real acceleration began in 1980. Expansion of output at that 
pace is, by itself, transformative. If there was no structural change and no technological 
change, the surge in output evidenced in Figure 3.4 would result in a surge in the use of 
energy as a factor of production. But Chapter 1 showed that beginning in 1977 there was 
an almost constant decline in China’s aggregate energy intensity. What were the reasons 
for this change in the relationship between energy use and economic growth? 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the composition of China’s GDP from 1952. It depicts steady 
economic transformation. When the People’s Republic of China was established 
the economy was heavily rural, with the agricultural sector generating over 70 per 
cent of GDP in 1952, while 23 per cent came from services and just eight per cent 
from industry. Excepting the abnormality of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), 
the share of GDP from agriculture fell almost constantly, reaching just 11 per cent 
by 2006. The decline in relative importance of agriculture was due mostly to the 
rapid expansion of China’s manufacturing base, which, according to Fridley and 
Aden (2008) grew from just 6 per cent of GDP in 1952 to 43 per cent by 2006. The 
exact point at which industry became a larger share of GDP than agriculture 
depends on which data source is used. According to Fridley and Aden (2008), 
services and industry both surpassed agriculture in 1985, while industry did not 
surpass the services sector until 1992. In this data set, the services sector reached 
39 per cent in 1988 and scarcely deviated from that point over the next two 
decades.  
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Data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011) tell a slightly 
different story. The World Bank data only extends back to 1980. According to the 
World Bank, at that time China’s industrial production had already exceeded that of 
agriculture with industry accounting for 48 per cent of GDP compared with 30 per 
cent from agriculture and just 22 per cent from services. The discrepancy may have 
been to some extent influenced by the difficulty in correctly valuing the historical 
record of China’s service sector. While the two datasets are not exactly equivalent, 
both depict China’s economy as experiencing considerable transformation in terms 
of the relative share of GDP from agriculture, industry and services until the late 
1990s, after which the relative importance of each sector seems to have stabilised.  
The representation in Figure 3.6 shows stagnation in China’s structural change. It 
shows GDP per capita on the horizontal axes (rather than time) to capture the 
relationship between structural change and economic growth with GDP per capita 
measured in PPP current international dollar terms, ranging from around PPP$250 
to almost PPP$7,000. 
Figure 3.4: GDP by Sector (1952-2006) 
Source: Fridley and Aden, (2008, p. 10B.1) 
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Figure 3.5: Composition of GDP (1952-2006) 
Source: Author’s calculations from Fridley and Aden, (2008, p. 10B.1) 
 
Figure 3.6: Composition of GDP versus GDP per capita (1980-2009) 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
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There is an initial increase in the relative importance of agriculture due to the early 
reforms beginning in 1978. This is followed by a constant decline in the relative 
importance of agriculture, with two clear periods in which the service sector 
expanded: from around PPP$250 to around PPP$1,000 (1980 to 1992) and again 
from PPP$1,600 to PPP$2,800 (1996 to 2002). While the initial shift toward a 
service-based economy was offset by relative declines in all three other major 
sectors, the second period of service sector expansion was almost entirely at the 
expense of the agricultural sector. The importance of industry and manufacturing 
had remained almost constant since the end of the initial period of structural 
change prior to reaching GDP per capita levels of around PPP$1,000 in 1996. The 
World Bank data show a second period of services sector expansion, from GDP 
per capita of PPP$1,507 (reached in 1995) when services accounted for 32.8 per 
cent of GDP to GDP per capita of PPP$2,863 (reached in 2002) when services 
accounted for 41.5 per cent of GDP. Since 2002 there has been little change in the 
relative output of the major sectors (World Bank, 2011).  
Figure 3.6 is surprising since it appears to show that structural change in China’s 
economy has stalled, despite the ongoing rapid economy-wide transformation 
apparently evident. Two alternative hypotheses are proposed to account for this 
apparent discrepancy: 
1. These macro-sector structural changes obscure some of the structural 
changes that have occurred in recent years at finer levels of sectoral detail. 
2. China’s provinces are undergoing counter-balancing structural changes: 
expansion of the services sector in some provinces is off-set by expansion of 
the industrial sector in other provinces such that the national level data 
reports no change.  
To demonstrate that China has experienced a fundamental transformation over the 
past 30 years, one of these two alternative hypotheses must hold. Otherwise the 
apparent economic stability identified in Figure 3.6 must be taken as contradicting 
the proposition and structural change must be abandoned as an explanation for the 
change in the relationship between economic production and energy use in China 




The level of sectoral detail presented in Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5, and Figure 3.6 is 
very broad. It distinguishes between only three sectors (and one subsector). It is 
plausible that while these three sectors have remained relatively stable in terms of 
their relative share of GDP since around 2002, there exists significant variation in 
the relative output of subsectors.  
To investigate the presence of structural change at finer sectoral disaggregation 
than the three-industry level presented so far, a simple test is carried out. The 
growth of each sector over the twelve years (1995 to 2007) can be compared with 
the total GDP growth creating a measure of relative sectoral growth as the 
difference in compound annual growth rates, according to the following formula: 
 (3.1) 
where Ri0−T is the relative growth rate of sector i  over the period beginning in year 
0  and ending in year T , Yit is the output of sector i in year t , GDPt is the total 
GDP in year t and n  is the number of years from 0 to T . A value greater than zero 
for any sector implies the average annual growth rate of that sector was faster than 
that of the economy as a whole. Similarly, a value less than zero for any given 
sector implies the growth rate of that sector was less than the growth of the 
economy as a whole. Economic growth in the absence of structural change would 
result in all sectors exhibiting a relative growth rate of zero, while economic growth 
in the presence of structural change would result in diverse relative growth rates. 
Constructing(a(complete(‘value(added’(dataset(
To determine the presence of structural change demands data that meet certain 
requirements. Firstly, the data should measure output at a finer level of sectoral 
disaggregation than the three sectors presented above. Secondly, it must be 
comprehensive, in order to cover the complete set of sectors so that the sum of 
output of all sectors is equal to GDP. Finally, it needs to be consistent over time so 






































There are several measures of output by sector available. The two most relevant 
are ‘Gross Value of Industrial Output’ (GVIO) and ‘Value Added of Industry’ (VAI). 
Both of these indices are available at similar levels of sectoral detail for a similar 
number of years and both represent the value of output. The main distinction is that 
GVIO measures the total value of output of each sector, while VAI excludes the 
value of inputs and measures only the activity performed by the sector itself.  
An example can help show why VAI is more appropriate for present purposes. 
Consider the case of the sector, ‘manufacturing of chemical fibres’. In 2007, the 
GVIO of this sector was 412 billion RMB while the VAI was just 81 billion RMB 
(NBSC, 2008, pp. 13-2). Only 20 per cent of the value of the sector’s output was 
created by the sector itself. The remaining 80 per cent of the value of total output 
was the value of intermediate goods purchased from other sectors. In 2007, the 
chemical fibres industry consumed 15 million tce of energy. This energy 
consumption fuelled the processes within the industry, but it did not contribute 
toward the production of the intermediate goods purchased by the industry. In 
calculating the energy intensity of the industry, we are therefore interested in the 
ratio of VAI to energy consumption, not the ratio of GVIO to energy consumption. 
The distinction is important. In this case the energy intensity using the incorrect, 
GVIO measure would be 262 million RMB per tce instead of the correct 51 million 
RMB per tce. VAI is therefore considered the appropriate index of sectoral activity 
for the purposes of this chapter.  
The NBSC reports sufficiently reliable and comprehensive data on output for 42 
sectors covering the years 1997 to 2007, but excluding 2004. Total GDP in current 
2010 prices is available from the China Statistical Yearbook 2010 along with the 
value added due to the primary, secondary and tertiary industries, plus the 
construction sector for the years 1978 to 2009 (NBSC, 2011, pp. 2-1). The 
explanatory notes from the same volume provide details of which sectors are 
included in each industry: 
Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fishery and services in support of these industries. 
Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and 
gas, and construction. 
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Tertiary industry refers to all other economic activities not 
included in the primary or secondary industries. (NBSC, 2011) 
The next section will need to match value-added in each sector to energy 
consumption, therefore the sectoral detail of the value-added data must match the 
sectoral detail of the energy data. Therefore the five sectors composing the primary 
industry are treated as a single sector in this chapter and no further data are 
required for that part. 
Value-added in the tertiary industry sector is provided at a six-sector classification 
from 1978 to 2009 for the first time in the most recent China Statistical Yearbook 
(NBSC, 2011, pp. 2-6). These data are easily aggregated to match the three sectors 
for which energy consumption data are available.  
Data for the secondary industry sector (excluding the construction sector) are less 
conveniently available. Sectoral level value-added data for the secondary industry 
are available for the years 1995-1998, 2003, and 2005-2007 from the China 
Statistical Yearbooks, 1996-1999, 2004, and 2006-2008. Data for the years 1999-
2002 are from the China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook 2001, 2002 and 
2003. Unfortunately these data are all recorded in current prices relative to their 
reporting year and so are not comparable in their raw forms. Rather than rely upon 
the accuracy and correlation of price index data, the value-added for each sector in 
each year has been converted into a percentage of industrial value-added for that 
year. Since the total value of industrial value-added is available in current, 2010 
RMB, the percentages are then multiplied by the 2010 value of industrial value-
added to derive sectoral value-added for industrial sectors in current, 2010 prices. 
The final, adjusted data are reproduced in Appendix D.  
Confirmation(of(alternative(hypothesis(1(
The results of this simple analysis over the periods are presented in Figure 3.7. 
Results for 1995 to 2001 are presented separately from the results for 2002 to 2007 
because the apparent suspension of structural change observed at the three-
industry level is most strongly observed in the 2002 to 2007 period. It is clear from 
Figure 3.7 that over both periods structural change is present, however the pattern 
of change is not the same. For instance, the average annual growth rate of value-
added in nominal terms of the sector that exceeded national growth by the largest 
margin since 2002, mining and processing of ferrous metal ores, averaged 31 
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percentage points higher than GDP but averaged 1 point lower than GDP in the 
seven years prior to 2002.  
The period from 1995 to 2002 saw substantial structural change, as observed in 
Figure 3.5. The results depicted in Figure 3.7 show that the agricultural sectors’ 
average annual growth was 6 percentage points lower than GDP, causing the 
observed decline in the share of GDP from the primary industry. Conversely, with 
the exception of financial intermediation, the tertiary industry sectors grew faster 
than GDP: the transport and real estate sectors grew 2 per cent faster than GDP, 
while wholesale and retail trade grew 1 per cent faster and ‘other’ services grew on 
average 9 per cent faster than GDP per annum.  
The largest changes were within industry. The mining sector as a whole grew more 
slowly than GDP over the period, with the mining of coal almost two thirds of a per 
cent slower, however, the ‘mining of other ores’ was the over all fastest growing 
sector, growing 32.3 per cent faster than GDP. This rapid growth was achievable 
largely because the sector was so small to begin with, producing just 233 million 
RMB value added of the 298,248 million RMB value added for the mining sector as 
a whole (less than 0.8 per cent of value added in the mining sector). By 2002 this 
sector had expanded to produce 1.7 per cent of the value added in the mining 
sector. During this period, the greatest expansion of sizeable industries came from 
the manufacture of communications equipment, computers and other electronic 
equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, transport equipment, and the 
manufacture of medicines and plastics.  
The period from 2002 to 2007, represented by the red bars in Figure 3.7, appears 
to indicate more structural change than the previous period. The agricultural sector 
continued to decline in relative importance, growing on average 6 per cent slower 
than GDP over the period, but the real interest is in the secondary and tertiary 
industries. The tertiary industry grew at almost exactly the same rate as the 
economy as a whole, leaving the relative importance of that industry largely 
unchanged. Within the tertiary industry, different services sectors exhibited 
markedly different rates of growth. For instance, the hotels and catering services 
sector averaged 2 per cent slower growth than GDP and the transport, storage and 
post sector averaged 3 per cent slower, while the real estate sector averaged 4 per 
cent faster growth than GDP and the financial intermediation sector averaged 5 per 
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cent faster. The tertiary industry as a whole retained its relative share of GDP 
because of the counter-balancing effect of the relative growth rates of the different 
services sectors over the 2002 to 2007 period. Similarly, the secondary industry 
averaged, just 1 per cent faster net growth than GDP over the period. This result 
masks substantial variation within the industry, with smelting and pressing of 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals averaging 10 and 19 per cent faster growth than 
GDP, respectively, and mining and processing of ferrous and non-ferrous metal 
ores averaging 31 and 16 per cent faster growth than GDP, respectively. These 
rapidly growing sectors were counter-balanced by the slower growth of a wide 




Figure 3.7: Sectoral growth relative to GDP growth 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: 1995-2002: Production and distribution of gas = 13.02; Mining of other ores = 32.34 
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In addition to the visual effect of Figure 3.7 it is useful to have an index that can 
objectively compare the scale of structural change over the two periods. Adding a 
single step to the previous equation creates an index of structural change 
according to the following formula: 
 (3.2) 
 
where I is the number of sectors and Δ0−T is the index of average annual structural 
change during the period 0 to T . This index can be used to compare relative levels 
of structural change in a single country at different periods of time, assuming the 
data retains a consistent sectoral decomposition. The process is a slight deviation 
from that proposed by Roman (1969), which used the arithmetic mean of the ratios 
of sectoral to total output growth, while this formulation uses the differences of 
sectoral to total output growth. Although the formulation proposed by Roman has 
been criticised as not being “independent of changes in the overall growth rate 
unaccompanied by structural change” (Moore, 1978) the criticism does not seem to 
hold for the formulation presented here. Further, the solution proposed to resolve 
this criticism involves an overly complex approach based on vector space and 
involving trigonometry. For the purposes of the argument, this degree of complexity 
is not required. 
The results of the delta-index are as follows:  
 1995-2007 1995-2002 2002-2007 2002-2005 
Δ0−T (per cent) 3.1 4.8 6.5 7.8 
The index results show that at the level of 47 sectors adopted in China’s more 
detailed industrial value-added data tables, structural change did not cease after 
2002, but was in fact greater on average during the years 2002 to 2007 than it was 
during 1995 to 2002. The years 2002 to 2005 were amongst the periods of highest 
structural change at this level of sectoral disaggregation.  
We have thus confirmed the first alternative hypothesis: structural change 







three-industry level of economic aggregation because finer levels of sectoral 
aggregation exhibited counterbalancing changes.  
While this is sufficient to establish the proposition that structural transformation has 
occurred, the possibility of the second alternative hypothesis, that China’s 
provinces are undergoing counter-balancing structural changes, should still be 
considered.  
Alternative*hypothesis*2:*Structural*change*is*regionally!off/setting*
The overwhelming feature of China is its size. Size dominates almost every analysis 
of China. But China is composed of 23 provinces, five autonomous regions, four 
municipalities and two special autonomous regions (SARs) that can be studied 
separately. The two SARs (Hong Kong and Macau) are set aside in this study 
because they are substantially different cases to the rest of China. However it is 
plausible that the remaining 32 administrative divisions (hereafter referred to 
collectively as ‘provinces’ for convenience) exhibit significant variation in their 
economic growth patterns. To see the plausibility of this hypothesis, one only need 
consider the variation in GDP per capita across the provinces. Figure 3.8 shows the 
considerable divergence in Gross Regional Product (GRP) per person across 
China’s provinces. While national GDP per capita is RMB 25,575 per capita, GRP 
ranges from three times that much in Shanghai to less than half that much in 
Guizhou.   
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Figure 3.8: Gross Regional Product (2009) (RMB per person) 
 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 2-15) 
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Figure 3.9: GRP, urbanisation and industry share of GRP (2009) 
 
Note: The area of each bubble is proportional to GDP per capita in 2008 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 2-15 and 3-4) 
 
The diversity of China’s provinces is further illustrated in Figure 3.9. The horizontal 
axis shows the percentage of population living in urban areas. The municipalities of 
Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin stand apart from the rest of the country, with 
urbanisation rates of 89, 85 and 78 per cent, respectively, while the majority of 
China’s provinces have urbanisation rates between 40 and 60 per cent with several 
provinces below 30 per cent. Similarly, the three richer municipalities are also 
amongst the provinces that have witnessed the largest deindustrialisation, in terms 
of the fall in share of GRP from industry measured against the peak level for that 
province (Beijing, with the largest deindustrialisation, witnessed industry fall from 
65 per cent of GRP in 1978 to 19 per cent in 2009) (NBSC, 2009). 
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Comparing sectoral shares of gross regional product (GRP) with sectoral shares of 
GDP over the period 2000 to 2007 reveals whether or not the apparent stay on 
structural transformation evident in Figure 3.6 was due to offsetting structural 
change across the different provinces. It appears that structural change at the 
three-sectoral level is more apparent when looking at provinces separately, rather 
than the country as a whole. Table 3.3 shows that while the secondary sector’s 
share of China’s GDP rose from 39 per cent in 2002 to 42 per cent in 2007 its share 
of Beijing’s GRP fell 2 per cent over the same period while its share of Jiangxi’s 
GRP rose 13 per cent. Similarly, the service sector’s share of China’s GDP 
remained between 41 and 42 per cent throughout the period from 2002 to 2007, 
but its share of Xinjiang’s GRP fell by 8 per cent over the same period while its 
share of Guizhou’s GRP rose 6 per cent. The change in sectoral shares of GRP for 
each province and for China as a whole over the period 2002 to 2007 are reported 
in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: Change in sector share of GRP from 2002 to 2007 
 Primary Secondary Industry Construction Tertiary 
National -3.0 2.5 2.2 0.4 0.4 
Shanghai -0.6 0.9 2.2 -1.3 -0.4 
Beijing -0.9 -2.0 -1.3 -0.7 2.9 
Tianjin -1.7 7.6 7.7 -0.1 -5.8 
Jiangsu -3.4 2.7 4.6 -1.8 0.7 
Zhejiang -3.3 2.9 2.9 -0.0 0.4 
Guangdong -2.1 5.8 6.9 -1.1 -3.7 
Inner 
Mongolia 
  -5.7 9.7   9.6 0.1 -3.9 
Shandong -3.9 6.4 7.7 -1.2 -2.6 
Liaoning -0.5 5.3 4.4 0.8 -4.8 
Fujian -4.0 3.6 3.0 0.6 0.5 
Jilin -4.2 6.7 6.9 -0.2 -2.5 
Hebei -2.7 4.4 4.9 -0.5 -1.7 
Chongqing   -3.8 3.7  3.6 0.1 0.0 
Hubei -1.9 2.4 2.4 -0.0 -0.5 
Heilongjiang -1.1 3.7 3.9 -0.2 -2.6 
Ningxia -3.0 10.2 10.8 -0.6 -7.2 
Shaanxi -1.7 9.5 10.2 -0.7 -7.8 
Shanxi -1.7 9.5 10.2 -0.7 -7.8 
Henan -6.6 9.3 10.0 -0.7 -2.7 
Xinjiang -1.1 9.4 11.1 -1.8 -8.3 
Qinghai -2.1 7.5 14.8 -7.3 -5.4 
Hainan -5.2 6.6   -1.5 
Sichuan -2.8 7.5 8.2 -0.7 -4.7 
Jiangxi -5.4 13.2 12.7 0.5 -7.8 
Anhui -6.0 6.7  4.0 1.0 -0.7 
Hunan -2.7 5.9 6.2 -0.3 -3.1 
Guangxi -3.0 7.2 7.4 -0.2 -4.2 
Tibet -8.5 8.6 0.9 7.7 -0.1 
Yunnan -2.4 2.8   -0.5 
Gansu -3.2 6.6 7.7 -1.1 -3.4 
Guizhou -7.4 1.8 6.4 -3.7 5.6 
Note: data points in bold indicate no data available for 2007. In that case data for 2006 was 
used.  
Source: NBSC Provincial Yearbooks, various 
 
The second alternative hypothesis, that China’s provinces are undergoing counter-
balancing structural changes, also appears to be correct1, supporting Proposition 
4, that China has experienced a fundamental transformation in production over the 
past 30 years, despite the apparent evidence that the process of transformation 
stalled in 2002 presented in Figure 3.6.  
                                                
1 Note, the hypotheses are not alternative to each other, but are alternative to the appearance of ‘no 




It has now been demonstrated that China’s production structure has continued 
undergoing a substantial transformation since 2001 despite the evidence presented 
in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. At the national level, the structural change of 
production has continued to occur, albeit at a finer level of sectoral detail than the 
three principle sectors. However, at the provincial level continual changes to the 
relative importance of the three principle sectors have continued at least up until 
2007. The next section links China’s continued transformation of production 
directly to aspects of change and non-linearity in the energy use – economic 
growth relationship.  
Impact*of*China’s*production*transformation*on*energy*
Table 3.2 gave an illustrative example of how structural change can impact the 
energy-economy relationship when sectors have unequal energy intensities. As can 
be seen from Table 3.2, changes in energy use can be traced back to changes in 
energy intensity, structural change, and changes in total output. Chapter 2 argued 
that the preferred methodology for isolating the changes in energy intensity, 
structure and magnitude of production in China was index decomposition analysis, 
IDA, and that the best index form to use was the multiplicative version of the 
logarithmic mean Divisia index.  
The first step to implement LMDI is to define a general identity: 
 (3.3) 
according to the following definitions: 
V t is total non-residential primary energy consumption in year t  
Vit is total energy consumption of sector i in year t  
x1,it is energy intensity of sector i in year t  
x2,it is sector i ’s value added share of total GDP in year t  
x3,it is GDP in year t  
Diverging from the standardised terminology, the general identity can expressed 
more intuitively as an energy identity: 







Where E is non-residential primary energy consumption; t identifies the year, i
identifies the sector, and Y represents output (value added). The right hand side 
represents the energy intensity of each sector; the share of each sector in total 
output; and the scale of total output. The energy identity formulation makes clear 
that the issue is one of sustainable development. Accepting that higher values of 
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Following the multiplicative LMDI approach, the change in energy consumption 




given the following definitions: 
Dtot is the total effect: the ratio of total non-residential primary energy 
consumption in year T to year 0  
VT is total non-residential primary energy consumption in year T  
V 0 is total non-residential primary energy consumption in year 0  
Dx1 is the intensity effect 
Dx2 is the structural effect 
Dx3 is the quantity effect  
Each of the decomposition factors are estimated according to the following 
equation: 













V 0 = Dx1Dx2Dx3
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 (3.6) 
 One of the great advantages of the IDA approach is the relatively simple data 
requirement. The above decomposition requires two sets of data: primary energy 
consumption and value-added of industry. The energy statistical yearbook (NBSC, 
2009) publishes national primary energy consumption at the sectoral level for 44 
sectors for the years 1995 to 2008. Data for sectoral value-added must be 
collected from a wider variety of sources. Unfortunately China stopped reporting 
sectoral level value-added data from 2008 onward, so our decomposition analysis 
is restricted to the years 1995 to 2007. Most of the value-added data come from 
China Statistical Yearbooks and China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbooks. 
Appendix C tabulates the data sources used for each component of the sectoral 
value added table. The full table is presented in Appendix D.   
IDA)Results)
Table 3.4 presents the decomposition results for the changes in primary energy 
consumption by producers. All the results are presented as ratios. The intensity 
effect estimates the change in total primary energy consumption by producers due 
to changes in the amount of energy consumed per unit of value-added by a given 
sector, summed across all sectors. The structural effect estimates the change in 
total primary energy consumption by producers due to changes in the share of 
GDP accounted for by the value-added of different sectors. The quantity effect 
estimates the change in total primary energy consumption by producers due to 
change in total GDP. The total effect estimates the change in total primary energy 
consumption by producers. The error is the difference between the total effect and 
the actual, observed change, largely due as explained in Chapter 2 by Type I 
errors.  
In all cases, a value of 1 indicates no change from one year to the next. A value 
below one indicates a reduction and a value above one indicates an increase. For 
instance, the intensity effect in 1995-1996 is 0.91. This tells us that if the total 
quantity and structure of GDP did not change from 1995 to 1996, but the energy 
intensity of production was equal to the observed change, then total primary 
Dxk = exp
ViT −Vi0( )
lnViT − lnVi0( )
VT −V 0( )






















energy consumption in 1996 would be 0.91 times the level of 1995.  We can 
interpret this as estimating that changes in energy intensity for 1995-1996 resulted 
in a 9 per cent reduction in energy consumption. 
Table 3.4 reveals much about the nature and determinants of the relationship 
between energy use and production in China over the past 12 years. Each value 
represents the ratio of energy use in the later period to the former period. One 
advantage of the LMDI approach is that results for several consecutive years can 
be calculated simply by multiplying the results for each of the years in the string. 
For instance, the intensity effect for 1995-2007 in Table 3.4 is calculated by 
multiplying the intensity effect of each year from 1995 to 2007. The top section of 
the table presents year-on-year results, while the bottom section presents results 
for longer groups of years.  
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 provide alternative graphical representations of the 
results presented in Table 3.4. Figure 3.10 shows the annual results, adjusted by 
simply subtracting 1 from each result and expressing the values as percentages. 
The effect is that a value of 1 in Table 3.4, which represents no change, is 
expressed in Figure 3.10 as 0 per cent, while a value less than 1 in Table 3.4 is 
expressed as a negative percentage change, and a value greater 1 in Table 3.4 is 
expressed as a positive percentage change. Figure 3.11 presents the cumulative 
impact of each effect.  
Figure 3.11 provides the most striking results. The overwhelming impact of the 
quantity effect is instantly observable. In an economy growing as quickly as 
China’s, this is to be expected. It is also clear that both the structural effect and 
intensity effect have acted to offset the quantity effect, however the intensity effect 
has had far more impact than the structural effect.  
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Figure 3.10: IDA results (1995-2007) – annual 
 
Note: results for 2003-2005 have been split evenly 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 3.11: IDA results (1995-2007) – cumulative 
 
Note: results for 2003-2005 have been split evenly 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 3.4: IDA results (1995-2007) 




effect Total Error 
1995-1996 0.91 0.98 1.17 1.04 0.000 
1996-1997 0.93 0.98 1.11 1.00 -0.003 
1997-1998 0.97 0.96 1.07 1.00 -0.004 
1998-1999 0.98 0.99 1.06 1.03 -0.004 
1999-2000 0.94 1.00 1.09 1.03 -0.007 
2000-2001 0.94 0.99 1.11 1.03 -0.003 
2001-2002 0.98 0.99 1.10 1.06 -0.002 
2002-2003 0.99 1.03 1.13 1.15 -0.001 
2003-2005 0.89 1.06 1.36 1.28 -0.001 
2005-2006 0.94 1.00 1.17 1.10 -0.001 
2006-2007 0.88 1.00 1.23 1.08 -0.001 
      
      
1995-2007 0.51 0.97 4.32 2.11  
1995-2002 0.70 0.88 1.96 1.21  
2002-2007 0.72 1.10 2.21 1.75  
2002-2005 0.88 1.09 1.54 1.48  
2005-2007 0.82 1.00 1.44 1.18  
Note: IVA data for 2004 is not available 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 3.4 presents the results more precisely. The results for the period 1995 to 
2007 show that total primary energy consumption by producers has more than 
doubled, with energy consumption in 2007 being 2.11 times the level in 1995. If 
output structure and energy intensity had remained constant over the whole period, 
the growth in GDP would have resulted in 2007 energy consumption being 4.32 
times the 1995 level. Only a very small part of the restraint on energy consumption 
was due to shifts toward less energy-intensive sectors, with the structural effect 
leading to a 3 per cent saving over the whole period. The overwhelming constraint 
on growth of energy use by producers was due to changes in the energy intensity 
of production, which resulted in a 49 per cent decrease in energy use. 
It has been demonstrated that China’s economy underwent a major transformation 
since the beginning of the reform era and that this transformation did not cease 
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after 2001. Why, then, did structural change have such a small impact on the 
energy use by producers? A partial answer to this question can be gleaned from 
Figure 3.11. The cumulative impact of the structural effect from 1995 was 
increasing reductions in energy consumption, but in 2002 this changed, with the 
cumulative effect of structural changes causing an increase in energy use. 
Throughout the period 1995 to 2002 structural changes resulted in modest but real 
declines in energy consumption. While the structural effect each year contributed 
only modest reductions in energy use, over the full seven years, an estimated 12 
per cent reduction in energy use in production can be attributed to structural 
effects. Then in the year from 2002 to 2003, the direction of structural 
transformation with respect to energy use changed such that producers’ energy 
consumption grew by 3 per cent over the year. Unfortunately China has not 
published value-added data for 2004 so changes in the period 2003-2004 cannot 
be isolated from those in the period 2004-2005: the change from 2003-2005 must 
be considered together. The structural effect over this two-year period continues in 
the same direction as 2002-2003, resulting in a 6 per cent increase in energy use 
over the two years.  
Taken together, the period 2002 to 2005 saw structural changes resulting in a 9 per 
cent increase in energy use by producers. The two subsequent years for which 
data are available ended this trend, but did not reverse it, with close to zero change 
in energy use by producers attributable to the structural effect for the years 2005-
2007. Table 3.4 shows that the structural effect from 2002-2007 resulted in a 10 
per cent increase in energy use by producers, almost completely reversing the 12 
per cent decrease attributed to structural change in the earlier period from 1995-
2002.  
The annual effects reveal a second change in the period 2002-2007 compared with 
the earlier period 1995-2002. From 2002, the magnitude of the quantity effect was 
considerably greater. This is clearly observable from the change in the gradient of 
the quantity effect in Figure 3.11. Table 3.4 reveals the significance of this change: 
the quantity effect over the seven years from 1995 to 2002 was 1.96, while the 
quantity effect over the five years from 2002 to 2007 was 2.21. Counterfactually, in 
the absence of any change in the economic structure or energy intensity, the 
change in output would have less than doubled energy use in the seven years prior 
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to 2002, but more than doubled energy use in the five years following 2002. These 
two observations provide the beginning of an explanation for China’s energy boom. 
Figure 3.10 also reveals that improvements in energy intensity were not constant 
over the 12-year period. There were two periods of very modest reductions in 
energy intensity: 1997-1999 and 2001-2003. Energy intensity fell much more 
rapidly in each of the other seven years. The years 2003 to 2007 were amongst the 
years in which energy-intensity fell most rapidly, with the single greatest 
improvement occurring between the years 2006 and 2007.   
These results raise their own questions. Why was there a boom in output beginning 
in 2002? Why was the boom most pronounced in relatively energy-intensive 
sectors? Why did the shift toward energy-intensive sectors cease by 2005 while the 
general boom continued? Why did reductions in energy intensity stall in 2001 and 
then improve so dramatically after 2003? 
Discussion*
Chapter 1 raised three fundamental forces that may be driving China’s economic 
transformation: central planning, China’s entry into the WTO, and China’s transition 
through the Lewisian turning point. 
The timing of China’s production boom and the change in direction of structural 
change point to the impact of entry into the WTO as a likely contender for 
explaining recent trends; however, exactly what real changes resulted from China’s 
entry to the WTO is unclear. 
One explanation is a major change in policy orientation following China’s entry to 
the WTO when Chinese policy makers embraced the idea that the market would 
solve any and all problems (Zhou, Levine, & Price, 2010).  In 1979 Deng Xiaoping 
proposed to quadruple GDP in 20 years, while energy use would only double. In 
response, China implemented an entire energy efficiency apparatus including: 
quotas on factories; monitoring systems; promotion of energy 
efficient technology at the factory level; closure of outmoded 
factories; financial incentives including a national program to 
invest in efficiency; establishing the China  Energy Conservation 
Investment Corporation with branches throughout China to 
evaluate projects; establishment of 70 energy conservation 
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service centres throughout the country to train people as energy 
conservation experts for their city or province (Levine, 2009), 
After joining the WTO, that energy efficiency apparatus, including detailed energy 
data collection, was “almost entirely abandoned” in favour of market mechanisms 
(Levine, 2009) allowing the unchecked growth of steel and cement production and 
the expansion of other energy intensive sectors, especially related to the 
construction sector. The 11th Five-Year Plan marked the end of the short period of 
policy blindness toward energy efficiency, with its major focus on energy intensity 
discussed in Chapter 1. The ‘policy explanation’ is supported by the results in 
Table 3.4, which show a shift toward energy-intensive industries and a decline in 
energy-efficiency savings. But the results in Table 3.4 also show an increase in the 
quantity effect that is unlikely to be related to energy efficiency policies.  
A second explanation is the result of China transitioning through the Lewisian 
turning point. If Garnaut, Song, Cai and others are correct that China is currently in 
the process of navigating the Lewisian turning point, can this explain the results 
observed in the previous section? According to Garnaut and Song (2006), the 
impact of the Lewisian turning point is to “generate structural change towards more 
capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated industrial structure at the 
relative expense of labour-intensive manufacturing and agriculture; and changes 
fundamentally the character of China’s interaction with the international economy” 
(Garnaut & Song, 2006). The changes described by Garnaut and Song effectively 
amount to a change in the factor endowments of an economy. Their conclusion 
follows the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, one result of which is that in the case of a 
relative increase in the endowment of one factor of production, output of products 
that employ that factor relatively intensively will expand, a result referred to as the 
Rybczynski effect (Feenstra, 2004). The results presented in Table 3.3 show that 
China’s provinces are at different stages of structural transformation, while Figure 
3.12 shows the variation in minimum wages across China’s provinces that could be 
driving the Lewisian effects. 
 96 
Figure 3.12: China's minimum wage by region 
 
Source: APCO Worldwide (2010) 
Identifying the impact of any Lewisian turning point effect, and isolating it from 
factor endowment changes due to other causes requires analysis beyond the 
scope of the present study. China’s labour market is notorious for the hukou 
system, and as Huang and Wang (2010) explain, China is yet to liberalise other 
factor markets. Golley and Meng (2011) show that the data are far from conclusive 
in support of the argument that China is currently navigating the Lewisian turning 
point. They argue that the evidence presented to support such arguments is 
misleading and that China’s institutional and policy barriers to a free labour market 
(not the exhaustion of surplus labour) are responsible for rising wages in the coastal 
provinces. A further point of complexity arises out of what Garnaut has come to 
recognise as the ‘turning period’ rather than the ‘turning point’ (Garnaut, 2010): the 
impacts of the turning period are distributed over a longer period of time, making 
the results more difficult to observe. Regardless of whether the Lewsian model is 
an accurate depiction of China’s current situation, it is still likely that changes in the 
 
5 
FYP will also provide improved social safety nets for  China’s  rural  population,  such as 
basic health care coverage and improved rural land distribution.  
 Regional development: As 
labor costs rise on China’s 
eastern coast, the western 
region will be more attractive to 
manufacturers. Long a 
government priority to drive 
development in that relatively 
less affluent region, the 
government will continue to 
grow the West through 
preferential policies such as 
land credit, lower taxes and 
subsidies for manufacturers 
looking to locate inland. 
 Income disparity: While a 
small proportion of individuals 
have become extremely 
wealthy, the income of many 
citizens has not kept pace with 
economic growth over the past decade. The 12th FYP will help increase income through 
raising minimum wage (for example, the Beijing government has recently announced its 
plan to increase minimum wages by 40 percent by 2015). Other policy tools will include 
the expansion of the government-funded social welfare and health care system and 
promoting labor-intensive service industries. Improved livelihoods are in turn expected to 
boost consumption as a percentage of GDP growth, a key goal for the 12th FYP.  
 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
China faces severe environmental degradation for many reasons, including rapid 
industrialization, a reliance on coal as an energy source, a relatively large and energy-intensive 
manufacturing industry and lax environ ental protection and e forcement. The 12th FYP is 
expected to focus on reducing pollution, increasing energy efficiency and ensuring a s able, 
reliable and clean energy supply. China’s   environmental g als will likely have  far-reaching 
effect as they will impact and shape a range of other industrial policies in a multitude of sectors. 
 
 Energy conservation: The 12th FYP is expected to contain preferential measures for 
developing energy-efficiency technology, as well as an expected mandatory energy 
emissions target of approximately 17 percent (down from the 11th FYP’s  20  percent).  
 Environmental quality: For the first time, this plan could contain green indicators that 
will hold local government officials accountable for green development, such as water 
consumption per unit of GDP, and proportion of GDP that is invested in environmental 
protection. The 12th FYP is rumored to include a new carbon emissions target that is in 
line  with  China’s  recent  pledge  to  reduce  40-45 percent of carbon per unit of GDP by 
2020, especially for high-polluting and high-energy usage sectors. In order to meet that 
commitment, government officials have recently made statements that a carbon tax may 
be implemented by 2013, as well as some type of carbon trading system by 2015, the 
form of which is currently being debated behind closed doors. The 12th FYP also will also 
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factor markets in China (especially rising wages in coastal provinces) have 
contributed significantly to the results presented in this chapter.  
Conclusion*
Analysing recent aspects of complexity and dynamism in the energy use – 
economic growth relationship in China necessarily begins with inspecting the 
relationship between energy use and economic production. The importance of the 
production side and the link between output and energy use have been established 
in this chapter. To demonstrate how the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth changes over time the chapter first linked energy use to 
production, then demonstrated how the structure of production in any economy 
transforms over time. The recent transformation of production in China was 
considered in some detail before analysing the impact of aspects of China’s recent 
transformation in production on energy use.  
The results of the analysis show firstly that the acceleration of production has 
dominated other aspects of the energy use – economic growth relationship. But it 
also linked the period from 2002 to 2005, in which China’s energy intensity grew for 
the first time since 1980, to the structural shift toward more energy-intensive 
sectors and a temporary decline in the rate of efficiency gains. Since 2005 China 
has increased the rate of efficiency gains and eliminated the structural shift toward 
energy-intensive sectors. Explaining why these changes occurred is a difficult task 
made even more difficult by insufficient data and multiple, apparently reinforcing 
events occurring roughly simultaneously. China’s entry to the WTO not only 
sparked a surge in production as China’s exports increased, but also a shift in 
policy orientation, an adjustment in factor prices and a change in consumption 
behaviour.  
While this chapter has emphasised the link between energy and production, 
production does not occur in a vacuum: it is a response to demand. The next 
chapters consider how changes to various aspects of demand since 2002 have 
impacted China’s energy use, beginning with Chapter 4, which focuses on 




Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production 
 Adam Smith (1776) 
Smith intended the above maxim, which comes from his discussion on the 
mercantile system, as a self-evident truth implying an obvious preference against 
government policies that attend to the interests of producers while sacrificing the 
interests of consumers. It serves also to focus the discussion on the relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth. Chapter 3 analysed changes 
in the relationship between energy use and economic production. It revealed that 
key drivers of China’s recent energy boom were a structural shift toward 
production of energy intensive sectors beginning in 2002, a decline in the rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency, and dramatic growth in the scale of production. 
But Smith’s words make it clear that production patterns are not fundamental 
drivers of the energy use. Druckman and Jackson (2009) make a similar point in 
relation to GHG emissions: “the responsibility for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
from economic activity lies with people’s attempts to satisfy certain functional 
needs and desires”. Chapter 1 demonstrated that in an open economy the energy 
used in production need not be equivalent to the energy embodied in consumption. 
The central objective of this chapter is to discover to what extent recent changes in 
China’s consumption are responsible for the rapid growth in energy use in China 
since 2002.  
The relationship of energy use to consumption (and other categories of final 
expenditure) is conceptually different to the relationship of energy use to 
production. This chapter therefore asks what is the best way to characterise energy 
use in consumption. Establishing a relationship between energy use and 
consumption raises the question of how that relationship evolves as the economy 
develops. Addressing that question draws on the experiences of developed 
countries at earlier stages of economic development. Comparing these 
observations with China’s contemporary experience not only helps answer the 
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question of how the relationship between energy use and consumption evolves 
through economic development, but also provides context to when asking whether 
China’s experience has been peculiar or familiar? To quantify the impact of 
changing consumption patterns on energy use, input-output structural 
decomposition analysis (IO-SDA) techniques introduced in Chapter 2 are 
employed. In this chapter, the IO-SDA is applied separately to three categories of 
final expenditure: rural household consumption, urban household consumption and 
provision of government services. The chapter concludes by discussing some 
implications for China’s energy future, an issue also taken up in the concluding 
chapter. 
Energy'use*in*consumption*
What is meant by energy-use in consumption? Chapter 2 explained two broad 
methods of conceptualising energy use: direct and embodied energy use. Energy 
use in consumption is best conceptualised as embodied energy use, explained as 
“the amount of energy required to deliver a product to final demand” (Miller & Blair, 
2009). This includes the direct energy use of non-Chinese producers whose 
products are consumed by Chinese consumers, and excludes the direct energy 
use of Chinese producers whose products are consumed by non-Chinese 
consumers. Chapter 3 presented a basic, illustrative energy flow diagram to depict 
the concept of direct energy use. Here, that diagram is adjusted to depict 
embodied energy. 
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Figure 4.1: Adjusted energy flow diagram 
 
In the adjusted energy flow diagram presented in Figure 4.1, total embodied energy 
use is represented by the sum of all arrows pointing to domestic consumption. It 
includes energy embodied in domestic consumption of raw fuels (the blue arrows 
connecting domestic and foreign primary energy supply to domestic consumption); 
energy embodied in domestic consumption of secondary fuels (the blue arrows 
connecting secondary energy commodities of domestic and foreign utilities to 
domestic consumption); and energy embodied in domestic consumption of non-
energy products (the red arrows connecting transformation into non-energy 
products by domestic and foreign firms to domestic consumption). It does not 
include any of the arrows pointing to exports. The diagram in Figure 4.1 does not 
show energy flows from foreign primary energy, utilities or firms, to domestic 
utilities or firms even though such transactions occur. The exclusion is for visual 
simplicity only, and the diagram is not intended to be a complete representation of 





































Chapter 2 detailed the IO methodology required to calculate embodied energy and 
explained the reliance on IO tables. The final use part of the two most recent IO 
tables (2002 and 2007), adjusted to show primary fuel consumption in consistent 
physical units, shows clearly the importance of considering embodied energy when 
analysing the relationship between energy and consumption. 












Intermediate use 24,835 8,869 916 1,048 35,668 
Final use 3,286 1,986 462 172 5,906 
Rural 
households 
1,141 119 16 52 1,328 
Urban 
households 
550 858 76 85 1,569 
Government 
services 
0 0 0 0 0 
Investment 0 0 0 0 0 
Change in 
inventories 
-231 42 -19 0 -208 
Exports 1,826 968 389 35 3,218 
Imports 236 4,184 14 8 4,442 
Other -1,231 71 136 0 -1,023 
Total Output 26,654 6,742 1,501 1,212 36,108 
Domestic Final 
Use 
1,460 1,018 73 137 2,688 
Total Output = Intermediate use + Final use – Imports + Other 
Domestic Final Use = Final use – Exports 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Intermediate use 43,883 14,136 1,788 1,710 61,517 
Final use 2,386 2,934 361 314 5,995 
Rural 
households 
1,389 344 9 107 1,850 
Urban 
households 
575 1,745 81 154 2,555 
Government 
services 
0 0 0 0 0 
Investment 0 0 0 0 0 
Change in 
inventories 
-703 -190 -195 0 -1,088 
Exports 1,125 1,035 465 52 2,678 
Imports 1,097 8,786 50 15 9,949 
Other -1,505 0 -24 0 -1,528 
Total Output 43,668 8,284 2,075 2,009 56,035 
Domestic Final 
Use 
1,261 1,899 -104 261 3,317 
Total Output = Intermediate use + Final use – Imports + Other 
Domestic Final Use = Final use – Exports 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In 2002, China’s total output of energy was around 36,000 PJ (Table 4.1). Total 
output is calculated as the sum of all energy used directly by producing sectors 
(intermediate use) and all energy used directly as a final use good (by households, 
government consumption, investment in fixed assets, change in inventories, and 
exported energy), minus imported energy and adjusted for survey errors (the ‘other’ 
column in China’s IO tables). In 2007 total output was 56,035 PJ (Table 4.2) (around 
1.5 times the 2002 level). Including net imports of energy, China’s total energy 
supply in 2007 was 63,306 PJ (calculated from Table 4.2). Fully 97 per cent of that 
energy was used for the production of intermediate goods. 
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The analysis in Chapter 3 focused on the intermediate-use energy: the energy used 
by firms to produce other goods. That type of analysis when applied to the 
consumption side would typically conclude that households’ total energy 
consumption was around 7 or 8 per cent of the national total energy consumption 
(total rural household consumption plus total urban household consumption 
divided by total energy output). This would be misleading since it ignores embodied 
energy implicit in the opening quotation in this chapter. Once all of the 
‘intermediate use’ energy is attributed to some ‘final consumer’, the results are 
quite different. 
These figures tell us that proper attribution of intermediate uses of energy is crucial 
to an accurate understanding of energy consumption. 
Justification*for*consumption*focus*
As argued in Chapter 1, energy embodied in consumption and energy-use for 
production are not equivalent and are independently determined. Chapter 3 
justified a focus on final energy use by producers, pointing to the dominance of 
producers as final users of energy, the fact that technological progress is a major 
determinant of the embodied energy intensity of goods and that such progress is a 
producer-side issue, and by pointing out that for the related area of GHG 
emissions, country emissions are counted with respect to their occurrence within 
that country’s borders, not with respect to their use as a factor of production for a 
product consumed by that country’s residents.  
But these arguments are incomplete. Environmental concerns have spurred interest 
in questioning whether environmental improvements in rich countries constitute 
actual reductions in the global level of GHG emissions, or whether they are 
accounting illusions due to shifting GHG-emitting activity off-shore: simply 
“indicators of increased ability of consumers in wealthy nations to distance 
themselves from the environmental degradation associated with their 
consumption” (Rothman, 1998). The argument underpinning research on 
environmental issues can be similarly applied to energy analysis: changes in the 
energy intensity of production may be due to real changes in the way our 
production systems meet global demand, or they may be due to changes in where 
things are produced. If the objective is to understand the energy needs of Chinese 
people, attention should focus on the total energy embodied in Chinese 
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consumption.  Moreover, understanding the relationship between energy use and 
consumption is important and useful because consumption is relatively well 
understood theoretically. Consumption patterns at different stages of development 
have been well studied and aggregate consumption levels are the subject of 
extensive quantities of data. Realistic expectations of energy demand requires a 
clear understanding of the relationship between consumption and energy use. 
Energy*and*consumption*during*economic*transformation*
Total energy use is ultimately a function of aggregate demand, and understanding 
energy flows in the Chinese economy must include this concept. Since patterns of 
consumption evolve as the economy develops, expectations of total energy 
embodied in China’s consumption should take into consideration changes in the 
energy-intensity of consumption (that is, the total amount of energy required to 
produce one unit worth of final consumption goods) and changes in the structure of 
consumption itself. Finally, understanding consumption trends enables the 
development of nuanced expectations about total embodied energy demand. The 
logic of this argument can be presented as six propositions: 
(1) Aggregate energy use is related to final consumption; (2) the relationship 
between energy use and final consumption is not constant over time; (3) the 
relationship between energy use and final consumption is dependent on 
consumption structure and production processes; (4) as economies develop, 
consumption structure changes; (5) China has experienced a fundamental 
consumption-side transformation over the past 30 years; and (6) China’s economic 
transformation has substantially altered the relationship between aggregate energy 
use and final consumption. 
The logic underpinning proposition (1), that aggregate energy use is related to final 
consumption, is directly related to Input-Output Analysis (IOA), which was 
explained thoroughly in Chapter 2. Proceeding on the assumption that the reader 
will accept the first proposition as having been demonstrated, consider the second: 
that the relationship between aggregate energy use and final consumption is not 
constant. Stating the proposition formally, if aggregate energy use is proportional 
to final consumption, through some calculable ‘total energy intensity of demand’ 
coefficient, that coefficient is variable.  The absolute quantity of final consumption 
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may change, and through the total energy intensity of consumption, aggregate 
energy demand will be affected, however, changes in the level of total consumption 
should not affect the energy intensity coefficient. In contrast, changes in the 
consumption bundle will affect the energy intensity coefficient.  
In Chapter 1 an illustrative non-linear energy-GDP relationship was presented. This 
was done in the context of interpreting GDP as total domestic output, but the exact 
same illustration applies if GDP is taken to mean total expenditure, one component 
of which is consumption. Since different products have different embodied energy 
intensities, a rebalancing of the relative share of products in the overall 
consumption bundle will alter the total energy intensity of demand.  
A second way in which that intensity can change is if production processes 
change. Even if final consumption remains constant in all respects, production 
processes may change over time. That change may be biased toward more or less 
use of energy. These two factors form the standard ‘structural’ and ‘technological’ 
effects that are the focus of many decomposition analyses. They are both focused 
on changes to the total energy intensity of demand, asserted to be variable by the 
second proposition. Together with the ‘quantity’ effect, they are the main 
categories for decomposing change in total embodied energy consumption. 
The demonstration in Chapter 1 that total energy intensity of demand is variable 
simultaneously establishes the third proposition: that the relationship between 
energy use and final consumption is dependent upon both consumption structure 
and production processes. 
The demonstration of the first three propositions has largely relied on referring to 
arguments established earlier in this thesis. Demonstrating the next three 
propositions requires new discussion and analysis. Subsequent sections are 
devoted to this. Demonstrating the fourth proposition, that consumption structure 
changes as the economy develops, largely relies on discussion of the theoretical 
development literature. The fifth proposition, that China’s consumption patterns 
have changed dramatically over recent decades, is empirical and will be 
demonstrated with reference to the most recently available Chinese consumption 
data. The final proposition, that changes in China’s consumption structure have 
impacted total embodied energy consumption in China, is analytical. This will be 
demonstrated with reference to the existing SDA literature and through new 
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application of SDA techniques. Having demonstrated the continuing influence of 
changes in consumption patterns over energy demand the chapter will end with a 
discussion of major influences on China’s recent and near-future consumption 
patterns. 
Economic*development*and*patterns*of*consumption*
There is no theoretical link between government consumption patterns and stages 
of economic development. However, household consumption patterns are strongly 
linked to development levels and growth rates. The argument that consumption 
structure is dependent upon economic development therefore focuses on the 
relationship of economic development to household consumption, both rural and 
urban.  
The relationship between a consumer’s expenditure on some particular good and 
that consumer’s income is known as an Engel Function: x p,w( ) , where x is 
demand for the good, p indicates constant prices, and w is the consumer’s wage. 
The derivative with respect to wages for a particular good ( l ) gives the wealth 
expansion path, expressed: ∂xl p,w( ) ∂w  (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). 
Only if the wealth expansion path of all goods are equal can an increase in 
household consumption have no impact on relative consumption shares. Even 
assuming very few product categories, such as food, other goods, and services, it 
is implausible to expect the income expansion path of each product to be equal. If 
the consumption basket is divided into larger numbers of discrete products the 
variety of income expansion paths should be expected to grow. 
In 1857 Ernst Engel published the first formal observation that consumption 
patterns depend on levels of wealth (Houthakker, 1957). In his study of production 
and consumption in Saxony, “he formulated an empirical law concerning the 
relation between income and expenditure on food… [stating] that the proportion of 
income spent on food declines as income rises” (Houthakker, 1957). In the post-
World War II era, when many rich countries were establishing development plans, 
there was interest in the question of whether consumption patterns followed 
predictable trends as countries moved from conditions of poverty to conditions of 
wealth. Houthakker (1957) contributed to that effort, examining household survey 
data across many countries to analyse the relationship between expenditure on 
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particular groups of items and total expenditure (controlling for household size). He 
considered four groups of items: food, clothing, housing and ‘others’. He found 
that although considerable variation existed across countries, the coefficient for 
food was uniformly less than one, confirming Engel’s law; the coefficient for 
clothing was almost uniformly between one and 1.5, classifying clothing as a 
‘moderate luxury’; the coefficient for housing was mostly less than one but the 
divergence across countries and regions was too great to make any stronger 
conclusion than the observation that housing is a necessity, confirming Schwabe’s 
law; and the coefficient for the ‘miscellaneous’ items were almost uniformly greater 
than 1.4, implying that goods other than the three main categories considered are 
of greater luxury value. 
Maslow formalised the evolution of individual human preferences in what has come 
to be known as “Maslow’s hierarchy of needs” in two papers on motivation theory 
(1943 and 1943). He described people as  
A perpetually wanting animal; the appearance of a need rests on 
prior situations, on other prepotent needs; needs or desires must 
be arranged in hierarchies of prepotency. (Maslow, 1943, p. 91) 
In aggregate economic terms, this translates into consumption profiles of countries 
with predominantly very poor people being dominated by consumption of 
necessities; as the number of people able to meet necessity consumption 
increases, the consumption profile shifts toward basic goods, then toward luxuries, 
and positional goods. It can be reasoned that the consumption profile is linked 
more directly to the share of population at certain income levels, rather than the 
national GDP per capita.  
It would be too strong to conclude that an ordered list of consumption preferences, 
applying across people, countries and time, could ever be constructed. As 
mentioned, Houthakker’s findings included considerable variation across countries, 
and even regions of the same country. Consumption possibilities are not constant 
over time, so that although necessity goods are relatively stable, luxury and 
positional goods are subject to variable perceptions and valuation. While a car may 
be a luxury good desired by Beijing’s present-day middle class, by the time 
Guizhou has a substantial middle class the personal car may have lost its status in 
favour of an urban apartment in the vicinity of a public transport hub. Already 
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China’s nouveau riche exhibit preferences for positional goods such as designer 
label clothing and accessories to lifestyle and experiential goods, such as holidays. 
There is substantial evidence that nation’s consumption profile, the aggregate 
result of individual consumption preferences, exhibits some broadly predictable 
variations as the economy develops, though precise predictions or ordering is not 
easy. This context establishes that the recent changes in China’s consumption 
profile, which will be discussed empirically in the next section, are not unusual – 
rather, they conform to the general experience of other, already developed 
countries. 
China’s*consumption*transformation*
The fifth proposition of the argument in this chapter claims that China has 
experienced a transformation of consumption patterns over the last 30 years. This 
section investigates that claim empirically, and separately for rural and urban 
households and government consumption. Figure 4.2 shows the level of GDP by 
expenditure for each of the main domestic consumer categories (fixed capital 
formation, households, government and changes in inventory). Figure 4.3 shows 
the same data calculated as relative shares of consumption by the different 
categories in the consumption identity. The most important feature to be observed 
in Figure 4.3 is the fall in the relative importance of household consumption, and 
the rise in the relative importance of investment (fixed capital formation).  
In 1978, at the beginning of the reform period, household consumption accounted 
for 49 per cent of total consumption, with rural households accounting for 30 per 
cent and urban households accounting for 18 per cent. At that time, investment 
accounted for just 30 per cent of consumption. In the first years after 1978, rural 
households increased their share of total consumption slightly, peaking at 33 per 
cent, mostly offset by changes in inventories. Household consumption peaked in 
relative importance in 1981-1982 at 53 per cent. Over the next two decades, to 
2000, household consumption fell moderately in relative terms to 48 per cent of 
total consumption despite the constant rise in the elative importance of urban 
households, which grew from just 18 per cent to 32 per cent of total consumption 
over the two decades. The modest decline in the relative importance of household 
consumption was offset by the modest growth in the relative importance of 
investment, which grew from 30 per cent in 1978 to 35 per cent by 2000.  
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Since 2000, the relative importance of household consumption and investment has 
changed dramatically, with the share of total consumption due to investment 
increasing by 12 percentage points over 9 years, to a peak of 47 per cent, while 
household consumption fell 11 percentage points to a low of 37 per cent. The 
decline in the relative importance of household consumption was evident in both 
rural and urban households: while rural households occupied a diminishing share of 
total consumption since 1982, urban households had been increasing almost 
constantly until 2001, peaking at 32 per cent of total consumption and falling to 28 
per cent by 2009.  
According to Perkins (2010), the falling share of household consumption in GDP is 
consistent with the rapid growth experience of other Asian countries, including 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan. However in China’s case household consumption has 
fallen from a level already around 15 per cent lower than was experienced by those 
countries. In Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the fall levelled off when GDP per capita 
reached around $10,000 in purchasing power parity terms. Whether this pattern 
repeats in China is yet to be seen. 
What has driven the dramatic transformation of China’s consumption profile over 
the last decade? Naturally, the level of expenditure in all categories (except 
changes in inventories) has increased. It is the relative rates of growth that have 
resulted in the changes to the overall expenditure profile. While urban households 
have driven a boom in household consumption, especially since 2003, 2002 began 
a much larger boom in fixed capital formation in China. Between 2000 and 2009, 
China’s annual growth in fixed capital formation has averaged 18 per cent in 
nominal terms: a doubling time of less than four years. At this growth rate, China’s 
fixed asset investment should have surpassed eight times the 2000 level around 
the middle of 2011. 
That China’s expenditure profile has undergone a major transformation in the last 
decade is undeniable. The next section looks more deeply into this question – 
considering household consumption specifically – to examine whether the 
consumption patterns within households has also changed. 
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Figure 4.2: Components of GDP by expenditure (hundred million yuan) 
 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 2-18) 
 
Figure 4.3: Relative shares of components of GDP by expenditure (per cent) 
 




Engel functions can be described both for aggregate consumption and for 
consumption of specific products or product groups. When different product 
groups exhibit divergent Engel functions and wealth expands significantly, 
consumption not only increases, but the pattern of consumption is transformed.  
The significant expansion of household consumption in China is evident from 
Figure 4.2 but to observe changes in the pattern of consumption, additional data 
are required. One simple measure used to demonstrate the changing consumption 
profile is the Engel coefficient, which measures food expenditure as a share of total 
expenditure. Figure 4.4 shows that for both rural and urban households in China, 
the Engel coefficient has declined steadily since the beginning of the reform era, 
with urban households consistently spending a slightly smaller portion of total 
expenditure on food.  
Figure 4.4: Engel coefficients of Chinese urban and rural households (1978-
2009) 
 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 10-2) 
 
The Engel coefficients are indicative of a change to China’s household 
consumption patterns. The high frequency of data available increase the usefulness 
of Engle coefficients compared with some other indicators, however, they do not 
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give any indication of changes in the portion of household expenditure outside of 
the food category.  
One source of data that details complete household expenditures by consumption 
category are IO tables. The most suitable IO tables for the purposes of confirming 
the presence of a consumption transformation are the higher frequency, less 
detailed IO tables. China has produced 17 sector IO tables for the years 1997, 
2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007. There are also IO tables for the years 1992 and 1995, 
however the sectors in those tables do not correspond with the those of the later 
tables, so the 1992 and 1995 tables are not used here. The five IO tables come 
from China Statistical Yearbooks (2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010). Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 present data as shares of total rural and urban household consumption for the 
year in question.  
The most useful visualisation of these changes can be achieved by aggregating the 
data into three consumption groups: food, manufactured goods and services. Food 
includes both the ‘agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry & fishery’ sector as well 
as the ‘manufacture of foods, beverage & tobacco’ sector. Services include the five 
sectors listed last in Table 4.3, and manufactured products include the remaining 
sectors. 
Figure 4.5 shows the transformation of consumption patterns in both rural and 
urban households over the past decade clearly. Food expenditure has fallen from 
around 60 per cent of rural household expenditure in 1997 to less than 40 per cent 
by 2007, and from around 40 per cent of urban household expenditure, to just 25 
per cent. The difference has largely been due to an increase in the portion of 
household expenditure directed to services, with rural households directing just 21 
per cent of total expenditure to services in 1997, but 42 per cent in 2007, and 
urban households directing 28 per cent of expenditure to services in 1997 and 49 
per cent by 2007. The share of expenditure on manufactured goods has not 
changed nearly so much, declining by 4 and 7 per cent over the decade for rural 
and urban households, respectively, with the entire decline occuring between the 
years 2000 and 2002. While rural households have only just begun to spend a 
larger share of their income on services than food, urban households passed that 
point before 2002.  
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Table 4.3: Rural household consumption shares 
(per cent) 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry & Fishery 38 32 30 26 21 
Mining  0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacture of Foods, Beverage & Tobacco 21 20 15 17 18 
Manufacture of Textile, Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Products 6 6 4 4 5 
Other Manufacture 2 3 2 2 1 
Production and Supply of Electric Power, Heat 
Power and  Water 1 1 1 1 2 
Coking, Gas and Processing of Petroleum 0 0 0 0 1 
Chemical Industry 3 4 3 3 3 
Manufacture of Nonmetallic Mineral Products 1 1 1 1 0 
Manufacture and Processing of Metals and Metal 
Products 1 1 0 1 0 
Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment 6 8 4 6 6 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 
Transport, Storage, Post, Data Transmission, IT 
Services & Software 2 3 3 5 5 
Wholesale and Retail Trades, Hotels and Catering 
Services 7 6 9 8 14 
Real Estate, Leasing and Business Services 6 8 14 12 10 
Financial Intermediation 2 3 3 3 3 
Other Services 3 4 10 11 11 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NBSC (2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010) 
 
Table 4.4: Urban household consumption shares 
(per cent) 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry & Fishery 20 18 15 11 8 
Mining  0 0 1 0 0 
Manufacture of Foods, Beverage & Tobacco 22 19 13 13 17 
Manufacture of Textile, Wearing Apparel & Leather 
Products 11 9 7 7 7 
Other Manufacture 4 4 3 3 3 
Production and Supply of Electric Power, Heat 
Power and  Water 1 2 3 3 3 
Coking, Gas and Processing of Petroleum 1 1 1 1 1 
Chemical Industry 2 4 3 3 2 
Manufacture of Nonmetallic Mineral Products 2 2 1 1 0 
Manufacture and Processing of Metals and Metal 
Products 1 1 1 1 0 
Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment 7 8 6 8 7 
Construction 0 0 0 0 1 
Transport, Storage, Post, Data Transmission, IT 
Services & Software 3 4 4 8 6 
Wholesale and Retail Trades, Hotels and Catering 
Services 9 9 13 12 14 
Real Estate, Leasing and Business Services 6 6 9 8 9 
Financial Intermediation 3 4 3 6 5 
Other Services 7 8 18 16 16 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NBSC (2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010) 
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Figure 4.5: Rural and urban household consumption shares 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Government*consumption*in*China*
Almost all (around 95 per cent) of government consumption is directed to the 
“other services” sector (see Table 4.5). While the level of government consumption 
has increased, especially since 2004, it has stayed between 13 and 15 per cent of 
total consumption expenditure since 1978 (NBSC, 2011, pp. 2-18). It should be 
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noted that China’s IO tables use special definition of government expenditure. 
Since the government is such a pervasive actor in China’s economy, most 
government activities are treated in the tables as a normal part of the supply 
process. Government owned firms, for instance, are treated as normal firms, and 
their purchases are not included in government consumption. Only government 
expenditure on final service delivery is included in government consumption in 
China’s IO tables. Since this is the data source being used here, that is the 
definition that applies in this chapter.  
Table 4.5 establishes that there is no major story to be told regarding 
transformation of government consumption.  
Table 4.5: Government consumption shares (per cent) 
 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry & 
Fishery 0 0 1 1 1 
Transport, Storage, Post, Data 
Transmission, IT Services & Software 0 0 2 2 5 
Real Estate, Leasing and Business Services 7 10 1 0 2 
Financial Intermediation 0 0 0 0 1 
Other Services 93 90 97 96 92 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Impact*of*China’s*consumption*transformation*on*energy*
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the evidence that aggregate 
energy demand exhibits a variable relationship to final consumption which is 
dependent on the consumption structure; that as economies develop the 
consumption structure changes; and that China has experienced just such a 
change in its consumption structure as it has developed since the beginning of the 
reform period. The next section will demonstrate that the fundamental 
transformation of China’s consumption structure has substantially altered the 
relationship between aggregate energy demand and final consumption. This 
proposition relies on the combination of changing consumption patterns and 
diverse embodied energy intensities, as demonstrated in Chapter 1. As mentioned 
above, this chapter analyses three functional relationships: E RH( ),E UH( ),E G( ) , 
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namely, energy as a function of rural household consumption, urban household 
consumption, and government consumption.  
Chapter 2 argued that the best methodology for analysing the impact of changing 
consumption patterns on energy demand is structural decomposition analysis 
(SDA). As with the analysis of the relationship between China’s production structure 
and energy demand presented in Chapter 3, the first step is to define an energy 
identity. Only slight modifications to the identity proposed in Chapter 3 are required 
for application to the current problem: 
 (4.1) 
Where, Et is the total quantity of energy embodied in consumption in year t , Ej ,it is 
the energy embodied in consumption of sector i by consumer group j in year t , Cj ,it
is the value of sector i by consumer group j  in year t , Cjt is the total value of 
consumption by consumer group j  in year t , and Pjt is the total population of 
consumer group j  in year t . The three consumer groups are rural households, 
urban households and government. The population of the government consumer 
group is taken as the total population of China. 
The right hand side represents the embodied energy intensity of each sector, the 
share of each sector in total consumption, the scale of total consumption per 
capita, and the population. As with the Production energy identity, the 
Consumption energy identity makes clear that the issue is one of sustainable 
development. People desire greater consumption (accepting a broad definition of 
“consumption”), but higher values of Et are problematic for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter 1. The sustainable development challenge is to achieve higher values of 






, that is, greater consumption, but restricted 
or lowered energy use. 
Following the multiplicative LMDI approach used in Chapter 3, the change in 
embodied energy consumption between years is decomposed according to the 
following general decomposition equation: 





















given the following definitions: 
Dtot is the total effect: the ratio of total embodied energy consumption in year T
to year 0  
VjT is total embodied energy consumption in year T for consumer group j  
V 0 is total embodied energy consumption in year 0  for consumer group j  
Dxi
j is the intensity effect for consumer group j  
Dxs
j is the structural effect for consumer group j  
Dxq
j is the quantity effect for consumer group j  
Dxp
j is the population effect for consumer group j . 
Setting aside terminology indicative of consumer groups (for simplicity), each of the 
decomposition factors are estimated according to the following equation: 
 (4.3) 
The biggest challenge of SDA, compared to IDA, is the relatively more complex 
data requirement. Embodied energy is not reported in statistical tables, and must 
be calculated from IO tables, energy balance tables and price index tables. 
Because of the reliance on IO tables, SDA for China is restricted to considerations 
of five-year intervals (or very few sectors). Existing literature has examined changes 
between China’s IO tables up to 2002, though recent literature focuses on energy 
related GHG emissions rather than energy consumption per say (see for example, 
Peters et al. (2007)). The next section gives a brief overview of the results related to 
consumption and embodied energy demand found in the literature (including the 
related literature on GHG emissions), and then extends the analysis up to 2007.  
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According to the energy identity presented in Equation (4.1) the three points at 
which consumption impacts energy use are the embodied energy intensity of 
consumption goods, the relative share of consumption goods in total consumption, 
and the magnitude of total consumption. The results of IOA provide the energy 
intensity of each sector. Here a modified version of the 2002 IO table is used in 
order to make it compatible with the 2007 IO table, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
There are 138 non-energy sectors and four energy sectors. Table 4.6 shows the 
seven non-energy sectors with the highest and lowest embodied energy intensities 
in 2002. Given the major discrepancy between the embodied energy intensity of 
different sectors, changes in the consumption profile will clearly have a major 
impact on energy use, as indicated in Chapter 1.   
Table 4.6: Seven most and least energy intensive sectors (2002) 
Energy intensity in 2002 
(GJ / 10,000 RMB) 
1. Urban public traffic (098) 1,455 
2. Transport via pipeline (101) 1,415 
3. Rolling of non-ferrous metals (062) 1,361 
4. Manufacture of metal products (063) 1,040 
5. Smelting of non-ferrous metals and manufacture of alloys (061) 922 
6. Timber and bamboo harvesting and transport (002.2) 817 
7. Manufacture of medicines (046) 745 
132. Manufacture of alcohol and wine 79 
133. Forestry (002.1) 77 
134. Social security (128) 74 
135. Real estate (113) 64 
136. Processing of aquatic products (016) 59 
137. Processing of petroleum and nuclear fuel (037) 58 
138. Banking, security, other financial activities (111) 58 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Expanding*the*general*embodied*energy*identity*
The general energy identity presented in Equation (4.1) can be written in an 
expanded form, identifying the consumer groups used in the current analysis: 
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 (4.4) 
This specific and expanded energy identity says that total energy consumption in a 
given year is equal to the energy embodied in rural household consumption of all 
sectors, urban household consumption of all sectors, and government expenditure 
on all sectors (all in the same given year). Following the logic of this expansion, the 
next section will first consider the relative importance of each consumer group 
before providing a detailed analysis of each of the consumer groups in turn, 
applying SDA to each individually.  
Overview:*relative*energy*use*by*three*main*consumer*groups*
When interpreting the three principal consumption-energy relationships it is useful 
to be aware of the context relating each consumer group to the others and to 
China’s total energy production, the quantity of energy used by China’s producers 
(the subject of analysis in Chapter 3) and the quantity of energy embodied in trade. 
The total energy requirements matrix derived through the IOA process explained in 
Chapter 2 shows the total energy consumption due to each consumer group. The 
values are reported as shares of total energy used for Chinese domestic 
consumption for ease of interpretation. The total domestic use is taken to be the 
sum of all energy inputs to goods consumed by rural and urban households, by 
government in the provision of services and for investment in fixed assets. 
Changes in inventories are included because they affect the total values, but the 
thesis does not offer any discussion of results associated with changes in 
inventories. Exports and imports are not counted toward total domestic 
consumption but are dealt with separately in Chapter 5. 
From Figure 4.6 we can see that in 2002, households accounted for 45 per cent of 
the total consumption (14 and 31 to rural and urban households, respectively) and 
47 per cent of total embodied energy use (16 and 31 per cent to rural and urban 
households respectively), making rural household consumption marginally more 
energy intensive than urban household consumption. Government consumption 
was clearly the least energy intensive, with government accounting for 16 per cent 
of consumption but only 12 per cent of embodied energy use. Given the results 
presented in Table 4.5 that showed the majority of government expenditure to be 
directed to the services sector, this should not be surprising. The final expenditure 
category, investment in fixed assets, accounted for both the largest share of total 












consumption (37 per cent) and the largest share of total embodied energy use (41 
per cent).  
Adding together rural and urban household consumption from Figure 4.7, it can be 
seen that combined household consumption generated 40 per cent of total final 
consumption (10 and 30 per cent for rural and urban households, respectively) and 
45 per cent of the total energy demand for all domestic consumption in 2007 (13 
and 32 per cent for rural and urban households, respectively). The household 
consumption results in 2007 were down slightly from their levels in 2002. As with 
2002, government consumption was the least energy intensive in 2007, accounting 
for 15 per cent of total final consumption and just 12 per cent of embodied energy.  
Again, as with 2002, investment accounted for the largest share of total final 
consumption and the largest share of embodied energy: 43 and 45 per cent 
respectively. The share of embodied energy in investment increased moderately 
compared with the share in 2002, changing from 41 to 45 per cent of total 
embodied energy: equal to the combined share from rural and urban households. 
The differences between the four energy relationships, , are 
deeper than simply embodied energy per unit of output. One additional difference 
is in the types of fuels from which energy is derived. The four main fuel categories 
are coal, petroleum and natural gas, coke and non-thermal electricity. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, differences across the four principal fuel groups are important for 
economic, social and environmental reasons.  
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Figure 4.6: Share of total final consumption and total embodied energy (2002) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 4.7: Share of total final consumption and total embodied energy (2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The differences in relative importance of each fuel type to each consumer group in 
2002 are summarised in Table 4.7 while Table 4.8 provides the same information 
for 2007. Rural households are revealed as deriving the largest share of energy 
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from coal with almost two thirds of their energy use coming from coal in 2002. 
Although this coal dependence diminishes somewhat by 2007 in favour of 
petroleum and natural gas, energy embodied in rural household consumption was 
still mainly derived from coal, with almost 60 per cent coming from that fuel source. 
Investment in fixed assets is also revealed as coal dependent, deriving more than 
half its energy needs from coal in 2002. As with rural households, investment 
dependence on coal diminished over the five years, with petroleum and natural gas 
supplying almost as much by 2007, but coal was still the source of 47 per cent of 
energy embodied in fixed asset investments. 
Table 4.7: Primary fuel shares in total embodied energy by consumer group, 
2002 (per cent) 
 Coal Petroleum & 
gas 
Coke Electricity 
Rural households 65.9 26.4 2.6 5.1 
Urban households 39.7 50.9 3.9 5.4 
Government 29.4 63.8 2.6 4.3 
Investment 52.2 34.9 7.4 5.5 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4.8: Primary fuel shares in total embodied energy by consumer group, 
2007 (per cent) 
 Coal Petroleum & 
gas 
Coke Electricity 
Rural households 58.4 33.3 2.4 6.0 
Urban households 29.5 61.3 3.8 5.4 
Government 26.0 66.2 3.2 4.5 
Investment 47.5 38.8 7.9 5.8 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Both urban households and government consumption were predominantly 
intensive in petroleum and natural gas, with almost two thirds of total embodied 
energy used for government consumption coming from petroleum and gas, and 
over half the embodied energy used for urban household consumption being 
derived from that fuel in both time periods. Coke and non-thermal electricity were 
less important fuel sources for all consumer groups. 
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In all consumer groups the portion of embodied energy derived from coal in 2007 
was 3 to 10 per cent lower than in 2002, with petroleum and natural gas accounting 
for virtually all of the proportionate increase. The relative importance of coke and 
non-thermal electricity remained relatively constant across all the consumer 
groups, but the shift away from coal toward petroleum and natural gas is both 
significant and important. 
The low relative importance of electricity as a source of embodied energy in the 
consumption profile of all consumer groups in both time periods is due to the focus 
on primary energy sources in the methodology of the analysis in this thesis. 
Electricity produced from coal is counted as coal consumption. Primary electricity 
includes only that produced from nuclear, hydro, solar, wind or other non-thermal 
generation techniques. Thermal electricity (that produced from coal, petroleum, gas 
and coke) is considered simply as a transmission mechanism for the primary fuel 
commodities. This approach can be a limitation in some regards since it obscures 
the extent of electrification in energy transmission. However, the thesis is not 
focused on questions of electrification so this limitation is not a concern here. 
This section has provided some context for the relative magnitudes of 
consumption, embodied energy intensity and fuel ratios of the four main consumer 
groups. The next section explores the relationship between consumption and 
energy in more detail, for each of the groups in turn. 
Energy*use*and*rural*household*consumption*
Households consume energy as both an embodied component of non-energy 
goods (for instance, the energy used to produce food purchased by households) 
and directly, as an energy commodity (for instance, the coal bricks purchased for 
cooking purposes). Rural households’ direct energy in 2002 was 1,328 PJ, or 1.70 
PJ per million people. In contrast, the IOA results show rural households’ total 
energy consumption in the same year was 2,846 PJ, or 3.64 PJ per million people, 
more than double that (see Table 4.1). The large discrepancy was due to the high 
proportion of energy embodied in rural household consumption of non-energy 
goods: 53 per cent of total rural household energy consumption (1,519 PJ, or 1.94 
per million people) was embodied in non-energy goods. Table 4.9 shows the 
breakdown of direct, embodied and total consumption of each fuel type and of 
aggregate energy for rural households in 2002.  
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Table 4.9 shows that the proportion of direct versus embodied energy consumption 
varied considerably across the four fuel types. A relatively large proportion of rural 
household coal consumption was consumed directly (almost two thirds). In 
contrast, only one fifth of coke consumed by rural households was consumed 
directly: 79 per cent was embodied in rural household consumption of non-energy 
goods with the largest share being embodied in farming (001) products. Petroleum 
and natural gas consumption was even more skewed toward embodied 
consumption, with 84 per cent being embodied in non-energy goods, with animal 
husbandry (003) and farming (001) products and road transport (097) being the 
main avenues of petroleum and natural gas embodiment. A larger portion of rural 
household consumption of electricity and heat power was direct consumption (36 
per cent), although even here the majority of rural household consumption was 
embodied in non-energy goods, with farming (001) products again having the 
largest share. Table 4.10 presents the equivalent figures for 2007. 
By 2007, rural households’ direct energy consumption was 1,850 PJ or 2.54 PJ per 
million people (almost 50 per cent greater than in 2002 in per capita terms, but only 
40 per cent greater in absolute terms). The results of IOA show rural households’ 
total energy consumption in the same year was 3,413 PJ, or 4.69 PJ per million 
people, meaning that 46 per cent of energy consumed by rural households in 2007 
was embodied in non-energy goods and services. The decline of almost 10 per 
cent relative to 2002 levels was due to rural households’ direct consumption of 
energy having grown faster (both at a faster rate, and by a larger increment) than 
the growth of embodied energy. Importantly, while direct coal consumption 
increased by a similar amount to direct consumption of petroleum and natural gas, 
the latter grew at an average rate of 24 per cent per year (a doubling period of less 
than three years), significantly higher than the 4 per cent annual growth in direct 
consumption of coal. 
 125 













Direct consumption (PJ) 1,141 119 16 52 1,328 
(PJ / million people) 1.46 0.15 0.02 0.07 1.70 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 734 633 59 92 1,519 
(PJ / million people) 0.94 0.81 0.08 0.12 1.94 
Total consumption (PJ) 1,875 752 75 144 2,846 
(PJ / million people) 2.40 0.96 0.10 0.18 3.64 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 













Direct consumption (PJ) 1,389 344 9 107 1,850 
(PJ / million people) 1.91 0.47 0.01 0.15 2.54 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 604 792 71 96 1,563 
(PJ / million people) 0.83 1.09 0.10 0.13 2.15 
Total consumption (PJ) 1,992 1,137 80 203 3,413 
(PJ / million people) 2.74 1.56 0.11 0.28 4.69 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 













2002 39.2 84.2 78.9 63.9 53.4 
2007 ! 30.3 ! 69.7 " 88.5 ! 47.2 !45.8 





Rural household total energy consumption increased from 2,846 PJ in 2002 to 
3,413 PJ in 2007. The change can be represented with the following expression:  
 (4.5) 
Separating the direct energy consumption from the embodied energy consumption 





The average annual growth rates of rural household direct, embodied and total 
consumption of energy are 6.8, 0.6 and 3.7 per cent, respectively, equating to 
doubling times of 7, 122 and 19 years. The change in rural household consumption 
of embodied energy can be decomposed into changes in energy intensity Di( ) , 
consumption patterns Ds( )  and per capita consumption levels Dc( )  and 
population Dp( ) , such that: 
 (4.8) 
whereDx,  x = i, s,c, p  are given by the formula established in Equation (4.3). 
Interpreting the values of is relatively simple. A value of 1 implies zero impact. A 
value between 0-1 implies the factor contributed to a decline in embodied fuel 
consumption (for example: 0.80 implies a 20 per cent decline) and a value greater 
than 1 implies that factor contributed to an increase in embodied fuel consumption 
(for example: 1.10 implies a 10 per cent increase). 
The results of the SDA are presented in Table 4.12. The first row presents 
estimates of the intensity effect: the amount by which rural household consumption 
of embodied energy would change if consumption patterns had remained constant, 
and only the production processes were allowed to change.  The result is an overall 
intensity effect of 0.76, which indicates a considerable energy-saving technological 














V 0 = DiDsDcDp
Dx
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rural household consumption over the period. This is a promising result from an air 
pollution and climate change point of view, especially since the technological effect 
was even greater on embodied coal consumption, pushing rural household 
consumption of embodied coal down by almost 40 per cent. The very low intensity 
effect on coal resulted in rural household consumption of embodied coal actually 
decreasing, while consumption of all other embodied fuels increased.  













Fuel intensity: !! 0.64 0.84 1.44 0.92 0.76 
Consumption Pattern: !! 1.06 1.20 1.03 1.05 1.12 
Per capita 
consumption: !! 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.30 
Population: !! 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Total: !!"! 0.83 1.23 1.79 1.17 1.03 
Error: 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Turning to the second row of SDA results, changes in the consumption pattern (the 
structural effect), which shows that rural households’ consumption bundle in 2007 
contained more energy intensive products than the 2002 bundle, resulting in an 
estimated 12 per cent increase in embodied energy consumption. The shift in 
consumption patterns moved furthest toward petroleum and natural gas intensive 
products, with the other fuels all registering moderate increases of between three 
and six per cent. The consumption pattern resulted in a considerable move toward 
petroleum and natural gas, partly due to the increase in consumption of products 
from three sectors: wholesale and retail trade (108), education (126) and catering 
services (110). Rural households spent almost nine per cent of their total 
expenditure in 2007 on retail products, compared with less than five per cent in 
2002. While this sector was not very energy intensive, the substantial increase in 
expenditure resulted in the quantity of petroleum and natural gas embodied in rural 
consumption of retail products increasing from 22 to 52 PJ. Similarly, the share of 
total rural household expenditure on education rose from three per cent in 2002 to 
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six per cent in 2007, resulting in embodied petroleum and natural gas levels rising 
from 14 to 29 PJ. The shift in expenditure on catering services was not as 
substantial as the other two sectors, but catering services were a more energy 
intensive sector. While its expenditure share rose less than two per cent, the 
impact on embodied petroleum and natural gas was an increase of 30 PJ. The 
embodied energy, energy intensity, and rural household consumption levels of the 
wholesale and retail trade sector, the education sector and the catering services 
sector are summarised in Table 4.13. 
The next two rows, per capita consumption and population, are almost constant 
across all fuel types. This is because the data are not sector-specific. The results 
show that the increase in per capita consumption of rural households resulted in an 
approximately 30 per cent increase in embodied consumption of all fuel types. The 
decline in China’s rural population in recent years has resulted in downward 
pressure on rural household consumption of embodied energy equivalent to an 
estimated 7 per cent decline between 2002 and 2007. It will be seen in the next 
section that the population effect is largely the result of the urbanisation of China: 
as the rural population falls the urban population has grown. In effect, the decline in 
rural household consumption of embodied energy associated with population 
changes merely reflects an accounting shift of consumption as people move from 
rural areas to urban areas. 
The fifth row of Table 4.12 shows the total effect. It is the multiple of the intensity, 
consumption pattern, per capita consumption level and population effects. The 
summarised results reported here may appear not to equate perfectly but this is 
due to rounding at the second decimal point. The total effect of changes in rural 
household consumption combined with changes in production processes varied 
substantially across the four fuel groups. The substantial improvements in coal 
intensity combined with a moderate shift toward coal-intensive products in the rural 
household consumption bundle resulted in a very moderate increase in the quantity 
of coal embodied in rural household consumption: just 5 per cent. In contrast, the 
increase in embodied coke was almost 80 per cent, though the relative 
insignificance of coke as a fuel source meant that this large relative increase 
contributed very little to the increase in total energy embodied in rural household 
consumption. 
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The sectors that had the largest impact on petroleum and natural gas consumption 
have already been discussed in this section. The relatively restrained increase in 
rural household consumption of embodied coal appears to be due largely to three 
other sectors: farming (001), manufactured of other foods (021)) and real estate 
(113). In 2002, rural households consumed around 400 billion RMB worth of 
farming sector output, embodying approximately 104 PJ of coal. By 2007, rural 
household consumption of farming sector products had fallen to 290 billion RMB 
embodying approximately 61 PJ of coal. The coal intensity of the farming sector fell 
from 26 GJ per 10,000 RMB to 21 over the five-year period, while the total energy 
intensity of the sector fell from 48 to 43 GJ per 10,000 RMB. While the 
technological effect in the farming sector was modest it was combined with the 
largest relative reduction in rural household consumption of all sectors, falling from 
21 to 12 per cent of total rural household consumption. The decline in expenditure 
share for the farming sector was almost double the decline of the share for the 
animal husbandry sector (003), which recorded the second greatest reduction in 
relative expenditure by rural households, falling from almost 12 per cent of rural 
household consumption in 2002 to 7 per cent in 2007. This change in consumption 
patterns combined with less energy-intensive production in the farming sector was 
an important contributor to rural households’ overall decline in embodied coal 
consumption.  
The second sector responsible for a large share of the growth in rural household 
consumption of embodied coke was the manufacture of other foods (021)1. In 
2002, rural households consumed around 29 billion RMB of products from that 
sector (just 1.5 per cent of total rural household consumption), embodying 
approximately 34 PJ of coal. By 2007 they consumed 53 billion RMB of ‘other 
manufactured food’ products (rising to 2 per cent of rural household expenditure), 
but the coal embodied in that consumption fell to 12 PJ. The decline was due to a 
substantial reduction in coal intensity of the sector, falling from 116 GJ per 10,000 
RMB to just 23, while total energy intensity of the sector fell from 183 to 36 GJ per 
10,000 RMB.  
                                                
1 This sector is a disaggregated component of the “other food processing and manufacturing 
(13019) sector reported in the 2002 IO tables, which recorded rural household expenditure of 
around 75 billion RMB. The RMB 29 billion figure comes from disaggregating the sector into 
five sectors: (016), (017), (018), (020) and (021) according to the method outlined in Chapter 
2. The values were then converted into 2007 prices. 
 130 
Finally, rural household consumption from the real estate sector in 2007 embodied 
61 PJ of energy less than it did in 2002 (40 PJ of which was coal). Though the real 
estate sector was not very energy intensive in 2002, embodying just 39 GJ of 
energy per 10,000 RMB of output (22 of which derived from coal and 14 of which 
derived from petroleum and natural gas) it was still responsible for considerable 
energy savings. By 2007, the energy intensity of the real estate sector fell to 14 GJ 
per 10,000 RMB (5 from coal and 7 from petroleum and natural gas). The result in 
relation to coal embodied in rural household consumption of the real estate sector 
was a fall from 52 to 12 PJ over the 2002 to 2007 period. 
These results are summarised in Table 4.13. They show that well-targeted energy 
efficiency gains can have a substantial impact, even if they occur in sectors that 
were not energy intensive to start with. 
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2002     407 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 104 66 11 16  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 26 16 3 4  
2007     291 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 61 43 8 12  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 21 15 3 4  
Manufacture of other foods (021) 
2002     29 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 34 15 1 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 116 51 5 11  
2007     53 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 12 5 1 1  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 23 10 1 2  
Wholesale and retail trade (108) 
2002     81 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 23 22 2 4  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 26 24 2 4  
2007     206 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 23 71 4 3  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 11 35 2 1  
 
Real estate (113) 
2002     239 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 52 32 4 5  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 22 14 2 2  
2007     227 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 12 15 2 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 5 7 1 1  
Catering services (110) 
2002     67 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 26 23 1 2  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 39 35 2 4  
2007     128 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 41 54 2 4  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 32 42 2 3  
Education (126) 
2002     67 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 24 14 2 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 35 20 3 5  
2007     147 B RMB 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 20 87 2 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 14 59 2 2  




There are both important similarities and differences in the pattern of energy 
consumption for urban households compared with rural households (see Tables 
4.14, 4.15 and 4.16). As with rural households, the majority of energy use (both 
direct and embodied) derives from coal or petroleum and natural gas, with coke 
and non-thermal electricity providing far smaller shares. A second similarity is that 
a declining majority of energy consumption was embodied in non-energy goods, 
though the share was higher for urban than rural households and the decline was 
less, falling from 72 to 70 per cent, compared with 53 to 46 per cent for rural 
households.  
A third similarity is that the growth in direct consumption of petroleum and natural 
gas and non-thermal electricity and heat power outstripped the growth in 
embodied consumption of those fuel sources. This is most likely related to the 
growing ownership of private cars and motorbikes that run on liquid fuels, the 
spread of electricity to homes in rural areas and increased ownership of home 
appliances across the country. The average annual growth rate of direct petroleum 
and natural gas consumption in rural and urban households was 24 per cent and 
15 per cent, respectively (doubling times of just under 3 and 5 years). Direct 
consumption of petroleum and natural gas by households can be expected to 
continue to grow as the number of middle-class households increases, as the 
prices of cars fall, and as China continues to build more roads.  
Despite these few similarities, there are important differences between the rural and 
urban household consumption relationships with energy. Most obviously, the total 
energy consumed on a per capita basis by urban households was around three 
times larger than by rural households and consumption of energy embodied in non-
energy goods by urban households was around four times the level of rural 
households. Both ratios fell only slightly over the five years. 
In contrast to rural households, urban households did not directly consume 
substantial amounts of coal: less than a quarter of urban household coal 
consumption was consumed directly, compared with more than two thirds for rural 
households. In 2002 rural households consumed 30 per cent more ‘direct coal’ per 
capita than urban households, although the reverse was true for embodied coal 
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consumption, with urban households consuming almost four times as much coal 
embodied in non-energy goods per capita as rural households. 
While rural households’ energy profile was dominated by coal, urban households 
consumed a higher portion of petroleum and natural gas: 50 per cent in 2002 and 
61 per cent by 2007 (compared with less than one third for rural households). On a 
per capita basis, urban households’ direct consumption of petroleum and natural 
gas was more than seven times greater than direct consumption by rural 
households in 2002, and was still more than five times higher by 2007 despite rapid 
growth in rural households (rural household direct petroleum and natural gas 
consumption grew at an average rate of almost 24 per cent per year between 2002 


















Direct consumption (PJ) 550 858 76 85 1,569 
(PJ / million people) 1.10 1.71 0.15 0.17 3.12 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 1,711 2,041 146 225 4,123 
(PJ / million people) 3.41 4.06 0.29 0.45 8.21 
Total consumption (PJ) 2,261 2,899 222 310 5,692 
(PJ / million people) 4.50 5.77 0.44 0.62 11.34 
Source: Author’s calculations 













Direct consumption (PJ) 575 1,745 81 154 2,555 
(PJ / million people) 0.97 2.94 0.14 0.26 4.30 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 1,922 3,452 243 304 5,920 
(PJ / million people) 3.24 5.81 0.41 0.51 9.97 
Total consumption (PJ) 2,497 5,197 324 458 8,475 
(PJ / million people) 4.20 8.75 0.55 0.77 14.27 
Source: Author’s calculations 













2002 75.7 70.4 65.8 72.5 72.4 
2007 " 77.0 ! 66.4 " 74.9 ! 66.4 ! 69.9 




Urban household total energy consumption increased from 5,692 PJ in 2002 to 
8,475 PJ in 2007. The change can be represented as:  
 (4.9) 
Separating the direct energy consumption from the embodied energy consumption 





Urban households can be seen to have increased both direct and embodied 
consumption of energy considerably faster than rural households, though the 
difference was greater for embodied consumption.  
As seen in the previous section, the change in urban household consumption of 
embodied energy can be decomposed into changes in energy intensity Di( ) , 
consumption patterns Ds( )  and per capita consumption levels Dc( )  and 
population Dp( ) , such that: 
 (4.12) 
where are given by the formula established in Equation (4.3).  
The results of the SDA are presented in Table 4.17. As before, there are both 
important similarities and differences between the patterns of energy use by urban 
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Fuel intensity: !! 0.63 0.83 1.27 0.92 0.75 
Consumption Pattern: !! 1.02 1.17 1.02 1.04 1.10 
Per capita consumption: !! 1.45 1.46 1.42 1.44 1.45 
Population:  1.17 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.17 
 1.09 1.66 2.15 1.61 1.40 
Error: -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The intensity effect on energy embodied in urban household consumption was 
even greater (further from a value of 1) than the effect on energy embodied in rural 
household consumption, driving a 25 per cent decrease in urban household 
embodied energy use. As with rural households, the impact was greatest on coal, 
and the only fuel with an intensity effect greater than 1 was coke. Although the 
intensity effect resulted in a 37 per cent decrease in embodied coal consumption 
by urban households, the structural, consumption and population effects meant 
that the actual change in the quantity of coal embodied in urban household 
consumption was a 9 per cent increase. 
A similar pattern can be seen across the other fuels, with the intensity effect 
restraining growth, but being overwhelmed by the structural, consumption and 
population effects, resulting in actual increases in the embodied consumption of all 
fuels, most substantially of coke. 
Since the intensity effect is not part of the behaviour of households, but relates to 
the production processes of various sectors, the key sectors where the intensity 
effect had the greatest impact on urban household consumption of energy were 
the same as those discussed in relation to rural households. While certain sectors 
had much more substantial improvements in energy efficiency, such as transport 
via pipelines (101), manufacture of cement, lime and plaster (050), and manufacture 
of brick, stone, and other building materials (052), output from these sectors was 
Dtot
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not consumed by households, so their impact on household energy use was only 
indirect, due to their use as inputs to other sectors.  
The sector recording the greatest reduction in energy intensity (excluding sectors 
whose output was not consumed by households) was urban public traffic (098). 
The energy intensity of the sector fell by almost 1,000 PJ, but because it is still a 
very energy-intensive sector and urban households spent a higher share of their 
expenditure on it in 2007 than in 2002, the total energy embodied in urban 
household consumption of urban public traffic increased more than the amount 
embodied in any other sector (see Table 4.19). 
As with rural households, the consumption bundle of urban households in 2007 
contained more energy intensive products than in 2002, resulting in a 10 per cent 
increase in embodied energy consumption. The effect was most pronounced in 
relation to goods intensive in petroleum and natural gas. The sectors recording the 
largest increase in their share of urban household consumption were wholesale and 
retail trade (108), health (127), manufacture of automobiles (074.1) and insurance 
(112). Consumption of each of these sectors embodied higher quantities of energy 
in 2007 than 2002. Details of the wholesale and retail trade sector were provided in 
relation to rural household consumption in the previous section and will not be 
repeated in related to urban household consumption. Details of the other three 
sectors in relation to urban household consumption are provided in Table 4.19. 
The growing wealth of urban households pushed up energy use much faster than 
the prosperity gains of rural households, resulting in a 45 per cent increase in 
energy embodied in urban household consumption, compared to a wealth effect of 
30 per cent for rural households. The simple implication of this result is that as 
China continues to urbanise and more Chinese people enjoy the rapid wage growth 
available in urban areas, the wealth impact on energy demand will continue to 
grow. 
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Table 4.18: Total and per capita growth rates of energy consumption 
 Average annual growth rate 
(per cent) 
Doubling time  
(years) 
Rural households   
Collectively 4.2 16.7 
Per capita 5.7 12.3 
Urban households   
Collectively 5.8 12 
Per capita 2.3 30.3 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 











Manufacture of automobiles (074.1) 
2002     24 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 17 12 3 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 71 49 12 11  
2007     151 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 4 4 1 1  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 31 35 10 6  
Urban public traffic (098) 
2002     31 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 9 547 1 2  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 30 1,751 4 7  
2007     87 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 16 1,229 4 5  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 19 1,414 4 5  
Insurance (112) 
2002     10 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 2 5 0 0  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 25 48 2 4  
2007     120 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 25 95 4 6  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 21 79 3 5  
Health (127) 
2002     164 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 60 56 5 9  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 37 34 3 5  
2007     430 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 154 149 16 22  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 36 35 4 5  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
By necessity, the population effect for urban households was approximately the 
reverse of the population effect for rural households, since it is predominantly the 
result of rural to urban migration. While population changes pushed consumption 
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of embodied energy by rural households down by seven per cent, it pushed up the 
consumption by urban households by 17 per cent. The asymmetry is likely due to 
the urban population growing at a rate faster than the rural population shrank, since 
China’s total population has also been growing. Comparing the growth rates of 
embodied energy consumption across all households with those on a per capita 
basis shows the importance of the population effect (Table 4.18). As the rural 
population has declined in China, the collective growth rate is lower than the per 
capita growth rate, although as the urban population has increased, collective 
growth rate is substantially higher than the per capita growth rate. 
Energy*use*and*government*services*
Government consumption as defined for the purposes of China’s IO tables was 
relatively minor and relatively stable, both in value terms and in terms of energy 
use. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 reveal total energy embodied in government consumption 
to be just 12 per cent of all total embodied energy consumed domestically in 
China. The share was constant in both 2002 and 2007. Table 4.20 shows the 
quantity of each fuel and the fuel share of energy used for government services in 
2002 and 2007. The importance of petroleum and natural gas relative to other fuels 
in the production chain supplying government services can be seen: petroleum and 
natural gas supplied almost two thirds of all the energy embodied in government 
consumption (a higher share than for any other consumer group). These important 
features of the energy profile of government services are due to the fact that almost 
all of government consumption is in the service sectors since, by definition, only 
final provision of government services is counted.  
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(PJ) 626 1360 55 91 2,132 
(per cent of total) 29.4 63.8 2.6 4.3  
2007 
(PJ) 809 2,061 100 141 3,112 
(per cent of total) 26.0 66.2 3.2 4.5  
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Structural*decomposition*analysis*
Energy embodied in government services increased from 2,132 PJ in 2002 to 3,112 
PJ in 2007. The change can be represented with the following expression:  
 (4.13) 
As government services do not include the direct purchase of any primary fuel 
commodities, this cannot be split into direct and embodied energy consumption: it 
is all embodied energy. The average annual growth rate of energy embodied in 
government consumption was 8 per cent per annum, equating to a doubling time 
of 9 years. As with rural and urban households, the change in energy embodied in 
government consumption can be decomposed into changes in energy intensity
Di( ) , consumption shares Ds( ) , per capita consumption levels Dc( )  and 
population Dp( ) , such that: 
 (4.14) 
where are given by the formula established in Equation (4.3). The results of the 
SDA are presented in Table 4.21. The first row presents estimates of the intensity 
effect: the amount by which energy embodied in government services would 








V 0 = DiDsDcDp
Dx
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processes were allowed to change.  The result: is an overall intensity effect of 0.83, 
which indicates technological changes have resulted in a significant reduction in 
the energy embodied in sectors consumed by government. As with the intensity 
effects recorded for households, the impact was greatest on coal consumption 
while only coke embodied in government consumption rose due to technological 
effects.   













Fuel intensity: !! 0.76 0.85 1.06 0.91 0.83 
Consumption Structure: !! 1.05 1.11 1.06 1.04 1.09 
Per capita consumption: !! 1.58 1.57 1.58 1.58 1.57 
Population:  1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 1.29 1.51 1.82 1.54 1.46 
Error: 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Source: Author calculations 
 
As seen earlier (see Table 4.5), government services have not undergone any major 
structural transformations since at least 1997. The estimated structural effect 
supports that finding, with relatively modest changes in each fuel being attributed 
to shifts in the consumption structure. Similarly, Figure 4.3 showed the share of 
government services in total GDP had remained constant, between 13 and 15 per 
cent of GDP: expenditure on government services essentially increased in line with 
GDP.  
The consumption effect, which estimates the impact of per capita changes in 
government services on energy use, indicates an increase of 57 per cent over the 
five years. In the absence of any change to energy intensity, to the structure of 
government consumption, or to the population level, this would have resulted in 
energy use for government services reaching 3,347 PJ in 2007, equating to an 
average annual growth rate of 9.4 per cent, which is very near China’s real GDP 
growth rate over the last decade. The fourth row estimates the effect that China’s 
population growth had on energy used for government services. As China’s 
Dtot
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population growth is restrained as a matter of policy, this effect was relatively 
modest, contributing an average annual growth rate of half a per cent to the 
increase in energy for government consumption over the period. 
The final row (excluding estimated errors) estimates the total effect that changes to 
production and consumption of government services had on fuel consumption. 
These results are similar to those for household consumption: coke consumption 
increased by the greatest proportion, but from such a low base that it contributed 
relatively little to overall energy use. Petroleum and natural gas use increased by a 
greater amount than coal use. Electricity and heat power used for government 
services increased by a substantial proportion, as did the amount used for urban 
household consumption, but the amount used by rural households increased by a 
much more modest amount. This pattern is most likely due to the higher share of 
electricity intensive products in government and urban consumption than rural 
consumption, namely, of services rather than food. 
In government consumption in particular, services dominated the consumption 
structure. Significant amounts of energy were embodied in government 
consumption of only five sectors, though two stand out as substantially more 
energy-using than the other three. The two are public management and social 
organisation (135) and urban public transport (098), while the other three sectors 
are education (126), health (127) and management of public facilities (123). 
By far, the largest amount of energy used for government services was embodied 
in the public management and social organisation (135) sector. This is exclusively a 
government consumption sector: it is not used as an input to any other sector and 
is not consumed by any other category of consumer. The only discrepancy 
between government consumption of the sector and total output and total 
domestic consumption is a very small amount of imports and exports and a slightly 
larger amount of reporting errors. Public management and social organisation 
accounted for around half of all expenditure on government services, although the 
share fell from 55 per cent to 45 per cent between 2002 and 2007. Although the 
share of total government consumption directed to the sector declined, the level of 
expenditure increased by almost 400 billion RMB, with the result that total energy 
embodied in government consumption of this sector increased by a relatively large 
proportion.  
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The high petroleum and natural gas intensity of the urban public transport (098) 
sector has already been discussed. Although the sector attracted less than 2 per 
cent of total government expenditure, that share of government expenditure 
generated almost as much energy demand as the share directed to public 
management and social organisation, making it the sector generating the second 
highest level of energy demand due to government service provision. 
Education (126) attracted the second highest share of government consumption, 
accounting for around a fifth of all government services expenditure, rising slightly 
over the last decade to 747 billion RMB in 2007 (almost double the household 
expenditure on education in that year). The very low (and improving) energy 
intensity of this sector resulted in only moderate energy demand relative to the high 
level of expenditure.  
Energy use for government health (127) expenditure increased by a greater 
proportion than energy use for expenditure on any other government services, 
rising from 148 PJ to 432 PJ from 2002 to 2007.  While the health sector had 
relatively low energy intensity (79 GJ per 10,000 RMB in both periods) government 
expenditure on this sector grew dramatically. As a share of total government 
expenditure it almost doubled, from 8.8 per cent in 2002 to 15.5 per cent in 2007, 
attracting an extra 357 billion RMB, raising government health expenditure to a 
level 25 per cent higher than household health expenditure. 
Management of public facilities (123) is the final sector for which government 
expenditure generated significant energy demand. The energy use for government 
consumption on management of public facilities was relatively constant over the 
period, falling by just 8 PJ to 127 PJ by 2007. The decline was due to a modest 
increase in the level of expenditure (a slight reduction in the share of total 
government expenditure) combined with a reasonable improvement in energy 
intensity, both in relation to coal and (more significantly) in relation to petroleum 
and natural gas.  
 144 











Urban public transport (098) 
2002     28  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 8 491 1 2  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 30 1,751 4 7  
2007     51 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 9 715 2 3  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 19 1,414 4 5  
Management of public facilities (123) 
2002     54 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 22 108 3 3  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 40 200 5 6  
2007     77 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 18 103 3 4  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 23 134 4 5  
Education (126) 
2002     385 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 136 78 1
0 
19  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 35 20 3 5  
2007     747 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 152 147 1
7 
32  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 20 20 2 4  
Health (127) 
2002     187 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 69 64 5 10  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 37 34 3 5  
2007     544 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 195 189 2
0 
27  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 36 35 4 5  
Public management and social organisation (135) 
2002     1,172 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 298 504 2
5 
44  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 25 43 2 4  
2007     1,566 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 322 575 3
5 
54  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 21 37 2 3  





The discussion and analysis in this chapter have important implications for China’s 
energy future. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that combined rural and urban household 
consumption was ultimately responsible for around 45 per cent of energy use in 
China between 2002 and 2007. While rural households’ energy use barely changed 
between 2002 and 2007, urban household energy use was 45 per cent higher in 
2007 than it was in 2002. The rapid growth in urban household energy use 
appeared to be the result of growing per capita consumption combined with a 
growing population and a shifting consumption bundle.  
Figure 4.8 shows China’s rural and urban population levels since 1970 up to the 
latest available year, 2009, then depicts the population levels targeted under 
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. Although urbanisation has resulted in a falling rural 
population and rapid growth of the urban population, there is still a long way to go 
before China approaches the urbanisation rate of most developed economies. In 
the 12th Five-Year Plan, China has targeted a total population of no greater than 
1.39 billion people with an urbanisation rate of 51.5 per cent by 2015 (Xinhua, 
2011). Meeting these targets would equate to an urban population growth of 94 
million people over five years, while the rural population would shrink by almost 40 
million people. This level of change is very close to the 92 million additional urban 
residents and 55 million fewer rural residents recorded between 2002 and 2007, 
implying that the population effect on household energy use over the 12th Five-Year 
Plan period would likely be similar to the population effect estimated in this 
chapter. In level terms, this equates to a ceteris paribus increase in household 
energy consumption of around 700 PJ due to population changes over five years. 
At the present rate of urbanisation, China’s urban population will reach 70 per cent 
of the total population in 2025. In China’s long march to urbanisation, the 
population effect alone ensures that household consumption will remain a strong 
driver of energy use in China for at least the next two decades. 
 146 
Figure 4.8: Population in China, 1970-2015 (millions of people) 
 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 3-1) and Author’s calculations based on Xinhua (2011) 
 
Two important targets in the 12th Five-Year Plan relate to GDP growth and the 
consumption share of GDP. The Plan calls for GDP to grow by seven per cent 
annually, and the consumption share of GDP to grow by an unspecified amount. 
Interpreting the target of ‘higher consumption share of GDP’ as an annual increase 
in the consumption share of GDP at a rate of one percentage point per year, leads 
to a consumption rate of 42 per cent by 2015. Assuming government consumption 
and net exports retain their relatively constant share of GDP at 17 per cent, the 
investment share of GDP must fall to 41 per cent. The ratio of urban to rural 
household consumption per capita has remained relatively constant, between 3.6 
and 3.7 since 2000 (NBSC, 2011, pp. 2-17). Assuming that ratio continues to stay 
constant the total rural and urban household consumption targeted by the 12th 
Five-Year Plan can be calculated. These results are depicted in Figure 4.9.   
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Figure 4.9: GDP by expenditure under the 12th Five-Year Plan (100 million 
RMB) 
 
Source: NBSC (2011, pp. 2-17) and Author’s calculations based on Xinhua (2011) 
 
The final target in the 12th Five-Year Plan necessary to draw implications for 
China’s energy future is the energy consumption per unit of GDP: this is targeted to 
be reduced by 16 per cent by 2015 compared with the 2010 level. Assuming a 
constant rate of improvement allows the projection of IOA results from 2007 on an 
annual basis to 2015 in accordance with the targets established under China’s 12th 
Five-Year Plan. Those results are presented in Figure 4.10. It is clear from Figure 
4.10that China’s targets under the 12th Five-Year Plan imply that urban household 
energy consumption will grow at a higher rate than it did under the 2002-2007 
period, while rural household energy consumption will continue to grow at around 
the 2002-2007 rate.   
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Figure 4.10: Estimated rural and urban household energy use under 12th 
Five-Year Plan conditions: 2002-2015 (PJ) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Whether the reality of China’s household energy consumption between 2010 and 
2015 will match the scenario depicted in Figure 4.10 depends on how closely China 
achieves its targets of GDP growth, population growth, urbanisation and energy 
intensity and whether the ratio of urban to rural per capita consumption remains 
constant. Changes to the consumption bundle will also cause deviations between 
reality and this scenario, but the results of the SDA presented in this chapter 
suggest those changes will be relatively modest. If, for instance, China’s GDP 
growth exceeds 7 per cent annually, the energy embodied in household 
consumption will be higher than this scenario indicates. If China fails to increase 
the consumption share of GDP, the level will be less.  
One aspect of the scenario demands attention. The total estimated energy 
embodied in household consumption in 2015 under this scenario is 20,717 PJ; 
almost double the 11,888 PJ estimated for 2007. This chapter has shown that 
household in China are responsible for around 45 per cent of China’s total energy 
consumption. The implication is that if China hits the 12th five-year plan targets 
identified here, a 45 per cent share of Chinese energy consumption could almost 
double between 2007 and 2015.  
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Conclusion*
China is undergoing a major transformation in both the scale and the pattern of its 
consumption. Two overwhelming forces are driving this: China’s lightning-speed 
urbanisation and the steady growth in consumption levels. The change in China’s 
consumption profile in recent years has been dominated by the explosion of urban 
household consumption and the growth of manufactured goods as a share of all 
household consumption (relative to the share of food). The discussion in this 
chapter has shown that China’s transformation is not peculiar in its nature given the 
historical context of other nations. China’s transformation may be larger and faster, 
but it has so far followed a familiar direction. 
The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that household consumption is 
one of the main long-term drivers of China’s energy use and will likely remain so for 
several decades.  
The changes in China’s consumption profile have important implications not only 
for the aggregate level of energy demand but also for the fuel mix required to 
produce consumption bundles. Coal dominates the rural household energy profile, 
especially direct consumption of coal. But since 2002 rural household consumption 
patterns have shifted substantially away from coal toward petroleum-intensive 
products. In contrast, urban households do not consume large quantities of energy 
directly: their energy profile is dominated by the consumption of products that 
embody petroleum. As with rural households, the shift in urban household 
consumption patterns has been toward products embodying petroleum. A similar 
trend toward consumption of the output of petroleum-intensive sectors appeared in 
the provision of government services. If China is successful in its 12th Five-Year 
Plan’s ambition of increasing the consumption share of GDP, the shift in energy 
needs toward petroleum at the expense of coal will likely accelerate2.   
Consumption is a relatively small part of China’s GDP (relative to investment and 
trade). This is consistent with the structure of expenditure in other ‘rapid-catch-up’ 
economies. An implication of this finding is that consumption is not currently the 
                                                
2 One interesting aside with implications for resource exporting countries such as Australia is 
that China’s production processes appear to have become more coke-intensive, although 
the increase in coke use is not tied to a shift in consumption patterns.  
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largest driver of energy use. However, urbanization is one of the key features of the 
Chinese economic transformation. Urban per capita incomes have grown faster 
than rural per capita incomes even while urban populations have exploded and 
rural populations shrunk. The continued urbanization will see greater emphasis on 
consumption of products embodying petroleum and lesser emphasis on direct 
consumption of cheap, dirty coal. The higher energy needs of urban households 
relative to rural households combined with the long process of urbanisation that 
China has yet to face mean this is one factor that will continue to drive substantial 
energy consumption well into the future.  
In considering the implications for China’s energy future, a scenario based on the 
12th Five-Year Plan was developed in this chapter. Under that scenario, energy 
embodied in household consumption in China would be expected to almost double 
by 2015 compared with 2007, a growth rate of around 10 per cent. In watching to 
see how the reality of China’s energy consumption deviates from the scenario, it 
will be useful to consider deviations from each of the targets used to build the 
scenario. In particular, if GDP growth exceeds 7 per cent per annum, the 
expectations for energy embodied in consumption will need to be revised upward. 
To continue the analysis of China’s energy boom that began in 2002 and to see the 
energy impact of one of the second key demand side drivers of China’s economy, 
the next chapter looks at the relationship between energy use and investment. 
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Chapter(5. Energy(and(investment(
The relationship between energy use and investment (fixed asset accumulation) in 
China is complex, interesting and important. It is important because investment 
accounts for a large share of the derived energy demand in China. It is interesting 
because investment in China presents a number of puzzles for economists: China’s 
investment is a larger share of GDP than in most other countries and is larger than 
many economists seem to believe is appropriate given China’s economic 
conditions. And it is complex because apart from changes to the energy intensity of 
investment in different sectors due to improvements on the production side, the 
level and composition of investment are the result of at least three interrelated but 
separately motivated groups: government, firms and households. 
The argument in the thesis begins with the presumption that the relationship 
between economic growth and total energy use is the aggregate of several non-
linear relationships, and that these relationships can be individually understood in 
the context of economic theory. This is the second of the three chapters that treat 
energy use as a function of aggregate demand. The previous chapter addressed 
the relationship of energy use to domestic consumption, concluding that 
consumption patterns in China are a substantial driver of China’s growing energy 
use but that consumption patterns did not offer a full explanation of the very rapid 
rise in energy use between 2002 and 2005. This chapter turns to the relationship 
between energy use and investment. How is the investment profile in China 
changing? Can investment explain the rapid growth in energy consumption 
beginning in 2002? To what extent is the underlying trend of growing energy use 
driven by investment? And what implications do the answers to these questions 
have for China’s energy future? 
Energy'use*in*investment*
What is meant by energy-use in investment? Energy-use in investment carries 
essentially the same meaning as energy-use in consumption. As with energy-use in 
consumption, the focus is on embodied energy. In this case, rather than delivering 
a product to final demand, energy-use in investment is the amount of energy 
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required to deliver investment to productive use: the creation of fixed assets. 
Investment in a machine in the manufacturing sector would include all the energy 
required to produce the machine (including all the energy required to provide the 
raw materials) and deliver it to its operational state.  
The ‘direct use of energy’ table presented in Chapter 2 reports that no energy is 
used in investment. This is because only expenditure on fixed assets is counted 
toward investment; there is therefore no expenditure on direct energy use since 
energy is not a fixed asset. As this chapter confirms (as in the previous chapter), 
measuring only the direct-use of energy fails to capture some of the most important 
drivers of energy demand.  
Justification*for*investment*focus*
In the previous chapter it was argued that to understand the energy needs of 
Chinese people requires a focus on the total energy embodied in Chinese 
consumption. The argument was predicated on the concept of embodied energy 
that treats energy use as a derived demand, dependent upon aggregate demand. 
While Chapter 4 analysed energy embodied in household consumption and 
government services, those constitute only a fraction of aggregate demand. 
Chapter 4 showed that of all the components of domestic demand, investment had 
grown the most rapidly, growing at an average annual rate of 18 per cent between 
2000 and 2009. Investment in China has been responsible for an increasing share 
of GDP. The best indicator available to demonstrate this point is fixed assets 
investment as a share of GDP (Barnett & Brooks, 2006). By this measure, gross 
fixed capital formation has become a substantially more important part of the 
Chinese economy, increasing from around 20 per cent in 1965, to 29 per cent in 
1978, to 36 per cent in 2002 and 49 per cent in 2009 (Figure 5.1). The impact of 
investment on energy demand is clearly important and requires particular treatment 
in this analysis. 
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Figure 5.1: Gross fixed capital formation (per cent of GDP) (1965-2009) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
 
In 2002 energy embodied in fixed asset investments accounted for around 41 per 
cent of energy embodied in final expenditure and by 2007 the share had risen to 45 
per cent (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7). 
Energy*and*investment*during*economic*transformation*
Part of aggregate energy demand is a function of fixed asset investment, and 
understanding energy flows in the Chinese economy needs to include this element. 
If it is accepted that patterns of investment are not constant, then expectations of 
total energy embodied in investment should take into consideration changes in the 
nature of the energy-intensity of investment and changes in the structure of 
investment itself. The logic of this argument can be presented as a series of six 
propositions. 
(1) Aggregate energy demand is related to investment; (2) that relationship is not 
constant; (3) the relationship between energy and investment is dependent on the 
investment structure; (4) as economies develop, the investment structure changes; 
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(5) China has experienced a fundamental transformation in investment over the 
past 30 years; and (6) that fundamental transformation has substantially altered the 
relationship between aggregate energy demand and investment. 
The first three of these propositions follow identical reasoning to the equivalent 
propositions in Chapter 4 relating to energy and consumption. Aggregate energy 
demand is related to investment, through some calculable ‘total energy intensity of 
investment’ coefficient, which is variable. These propositions are perfectly 
analogous to the arguments presented in the previous chapter. The fourth 
proposition, however, needs new evidence. Why should the structure of investment 
be dependent upon economic development? The next section draws on general 
economic principles to demonstrate the variation in the structure of investment 
over the development process. 
The fifth proposition is empirical: that China has experienced a fundamental 
investment transformation over the past 30 years, and will be demonstrated with 
reference to the most recently available Chinese investment data. The final 
proposition is analytical: that China’s investment transformation has altered the 
relationship between aggregate energy demand and investment. Demonstrating 
this proposition will rely on the same IOA and SDA techniques used to demonstrate 
the equivalent proposition in Chapter 4. Demonstrating these six propositions is 
sufficient to show that energy demand has a non-linear relationship with investment 
in China and will contribute one more piece of the energy-economy puzzle. The 
results of the analysis contribute to understanding how China’s growing energy use 
is related to investment in fixed assets and, as will be seen, can be interpreted as 
explaining to some extent the boom in energy use from 2002. 
Economic*development*and*patterns*of*investment*
Understanding how the relationship between energy consumption and fixed asset 
investment changes as an economy develops requires some general understanding 
of the relationship between fixed asset investment and economic growth. Research 
on the determinants of investment has not received the same level of attention that 
determinants of consumption and production have received (Adda & Cooper, 
2003). Accordingly, there is substantial disagreement in the literature about the 
relationship between investment and economic growth (Herrerias & Orts, 2010).  
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Part of the challenge stems from the fact that different types of investors have 
different motivations for investment. Consequently, the relationship between 
investment and economic growth is best understood as an aggregate of the 
relationships that several categories of investors have with economic growth. The 
three most important categories of investors are households, government and 
enterprises.  
Of the three, theoretical understanding of the determinants of investment by firms 
is strongest. The fundamental model that explains investment by firms is the 
neoclassical model of investment (Mankiw, 2003). According to that model, 
investment depends on the marginal product of capital, the interest rate, and the 
rate of capital depreciation. Since the marginal product of capital and the 
depreciation rate vary across sectors and are heavily impacted by the broad stages 
of economic development discussed in Chapter 3, the structure of investment by 
firms is also related to the stage of economic development1. The evolution of the 
investment structure through the process of economic development was reasoned 
as early as Adam Smith: 
According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater 
part of capital of every growing society is, first, directed to 
agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign 
commerce (Smith, 1776, p. 274). 
But Smith was also aware that the ‘natural course of things’ was not necessarily 
the actual course of things (Fiaschi & Signorino, 2003). China’s case is particularly 
unusual since there are major distortions in the determinants of China’s investment 
patterns such as the heavy influence of the state in the banking system and the 
relationships between managers in state-owned enterprises and government 
officials (Pettis, 2011). Perhaps the most that can be generalised is that in a free 
market economy with an efficient financial sector and an impartial bureaucracy, 
investment follows expected relative rates of return. The rates of return in a given 
sector, if the market is functioning well, ought to reflect the productivity gains from 
investment in that sector and be determined as the equilibrium of demand and 
                                                
1 To see that this is the case, consider the marginal products of manufacturing and 
intellectual capital in the US. The marginal product of manufacturing capital is not much 
higher than the depreciation rate, so there is very little investment in manufacturing in the 
US, while the marginal product of intellectual capital far exceeds the depreciation rate, 
directing US investment away from manufacturing and toward intellectual property. This 
conforms to the post-industrial stage of economic development characterizing the US 
economy.   
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supply for investment. This minimal generalisation may even be sufficient to explain 
China’s high rate of investment: Sun et al. (2011) showed that China has 
experienced a consistently high rate of return to capital, and that this can explain a 
large share of the high rate of investment. 
In contrast to investment by firms, household investment is not strongly affected by 
sectoral variations in the marginal product or depreciation rate of capital. 
Household investment in fixed assets is largely restricted to housing or real estate. 
Naturally, not all household savings are in real estate (much is directed to firms 
through stock markets and so on) but the accumulation of fixed assets by 
households generally occurs in this one sector. The aggregate household demand 
for real estate is determined primarily by expected household income, expected 
interest rates and the population (Mankiw, 2003). China’s rapid urbanisation 
obviously exerts massive upward pressure on the demand for urban housing, as do 
the rising wages of Chinese people. The natural consequence is both rising 
property prices2 and large-scale investment in construction of residential buildings. 
The pace and (until late 2011) seeming inevitability of rising house prices, largely 
due to the sheer numbers of people looking to move to China’s cities, has meant 
that housing has been seen as a reliable source of capital gains. Partially as a 
consequence, construction of housing far outstrips occupancy rates. This is an 
unusual feature of China’s property market and affects the amount of investment in 
construction, with important implications for energy use that will be discussed 
below. 
The last of the three types of investor is the government. Government motivation 
for investment is quite different to that of either the firm or the household. While 
government investment is usually (ideally) subject to some form of commercial cost 
benefit analysis, the benefits of interest are generally social benefits rather than 
private benefits. Political ideology is also hugely important as a determinant of 
investment, making any general theory of government investment elusive. 
Government fixed asset investment usually focuses on infrastructure, utilities and 
essential services such as schools and hospitals. While there are some differences 
in infrastructure needs at different stages of development (Lin, 2010), the existence 
of a ‘set path’ is much weaker in ‘catch up economies’: the least developed 
                                                
2 China’s property prices began to fall in late 2011, in response to government policies 
targeting that outcome. 
 157 
countries today would aim to invest in a broad spectrum of infrastructure and 
essential services, likely focusing on areas of local scarcity, with no set path related 
to development. Governments do not first invest in roads, then schools and 
hospitals and only then invest in communications and internet infrastructure 
(Rodrik, 2007). This is evident in the juxtaposition of deep mobile phone penetration 
with limited access to clean water in many places around the world. The level of 
government fixed asset investment in any given year may also be partly a tool of 
macroeconomic management of which the aim may be smoothing aggregate 
demand. The underlying theory is that when private investment lags, public 
investment should rise to maintain employment, but when private investment 
booms, public investment should retreat to avoid crowding-out effects. Since there 
is no strong theoretical link between levels or structure of government investment 
in fixed assets and stages of economic growth, the best strategy for ascertaining 
patterns in a particular country is a combination of empirical analysis and 
consideration of public statements of intent by the government in question.  
In aggregate then, the impact of economic development on investment is primarily 
one of scale: as the economy grows, so investment grows. Only investment by 
firms would be expected to follow a pattern of broad structural transformation as 
the economy develops. Household investment remains in housing at all stages of 
development, and government investment remains focused on the provision of 
infrastructure and essential services, subject to the political ideology of the 
government in question. How does China’s recent investment pattern fit this 
general story? The next section considers this question empirically.  
China’s*investment*transformation*
The fifth proposition in the argument at the beginning of this chapter is an empirical 
claim that China has experienced a fundamental investment transformation over 
the last 30 years. Characterising China’s recent investment patterns is the first step 
toward analysing the link between fixed asset investment and aggregate energy 
use. The aspects of China’s investment transformation most pertinent to its energy 
use are the quantity, structure and energy intensity of investment.  
The most obvious characteristic of Chinese investment is its very rapid growth. 
Figure 5.2 shows investment both in terms of the quantity and as a share of GDP 
dating back to 1965. The feature of Figure 5.2 most relevant here is the increase in 
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investment as a share of GDP in the years 2001 to 2004, when investment rose 
from 34 per cent of GDP to 41 per cent. A second increase occurred between 2008 
and 2009 when China’s 4 trillion RMB stimulus package and very weak global 
demand resulted in investment rising from 41 to 46 per cent of GDP in one year. 
That short-term increase is already being reversed but the result is that the value of 
investment in 2010 was more than triple the 2000 value. 
Figure 5.2: China's gross fixed capital formation, level and share of GDP 
(1965-2010) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
 
In an environment of such rapid investment growth it would be highly surprising if 
all forms of investment were growing at an equal rate. Figure 5.3 shows the three 
broad types of investment spending and creation of new assets at the sectoral 
level. As would be expected, there has been a steady change in the structure of 
investment in China. The share of investment in construction and installation has 
fallen from more than 70 per cent in 1981 to around 60 per cent now. Most of the 
relative decline in investment in construction and installation has been matched by 
a relative increase in the ‘other’ category of investment.  
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Figure 5.3: Structure of investment 
 
Source: NBSC (2010, pp. 5-4) 
 
Because these categories are quite broad, and because the ‘other’ category is of 
increasing importance although little clarity, the official definition of each of these 
categories provided by the NBSC explanatory notes is reproduced here: 
(1) Construction and installation (work volume of construction and 
installation) refers to the construction of houses and buildings and 
the installation of various kinds of equipment and instruments. 
They include construction of houses; equipment foundations, 
industrial kilns and stoves, and metal structure work; preparation 
works and temporary works for project construction, and clearing 
up works post project construction; pavement of railways and 
roads, drilling of mines and putting up of oil pipes; construction of 
water conservancy; construction of underground air-raid shelters 
and construction of other special projects; value of equipment for 
heating, sanitation, ventilation, lighting, gas, painting, etc. that are 
covered by the budget of housing projects; laying out of various 
pipelines (for steam, compressed air, petroleum, tap water and 
sewage) and wiring and cabling for electric power and for 
communications; installation of various machinery and equipment; 
testing operation for pre-testing the quality of installation projects, 
and land and other development work conducted by real estate 
developers for commercialized housing. The value of equipment 
installed is itself not included in the value of installation projects. 
(2) Purchase of equipment and instruments refers to the total 
value of equipment, tools, and instruments purchased or self-
produced which come up to the cut-off point for fixed assets by 
 160 
the construction units or investing enterprises or institutions. 
Equipment, tools and instruments purchased or self-produced for 
new workshops by newly established or expanded units are 
categorized as “purchase of equipment and instruments” no 
matter whether they come up to the cut-off point for fixed assets. 
(3) Other expenses refer to expenses arising during the 
construction or purchase of fixed assets other than those 
mentioned above. (NBSC, 2010, pp. Ch5-Explanatory Notes) 
A slightly more detailed breakdown of the sectoral destination of investment funds 
is available from China’s IO tables. The final-use part of the 17 sector IO tables 
available for 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2007 show that over the period 1997 to 
2007, two sectors account for around 90 per cent of total investment: construction 
and the manufacture of machinery and equipment (see Table 5.1). The data from 
Table 5.1 are summarised in Figure 5.4, showing the share of total fixed capital 
formation due to the two dominant sectors and the group of services sectors 
combined. The agriculture sector and the ‘other manufacture’ sector are not 
included in Figure 5.4 since they are negligibly small relative to other sectors. While 
the data from the IO tables provide additional information, particularly with regard 
to the details of the ‘other’ categorisation in Figure 5.3, it does not change the 
general story: the construction sector attracted the overwhelming majority of 
Chinese investment over the past decade, attracting 67 per cent in 1997 and 2000 
and falling to 56 per cent by 2007. Most of the remaining investment went to 
machinery and equipment, which accounted for 27 per cent in 1997 and 2000, 
rising to 34 per cent by 2005. Almost the whole modest decline in the relative share 
of investment funds going to the construction sector has been due to an increase 
in investment in the manufacture of machinery and equipment, and an increase in 
investment in the services sector. Both sectors attracted around 6 per cent more of 
China’s total investment in 2007 than in 1997.  
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Table 5.1: Gross fixed capital formation by sector (1997-2007) 
(100 billion yuan) 
(per cent of total) 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry & 
fishery 
5,938 7,240 7,727 14,119  10,672  
(2.4) (2.2) (1.8) (1.8) (1.0) 
Other manufacture 1,970 2,189 2,595 6,214  19,632  
(0.8) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8) (1.9) 
Manufacture and processing of metals 
and metal products 
1,703 2,166 3,216 8,834  9,530  
(0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (1.1) (0.9) 
Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment 
68,738 88,229 125,818 266,361  355,016  
(27.3) (27.0) (28.8) (34.5) (33.7) 
Construction 167,473 216,877 272,754 412,394  588,466  
(66.6) (66.5) (62.5) (53.3) (55.8) 
Transport, storage, post, IT, computer 
services & software 
583,581 771,846 1,976 11,461  14,974  
(0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (1.5) (1.4) 
Wholesale and retail trades, hotels and 
catering services 
3,267 3,722 9,548 17,869  18,821  
(1.3) (1.1) (2.2) (2.3) (1.8) 
Real estate, leasing and business 
services 
1,869 5,044 11,427 3,330  34,063  
(0.7) (1.5) (2.6) (0.4) (3.2) 
Other services 0 0 1,261 2,066  3,185  
(0.0) (0.0) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) 
Total 251,542 326,238 436,321 773,048  1,054,359  
Note: Eight sectors had zero gross fixed capital formation in every year and have been 
excluded from the table. These are: mining; manufacture of foods, beverage & tobacco; 
manufacture of textile, wearing apparel & leather products; production and supply of 
electric power, heat power and water; coking, gas and processing of petroleum; chemical 
industry; manufacture of non-metallic mineral products; financial intermediation. 
Source: Final-use part of IO tables, NBSC (2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010) 
 
Figure 5.4: China's key investment sectors (1997-2007) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Does this all demonstrate that China has experienced a ‘fundamental 
transformation in investment’? One conclusion could be that construction and the 
manufacture of machinery and equipment account for nearly all of fixed asset 
investment and have done so for decades. However, this would be to dismiss 
some very important changes to investment in China. The largest change to 
investment in China since 1997 has been the sheer scale of that investment, which 
is arguably not a transformative feature in the sense of not representing a change in 
the nature of investment, but can be considered transformative in the context of the 
wider economy. The most notable way in which investment itself could be said to 
have transformed is the increasing dominance of manufacturing of machinery and 
equipment, rather than construction, and an increase in investment in services from 
a very low base as recently as 2000.  
There may be some legitimate question as to whether ‘transformation’ is too strong 
a word to represent these changes, but it is clear that they are all important and 
substantial changes in the investment profile of China with serious implications for 
the relationship between fixed asset investment and energy use. In this chapter the 
term ‘transformation’ will be used, with the acknowledgement that a substantial 
portion of the transformation relates to a change in scale rather than form. The next 
section looks at the impact of that change on China’s use of energy. 
Impact*of*China’s*investment*transformation*on*energy*
The previous section presented discussed evidence for the first five propositions in 
the argument here: that aggregate energy demand exhibits a variable relationship 
to final consumption (a component of which is investment in fixed assets), that as 
economies develop patterns of investment in fixed assets change, and that China 
has experienced a transformation in its patterns of investment in fixed assets over 
the past thirty years. The final proposition, that this transformation has impacted 
China’s use of energy, remains to be shown. This section demonstrates that impact 
using the logic established in Chapter 1 and the methodologies presented in 
Chapter 2: IOA and SDA. As with the analysis of the relationship between China’s 
production structure and energy demand presented in Chapter 3, and the 
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relationship between China’s consumption structure and energy demand presented 
in Chapter 4, the first step is to define an energy identity for investment: 
 (4.1) 
Here, Et is the total quantity of energy embodied investments in fixed assets in 
year t , Eit is the energy embodied in investments produced by sector i in year t , Iit
is the value of investments in fixed assets produced by sector i in year t , I t is the 
total value of investments in fixed assets in year t , and Pt is the total population in 
year t . The right hand side of Equation (4.1) represents the embodied energy 
intensity of each sector, the share of each sector in total investment, and the scale 
of total investment per capita and changes in the population. Therefore efforts to 
reduce the total energy required for investment in fixed assets could focus either on 
improving the total energy intensity of sectors, incentivising investment into low-
energy-intensive forms of fixed asset accumulation, or reducing the quantity of 
total investment on a per capita basis. Population is not considered a policy lever in 
this context despite the Chinese government’s substantial involvement in 
influencing population levels. 
Following the multiplicative LMDI approach explained in Chapter 2, the change in 
energy embodied in investment between years is decomposed according to the 
following general decomposition equation: 
 (4.2) 
given the following definitions: 
Dtot is the total effect: the ratio of total energy embodied in investment in year T
to year 0  
VT is total energy embodied in investment in year T  
V 0 is total energy embodied in investment in year 0   
Dxi is the intensity effect  
Dxs is the structural effect  
Dxq is the quantity effect  

















V 0 = DxiDxsDxqDxp
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Because of the limitations of China’s IO data, year T is 2007 and year0 is 2002. 
Each of the decomposition factors Dxk( ) are estimated according to the following 
equation: 
 (4.3) 
The next section provides an overview of energy embodied in investment in China, 
based on IOA. 
Energy*use*and*investment*in*fixed*assets*
The importance of investment to China’s economy was demonstrated in the first 
part of this chapter. This importance is clearly illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows 
the rising share of investment relative to GDP, reaching 45 per cent in 2009. Figure 
5.5 makes it clear that fixed asset investment is an even more important driver of 
embodied energy consumption than it is a driver of GDP. 
The aggregate data in Figure 5.5 is presented in more detail in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 
shows that Chinese investment derived most of its energy needs from coal: 52 per 
cent in 2002 and 48 per cent in 2007. Petroleum and natural gas provided the next 
largest share. The decline in relative importance of coal as a fuel source, with 
petroleum and natural gas becoming proportionately more important, is consistent 
with the results observed for both rural and urban households and government 
expenditure.  
While coke accounted for less than 8 per cent of all the energy used to satisfy 
investment demand, investment in fixed assets was responsible for almost three 
quarters of China’s total domestic demand for coke in 2007, up from around two-
thirds in 2002. Investment in the construction sector was responsible for half the 
coke used for all Chinese investment in 2007, or 40 per cent of all the coke 
embodied in Chinese consumption.   
Dxk = exp
ViT −Vi0( )
lnViT − lnVi0( )
VT −V 0( )
lnVT − lnV 0( )





















Figure 5.5: Investment share of embodied energy and total final consumption 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 













(PJ) 3,872 2,586 551 412 7,421 
fuel share (per cent) 52.2 34.9 7.4 5.5 100 
2007 
(PJ) 6,229 5,090 1,034 757 13,111 
fuel share (per cent) 47.5 38.8 7.9 5.8 100 





Energy embodied in investment increased from 7,421 PJ in 2002 to 13,111 PJ in 
2007. The change can be represented with the following expression:  
 (4.4) 
As investment in fixed assets does not include the direct purchase of any primary 
fuel commodities, total energy use cannot be split into direct and embodied energy 
components: it is all embodied energy. The average annual growth rate of energy 
embodied in investment was 12.1 per cent per annum, equating to a doubling time 
of 5.8 years. As usual, the change in energy embodied in investment can be 
decomposed into changes in energy intensity Di( ) , sectoral shares Ds( ) , per 
capita investment levels Dq( )  and population Dp( ) , such that: 
 (4.5) 
where are given by the formula established in Equation (4.3). The results of the 
SDA are presented in Table 5.3. The first row presents estimates of the intensity 
effect: the amount by which energy embodied in investment would change if 
investment had remained constant and only the production processes used in 
producing the investment goods were allowed to change. The result is an overall 
intensity effect of 0.86, which was the least substantial impact (closer to 1) of all 
intensity effects estimated in this thesis, including for rural and urban households, 
government consumption, and as will be seen in the next chapter, exports and 
imports. The weak intensity effect held across both coal and petroleum and natural 
gas, though the intensity effect on coke embodied in fixed asset investments was 
greater than the intensity effects on coke embodied in household or government 
consumption, or exports. As with the estimates for the other consumer groups, the 
intensity effect for fixed asset investment had the largest impact on coal, while 
there was only a minor impact on petroleum and natural gas embodied in fixed 








V 0 = DiDsDqDp
Dx
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Fuel intensity: !! 0.80 0.95 0.86 0.84 0.86 
Investment structure: !! 0.96 1.00 1.05 1.05 0.98 
Per capita investment: !! 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.02 2.03 
Population:  1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
 1.61 1.97 1.88 1.84 1.77 
Error: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The second row of Table 5.3 shows the structural effect: the impact of changes in 
the allocation of investment across the 142 sectors. The relatively small structural 
effect (minor deviations from 1) is consistent with expectations: the structural effect 
across all fuel types was a very modest 2 per cent reduction. While the structural 
effect resulted in a small decrease in coal use, partly offset by a small increase in 
coke and electric and heat power, there was almost no impact on petroleum and 
natural gas use.  
The fall in the share of investment expenditure on construction was the main 
structural change to China’s investment patterns over the five years, with 
construction attracting a share of investment expenditure that fell from 66.5 per 
cent in 2002 to 55.8 per cent in 2007, a decline equal to 10.7 percentage points of 
investment expenditure. There was also a minor reduction in the amount of energy 
required to produce a unit value of construction, with the total energy intensity of 
the sector falling from 157 to 151 GJ / 10,000 RMB. Alongside the reduction in total 
energy input required was a substitution of petroleum and natural gas for coal, with 
the coal intensity of construction falling 8 GJ and the petroleum and natural gas 
intensity rising 4 GJ for every 10,000 RMB of output by the sector. Although 
construction attracted a declining share of total fixed asset investment over the five 
years this should not be taken as implying an absolute decline for the sector: 
investment expenditure on construction in 2007 was still 2.5 trillion RMB higher 
than in 2002. 
Dtot
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At the 142-sector level, there are no other sectors that stand out as having 
attracted substantial shares of investment expenditure. Taken together however, 
the 29 manufacturing sectors that produced fixed assets in either 2002 or 2007 
attracted an additional 10.4 per cent of investment funds in 2007 compared to their 
share in 2002, rising to 36.4 per cent of investment expenditure from 26.1 per cent 
in 2002 (see Appendix E for the list of key manufacturing secotrs, including sector 
name and line number). 
Of those 29 manufacturing sectors the sector that witnessed the greatest rise was 
the manufacture of automobiles (074.1) which attracted almost 3 per cent more of 
investment expenditure in 2007 than in 2002, rising to 6.4 per cent, embodying 552 
PJ in 2007 (more than double the energy embodied in investment in fixed assets 
manufactured by the automobile sector in 2002 despite the significant reduction in 
energy intensity of the sector). The sector that witnessed the second most 
substantial increase in the share of investment funds attracted was the 
manufacture of equipment for power transmission, distribution and control (078).  
The 41 services sectors (196.1 to 135) combined increased their share of total 
investment in fixed assets from 5.3 per cent in 2002 to 6.7 per cent in 2007, though 
their combined energy use was just 246 PJ in 2002 and 283 PJ in 2007. The details 
of sector level energy use, value and intensity for the sectors discussed in this 
section are summarised in Table 5.4.  
The population effect was without surprise. The estimated effect of population 
changes on energy use for investment was identical across all fuel types since 
population is not fuel specific. It was also identical to the estimated impact on 
energy use for government consumption, since population is not tied either to the 
government or investment. Naturally, the estimates discussed in Chapter 4 for rural 
and urban households were different, since rural and urban population growth is 
not the equivalent of total Chinese population growth: China’s rural population has 
shrunk while the urban population has grown more rapidly than the national rate. 
The rate of urbanisation is one of the key drivers of investment in the construction 
industry, the results of which, with respect to energy use, appear in Table 5.4. 
The last of the SDA results to be considered is the quantity effect: the impact on 
energy use for investment due strictly to changes in the value of investment (in per 
capita terms). The quantity effect is constant across all fuel types because it is 
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abstracted from the change in relative importance of sectors with divergent energy 
intensities. China’s investment boom has driven energy embodied in investment up 
by 103 per cent in five years. In the absence of technological and structural effects, 
the increase in per capita investment would have more than doubled the energy 
used for fixed asset accumulation. Combining the population effect and per capita 
quantity effect to estimate the total quantity effect would result in a value of 2.09, or 
a 109 per cent increase over five years. 
Although the investment boom had such a tremendous impact on energy use for 
investment, the intensity effect partially restrained the final impact, such that actual 
energy use for investment did not grow quite so dramatically, though a 77 per cent 
increase in energy use over five years can only be considered slow in relation to a 
103 per cent increase. The energy boom had the least impact on coal use, which 
increased 61 per cent over the period, while petroleum and natural gas use very 
nearly doubled.  
Figure 5.4 indicated that machinery and equipment attracted around a third of total 
investment. However ‘machinery and equipment’ is a composite sector, combining 
30 of the 142 sectors analysed in this chapter. Similarly, the reference to ‘services’ 
in Figure 5.4 is a combination of 41 of the 142 sectors. At the 142-sector level, the 
only interesting sector in relation to investment is the construction sector. The 
increase in energy used for investment in the construction sector accounts for 65 
per cent of the total increase in energy used for investment.  
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Coke Electricity Total  
Manufacture of automobiles (074.1) 
2002      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     171  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 122 84 21 19 245 
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 71 49 12 11 144 
2007      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     673 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 209 236 66 41 552 
GJ per 10,000 RMB 31 35 10 6 82 
Manufacture of equipment for power transmission, distribution and control (078) 
2002      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     27 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 21 15 4 3 42 
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 78 55 15 11 159 
2007      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     67 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 117 131 31 30 310 
GJ per 10,000 RMB 45 51 12 12 120 
Construction (098) 
2002      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     3,333  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 2,895 1,734 339 260 5,227 
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 87 52 10 8 157 
2007      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     5,885  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 4,640 3,302 553 420 8,915 
GJ per 10,000 RMB 79 56 9 7 151 
Combined manufacturing sectors (033-094) 
2002      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     1,306  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 856 701 200 135 1,892 
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 66 54 15 10 145 
2007      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     3,842  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 1,486 1,563 466 318 3,834 
GJ per 10,000 RMB 39 41 12 8 100 
Combined services sectors (096.1-135) 
2002      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)     265  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 101 121 10 14 246 
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 38 46 4 5 94 
2007      
Value of investment (Billion RMB)      710  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 82 170 14 17 283 
GJ per 10,000 RMB 12 24 2 2 40 
      




The changing relationship between investment and energy use has important 
implications for China’s energy future. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show that investment 
was responsible for 37 per cent and 43 per cent of China’s energy use in 2002 and 
2007, respectively. The rapid growth of investment has been one of the key drivers 
of China’s rapidly growing energy use since 2002. Determining the implications of 
the analysis in this chapter for China’s energy future depends critically on 
expectations of future investment in China and the relationship between investment 
and energy use.  
The results of IOA discussed in this chapter indicate that investment embodied 
13,111 PJ of energy in 2007, when total investment expenditure was 10,395 billion 
RMB. There are two investments scenarios worthy of consideration in drawing 
implications for China’s energy future. 
China’s 12th Five-Year Plan provides one case. Figure 4.9 depicts the implications 
of the 12th Five-Year Plan for gross fixed capital formation and other forms of 
expenditure. This Plan calls for annual GDP growth of 7 per cent, implying that 
GDP should reach 51,779 billion RMB by 2015. It also calls for an increase in the 
share of consumption in GDP. Assuming the consumption share of GDP increases 
at a rate of 1 percentage point per year entirely at the expense of the capital 
formation rate, the capital formation rate would fall from 48 per cent of GDP in 2009 
to 42 per cent of GDP by 2015. These assumptions imply that investment will reach 
21,691 billion RMB by 2015 if the 12th Five-Year Plan targets are met.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the 12th Five-Year Plan also calls for a 16 per cent 
reduction in energy intensity between the years 2011 and 2015. Making the 
assumption that this equates to a linear and uniform reduction in energy intensity 
from 2007, the energy intensity of investment would fall from 0.1261 PJ / 100 
million RMB to 0.0996 PJ / 100 million RMB between 2007 and 2015. These figures 
imply a scenario where investment requires the consumption of 21,614 PJ of 
energy in 2015 – 65 per cent more than was required for investment in 2007. 
The alternative scenario is based on the continuation of current trends. If 
investment in China were to continue growing at the average annual growth rate of 
investment that occurred between the years 2002 and 2007, it would reach 44,405 
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billion RMB by 2015. The average annual growth rate of investment between 2002 
and 2007 is significantly lower than was the rate from 2007 to 2009, however those 
years were characterised by a deliberate government stimulus package that is 
unlikely to represent future conditions. This scenario depicts annual gross fixed 
capital accumulation double the amount called for under the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
The difference between the two is clearly illustrated in Figure 5.6.  
Figure 5.6: Two scenarios for gross fixed capital formation (2011-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The 12th Five-Year Plan calls for a considerable deceleration of the investment 
growth rate. While it is relatively simple to create a basic scenario for the value of 
fixed capital formation, rationalising a scenario for the sectoral distribution of fixed 
capital formation, or changes to the energy intensity therein, is much more 
problematic. Therefore, a scenario based upon the assumption that the reductions 
in energy intensity called for by the 12th Five-Year Plan are realised uniformly and 
linearly over time is considered. The energy required by each of the two scenarios 
(the 12th Five-Year Plan scenario, and the alternative scenario) is presented in 
Figure 5.7.  
 173 
Figure 5.7: Two scenarios for energy in gross fixed capital formation (PJ) 
(2011-2015) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The energy required for investment in 2015 under the 12th Five-Year Plan scenario 
is only 16 per cent higher than the amount required in 2009 (and 65 per cent higher 
than the quantity of energy required for investment in 2007). In contrast, the 
alternative scenario based on recent growth trends for investment and the same 
energy intensity assumptions as the 12th Five-Year Plan scenario, imply the energy 
needed by investment in 2015 will be 138 per cent higher than the amount required 
in 2009 (or 228 per cent higher than the amount required in 2007). Clearly, the 
growth path for investment will have tremendous implications for China’s energy 
future. While neither of the two scenarios depicted are likely to eventuate, 
awareness of the energy implications of each hypothetical circumstance will 
provide an important analytical aid as the true trajectory of China’s future 
investment patterns becomes known. 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the energy intensity for investment fell by 
only 14 per cent between the years 2002 and 2007. This is less than the 12th Five-
Year Plan calls for, and also less than the reduction in energy intensity from 2002 to 
2007 in other expenditure categories. The implication of this analysis is that even 
the high (alternative) scenario presented in Figure 5.7 is low, in comparison with 
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observations from the period 2002 to 2007. Close observation of China’s 
investment trends will be important to see how China’s energy requirements are 
likely to develop over the 12th Five-Year Plan period. 
Conclusions*
Investment is one of the most important drivers of the Chinese economy and one of 
the main sources of demand for energy use. It is therefore critically important to 
understand the relationship between investment and energy in the Chinese 
economy. China has experienced an investment boom over recent decades, even 
surpassing that of the other ‘rapid-catch-up’ Asian economies during their boom 
years. The majority of that investment has been in construction, although the 
amount of investment in machinery and equipment began approaching the 
construction levels after 2001 when China joined the WTO.  
The impact of that rapid and uneven investment growth on China’s energy use has 
been astounding. The energy embodied in investment increased by 75 per cent 
over five years, representing an average annual growth rate of 12.1 per cent. The 
results set out in this chapter also lead to a more specific conclusion: 29 
manufacturing sectors (listed in Appendix E) appear to be the most responsible. 
Although the construction sector attracted more investment than these sectors, 
investment there did not expand at the rate of the 29 manufacturing sectors taken 
together. Additionally, while construction does not have a low energy intensity, 
neither does it have an especially high energy intensity. Were it not for a substantial 
reduction in the coal intensity of key sectors, the energy needs of investment in 
2007 would have been double the amount that was needed in 2002. 
Energy for investment, as with consumption, is dominated by coal, but, as with 
consumption, this is changing: the growth of petroleum and natural gas as sources 
of energy fuel for fixed asset investment has far outpaced the growth of coal. This 
is not due to a change in investment patterns, however. It is due to progress in coal 
efficiency relative to progress in oil and gas efficiency. This is evidenced by the 
difference in the intensity effects of investment across the four main fuel 
commodities: while the coal intensity of investment fell 20 per cent from 2002 to 
2007, the oil and gas intensity fell just 5 per cent. The result was that while coal 
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used for investment increased by 60 per cent over five years, petroleum and natural 
gas used for investment very nearly doubled.  
This shift to an increasing reliance on oil and gas is a pattern discernible right 
across China’s economy. Aside from coal, oil and gas, the importance of 
investment for China’s use of coke, specifically, is even greater than its impact on 
energy use generally: investment was responsible for three quarters of the coke 
used in China and the construction sector was responsible for half the coke used in 
investment.  
The analysis of the relationship between investment and energy use has 
implications for the role of investment in China’s energy future. Investment in 
construction embodied almost 9,000 PJ of energy in 2007, mostly from coal, oil 
and gas: equivalent to more than 10 per cent of all the energy embodied in China’s 
total economic output. Changes in the construction sector would clearly have 
major ramifications for both energy use and GHG emissions. Similarly, the 29 fast-
growing manufacturing sectors have driven a large share of the growth in energy 
embodied in investment. How long will this continue? Given China’s most recent 
five-year plan, what might be expected from investment in China, and what are the 
implications for China’s energy future? 
The final section of this chapter drew attention to three types of investor: 
households, government and firms. It demonstrated that firms have provided both 
the largest and the fastest growing share of investment in China. It also showed 
that even during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, when the government made a 
concerted and determined effort to increase investment, the impact was most 
notably only in the infrastructure and essential services sectors. The large reliance 
on self-raised funds for investment calls into question the central government’s 
ability to strongly influence the investment rate outside of sectors where it has 
relatively direct control. The takeaway message from that discussion is that 
investment in China may be driven more by the market than many people believe. 
While China continues to urbanise, the market incentives for continued investment 
in construction will remain: one report predicts an additional 350 million urban 
residents in China by 2025 (McKinsey Global Institue, 2009).  
However, ongoing weak external demand, depending on whether it can be 
reversed soon or not, may change the economic incentives for investment in 
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China’s manufacturing sectors. If that became the case a significant component of 
the growth in demand for energy could dissipate. Of course, manufacturers would 
look for alternative markets and China’s own consumers have long attracted 
manufacturers from all over the world. Whether they are ready to replace the lost 
demand from China’s external markets remains to be seen. Even if China’s 
consumers do become a powerhouse of domestic demand in the near future, they 
will not displace investment in China. Investment as a driver of China’s growth has 




Since China began its market reforms in 1978 it has become an increasingly 
important trading nation and trade has become an increasingly important part of 
China’s GDP. In the years since joining the WTO in 2001, China experienced a 
surge in trade encompassing both exports and imports. How has China’s post-
WTO membership trade growth affected the economic growth – energy use 
relationship? China’s export growth may be one of the most frequent economic 
stories told in recent decades (with the exception of the 2008 financial crash). To 
what extent has external demand driven China’s energy use? Similarly, to what 
extent have imports ‘mitigated’ Chinese energy use?  
Taken together, the two sides of China’s post-2001 trade boom have resulted in an 
important shift in global production processes, with China coming to play a huge 
role in low-wage manufacturing. Has the transformation of the role of international 
trade in China’s economy resulted in a shift in the location of global energy use? As 
Dong et al. (2010) point out; international trade separates consumption from 
production, introducing complications to the study of energy in the economy. It 
was shown in Chapter 4 that China’s growing household consumption generated a 
steadily increasing demand for energy, both as an energy-fuel and as a factor of 
production for non-energy products, and in Chapter 5 that China’s investment 
boom has driven a rapid expansion of energy use. However, the thesis has not yet 
explored the relationship between China’s growing domestic demand and energy 
embodied in imports. China’s energy intensity targets could effectively be met by 
importing large quantities of energy-intensive products without reducing China’s 
actual energy requirements, only changing the location at which energy is used. 
That may soothe anxieties in China, but it would not address the challenges related 
to aggregate global energy use, especially GHG emissions. 
This chapter addresses the role of trade in China’s energy use, using the 
techniques introduced in Chapters 1 and 2: input-output analysis (IOA) and 
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structural decomposition analysis (SDA). The results have substantial implications 
for China’s role in the world as an energy-using nation.  
Energy/use*in*trade*
What is meant by energy-use in trade? The answer to this question with respect to 
exports is very different from the answer with respect to imports. The concept of 
energy-use in exports is essentially the same as that of energy-use in consumption 
or investment (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). It is the concept of embodied 
energy-use introduced in Chapter 2, explained as “the amount of energy required 
to deliver a product to final demand” (Miller & Blair, 2009, p. 401). However, in the 
case of energy embodied in exports the definition should be refined to read, ‘the 
amount of energy required to deliver a product to export’.  
The concept of energy-use in imports has a unique and non-intuitive meaning in 
the context of single-country IO analysis. As the name implies, single-country IO 
analysis relies on the IO tables of a single country. China’s IO tables quantify the 
imported value of each sector, but they do not provide details on which countries 
were the exporting country, what the inter-industry transactions were in the 
exporting country, or who within China consumed what share of imports. It is 
therefore impossible to know the process by which imported goods were 
produced, and consequently impossible to estimate the energy embodied in 
imported goods without building a global, multi-regional IO model incorporating 
every trading country. The GTAP database is an effort to do just that, but GTAP 
covers only 57 commodities and the most recent year for which data is available is 
2004. Additionally, GTAP is intended to be cross-sectional, so its application to 
questions of structural change is not ideal (GTAP, 2011). Therefore, rather than 
creating a separate time series of multi-regional IO tables covering all trading 
countries, careful interpretation of the import data in China’s IO tables is preferred. 
The approach yields considerably useful information.  
Applying the same methodology used to calculate energy embodied in 
consumption, investment and exports, energy ‘embodied’ in imports is best 
interpreted as a measure of mitigated domestic production. This approach is 
consistent with that used by Liu et al. (2010). An example is illustrative. In 2007 
China imported some 15 million RMB of farming sector products. For China to 
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produce that much farming sector output would require the use of 37 PJ of coal, 30 
PJ of petroleum and natural gas, 5 PJ of coke and 7 PJ of electricity. By importing 
those goods, China mitigated the need to use those energy resources domestically. 
Whether the countries that produced the 15 million RMB of farming sector 
products used the same, more, or less energy in production is unknown so the 
energy embodied in imports cannot be accurately estimated. But the domestic 
energy-use mitigated can be estimated. In the case of 15 million RMB of farming 
sector output for 2007, 79 PJ of energy was mitigated. These concepts are 
depicted in the energy flow diagram for trade (Figure 6.1): all the green arrows 
represent transactions that result in the export (either direct or embodied) of 
energy, while all the blue arrows represent transactions that result in the import 
(either direct or embodied) of energy.  
Figure 6.1: Energy flow diagram depicting simplified trade flows 
 
Justification*for*trade*focus*
With the interpretation described above, the balance between energy embodied in 


































China’s position in the global supply chain. Ceteris paribus, an increase in energy 
embodied in exports implies China is occupying a larger share of the energy-
intensive parts of global production, and by extension, that the world is outsourcing 
energy-intensive activities to China. Conversely, an increase in energy mitigated 
through imports implies that China is outsourcing energy-intensive activities to the 
rest of the world, such that China decreases its contribution to the energy-intensive 
part of the production chain. The extent to which this is the case also has important 
implications in the area of international climate change negotiations: according to 
Peters and Hertwich (2008), “emissions embodied in trade may have a significant 
impact on participation in and effectiveness of global climate policies.” 
The plausibility of the hypothesis that China has moved to occupy a larger share of 
the energy-intensive parts of global production is clear from an inspection of global 
primary energy consumption trends. Figure 6.2 shows world, OECD and Chinese 
primary energy consumption since 1965. World primary energy consumption has 
scarcely deviated from the growth trend in the last 44 years, yet OECD primary 
energy consumption was at the same level in 2009 as it was in 1999. There was a 
small decline in OECD primary energy consumption post-2008 that was almost 
certainly due to the global financial crisis, but even prior to 2008 primary energy 
consumption had levelled in the OECD, with an average annual growth rate 
between 2000 and 2007 of just 0.6 per cent. At the same time as primary energy 
consumption in the OECD has apparently ceased to grow, world energy 
consumption has held to the long-term trend of 2.5 per cent average annual 
growth. The growth in primary energy consumption has come from non-OECD 
countries, notably China.  
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Figure 6.2: Primary energy consumption (1965-2009) 
 
Source: BP (2010) 
 
Figure 6.3: Household final consumption expenditure (1980-2009) 
 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
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Yet neither the world nor the OECD experienced a corresponding decline in 
household final consumption expenditure (with the exception of the GFC from 2008 
to 2010), nor has China experienced a corresponding increase in household final 
consumption expenditure (Figure 6.3).  
The continual rise of global energy consumption, the levelling-off of OECD energy 
consumption and the rapid increase in Chinese energy consumption, combined 
with the steady growth trend of global, OECD and Chinese household final 
consumption expenditure, imply a shift in location of the production of goods 
consumed in the OECD to China that is likely to provide at least a partial 
explanation for the rise of Chinese energy use.  
The relative balance of energy embodied in China’s exports and energy mitigated 
through Chinese imports has important implications for interpreting China’s energy 
boom: if China has large quantities of energy embodied in exports relative to the 
amount mitigated through imports, China’s energy boom, in part at least, is simply 
due to the relocation of global production of energy-intensive products to China. As 
China’s comparative advantage shifts, this is likely to change. Were those energy-
intensive process to relocate again, China’s energy use would fall but, ceteris 
paribus, there would be no impact on global energy use. Alternatively, if China has 
not increasingly become a net exporter of embodied energy, then the growth in 
demand for energy witnessed in China cannot be considered partly due to a 
geographical shift in global energy-intensive supply side activities, and must be 
considered as a gross increase in global energy needs caused by demand-side 
factors in China. 
Energy*and*trade*during*economic*transformation*
A central theme of the thesis is non-linearity in the relationship between energy-use 
and economic growth. Chapter 3 argued that the production transformation 
experienced by China over the past 30 years has substantially altered the energy-
economy relationship. Chapters 4 and 5 treated production as a function of 
demand, extending the argument to show that non-linear relationships between 
household, government and investment-driven demand were responsible for a 
large share of the non-linearity in the relationship between energy use and 
production. This chapter introduces the final element of the argument: trade. The 
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changes in China’s trade patterns since the beginning of the reform period, but 
most especially since 2001 when China became a member of the WTO, have been 
a considerable source of non-linearity in the relationship between China’s energy 
use and economic growth.  
The essential elements of this argument are contained in the following eight 
propositions: (1) energy use is determined by derived demand; (2) exports are a 
component of aggregate demand; (3) imports mitigate domestic production and 
energy-use required to satisfy demand; (4) the relationship between energy use and 
the components of aggregate demand is not constant; (5) as economies develop, 
trade patterns change; (6) China has experienced a transformation of its trade 
patterns since 1978 and an even greater transformation since 2001; (7) China’s 
trade transformation has substantially altered the relationship between energy-use 
and aggregate demand; and (8) China’s trade transformation has also substantially 
altered its role as an energy user in the global supply chain. 
The first proposition, that energy use is determined by derived demand, is 
effectively the same initial proposition used in the arguments presented in Chapters 
4 and 5 on the relationships of energy with consumption and investment. The logic 
of the proposition was expounded in Chapter 2.  
The second proposition is trivial given an examination of the basic macroeconomic 
identity: . The identity states that total output is equivalent to 
household consumption, plus government expenditure, plus investments, plus 
exports, minus imports. Exports can be treated in this context as simply another 
component of aggregate expenditure, equivalent in most respects to household 
consumption, government consumption and investment. The crucial respect in 
which exports differ from those other components of consumption is that it 
captures foreign consumption rather than domestic consumption.  
The third proposition is a summary of the argument developed earlier in this 
chapter regarding the conceptualisation of imports in single country IOA. The fourth 
proposition, that the relationship between energy-use and the components of 
aggregate demand is not constant, is a restatement of the argument initially 
developed in Chapter 1 and used throughout this thesis, that there exists a 
calculable coefficient linking aggregate energy-use to aggregate demand, but that 
coefficient is not constant over time or across countries. The other four 
Y ≡ C +G + I + X −M
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propositions remain to be demonstrated. The next sections address each of those 
four propositions in turn.  
Economic*development*and*patterns*of*trade*
Patterns of international trade depend on key economic development parameters; 
this understanding has been central to trade theory since Ricardo (1817). Ricardo’s 
model of international trade determined by comparative advantage was based on 
relative costs of production, or technological effects. Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin 
(1924) developed the main alternative model of international trade. The Heckscher-
Ohlin theory emphases relative factor endowments as the determinants of 
international trade. According to Feenstra, 
The Ricardian model introduces us to the idea that technological 
differences across countries matter. In comparison, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model dispenses with the notion of 
technological differences and instead shows how factor 
endowments form the basis for trade. (Feenstra, 2002, p. 1) 
In reality, both technological differences (broadly defined) and factor endowments 
(also broadly defined) are important determinants of trade between nations. Both 
technological capacity and factor endowments contribute to the cost of 
production, and it is the cost of production that inevitably determines what gets 
made where, or in other words, patterns of trade.  
Taking broad definitions of both technology and factor endowments, economic 
development can be described in large part as a change in a country’s 
technological capacity and factor endowment. As a country develops investment in 
all forms of capital (physical, human, social etc), the nation’s endowment of those 
factors, and technological capacity are expanded, raising the productivity of those 
factors. As asserted by the fifth proposition in the argument of this chapter, the 
country’s external trading relations are inevitably affected by the process of 
economic development.  
China’s*trade*transformation*
The sixth proposition asserts that China has experienced a transformation of its 
trade patterns since 1978, and an even greater transformation since 2001. The 
clearest indication of the truth of this statement comes from the rapid growth in 
China’s trade relative to its GDP. Trade as a share of GDP grew from 5 per cent in 
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1970 to almost 14 per cent by the beginning of the reform period in 1978, then to 
43 per cent in 2001: this is an almost constant arithmetic growth rate of 
approximately 1.2 percentage points per year.  
After China’s entry to the WTO both imports and exports surged with trade as a 
share of GDP increasing by around 4.6 per cent each year until 2006 when trade 
peaked as a share of GDP at 71 per cent and exports reached almost 40 per cent 
(Figure 6.4). The global financial crisis interrupted this remarkable trend. 
Considering the period relevant to this study, in 2002 China’s exports were 3.1 
trillion RMB while imports were 2.7 trillion RMB (NBSC, 2002). By 2007 the values 
had risen to 9.6 and 7.4 trillion, respectively (NBSC, 2007) meaning China’s total 
trade tripled in five years (in nominal terms). Promoting the export sector has been 
an abundantly successful development strategy for China over the past three 
decades: Garnaut argues that the “linking of markets has been a key to accelerated 
and sustained growth in China” (Garnaut, 2007, p. 1). Trade has become such an 
integral part of the Chinese economy that any study of energy in China’s economy 
that did not pay particular attention to trade would not be complete. 
Figure 6.4: Trade as per cent of China's GDP (1970-2009) 
Source: World Bank (2011) 
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Figure 6.5: GDP, export and import indices: 1980=100 (1981-2006) 
 
Source: Kahrl and Roland-Holst (2008) 
 
Impact*of*China’s*trade*transformation*on*energy*
Having shown that the patterns of trade flows are not constant over time, but ather 
that they necessarily change as an economy develops and that China’s trade flows 
have undergone such extensive changes in recent years that the term 
‘transformation’ is applicable, it is now time to examine exactly what the impact of 
China’s changing trade patterns has been on its energy use.  
A small number of papers have studied energy embodied in China’s trade in recent 
years, and some have studied the related issue of greenhouse gas emissions 
embodied in China’s trade. 
For instance Zhao and Hong (2008) estimate energy embodied in trade for the 
years 1997, 2000 and 2002. Their study covers 15 sectors but appears to be based 
on old data since they claim China’s energy consumption in 2000 was 5.7 per cent 
lower than in 1997. They find that changes to exports led to an increase of 46 
million TSE of energy consumption in China between 1997 and 2000, while 
changes to imports led to a decrease of 70 million TSE and changes to net exports 
resulted in 24 million TSE.  
The next section describes the methods used in this paper. Section two presents empirical ﬁndings in greater detail. The ﬁnal
section offers concluding remarks.
1. Methods: structural patterns of energy use and energy prices
Energy is one of the most ubiquitous elements in modern industrial production systems. Energy services are embodied in
all goods and services through both direct and indirect energy consumption. Direct energy consumption refers here to the
energy used directly in the process of producing a good or service. Indirect energy consumption refers to the energy embodied
in intermediate goods and services used throughout a production process. Elucidating direct and indirect energy linkages
across supply chains requires detailed information about inter-industry transactions and careful accounting for energy's
contribution at every stage of production, from resource extraction to ﬁnal consumption. As an inter-industry accounting
framework, input–output (I/O) tables provide a useful means of examining energy and resource ﬂows within an economy. In
this section, we provide an overview of the I/O methods we use to shed light on the pathways by which energy services ﬂow
through the Chinese economy. For the sake of expediency, we assume that the reader has a basic understanding of Leontief
input–output analysis.
Fig. 1. GDP, export, and import growth, China, 1981–2006. Source: NBS, various years.
Fig. 2. Final demand activities and imports, China, 1981–2006. Source: NBS, various years.
650 F. Kahrl, D. Roland-Holst / China Economic Review 19 (2008) 649–658
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Kahrl and Roland-Holst (2008) use IO analysis to study energy embodied in China’s 
trade for the years 2002 and 2004. They use the 122 sector IO table for 2002 as 
well as the 39 sector tables for 2002 and 2004. They assume that all sectors use 
imported content in equal proportions in order to ‘net out’ the imported content of 
exports. This process leads them to the conclusion that exports accounted for 
between 8 and 13 per cent of China’s energy use in 2002, rising to between 13 and 
19 per cent in 2004. The wide range in their estimates is due to their use of two 
separate IO tables for 2002. The 122 sector table contains substantially less 
aggregation bias than the 39 sector table, and generates results at the bottom of 
the estimation range, while the more aggregated, 39 sector table generates results 
at the top end of the estimation range.  
Guan, Peters and Weber (2009) estimate the factors driving China’s carbon 
emissions between 2002 and 2005 using SDA with China’s 42 sector IO tables and 
assume imports are produced with Chinese technology (the same assumption is 
applied in this thesis). They find that emissions for Chinese production increased by 
46 per cent between 2002 and 2005 and attribute half the increase to exports, in 
contrast to 36 per cent from investment, 7 per cent from government and 7 per 
cent from household consumption. 
Yan and Young (2010) estimate carbon emissions embodied in China’s trade from 
1997 to 2007 but assume that imports are produced using US technology. They do 
not report the effects of trade on energy use since their interest is global carbon 
emissions.  
Liu et al. (2010) estimate energy embodied in China’s trade for the years 1992, 
1997, 2002 and 2005. Their data contains 52 separate industries. Their approach is 
the most similar to that used in this thesis and their results are summarised below, 
with Table 6.1 showing energy embodied in exports and imports; Table 6.2 
summarises the SDA results.  
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Table 6.1: Energy embodied in exports and imports (Liu et al., 2010) 
 1992 1997 2002 2005 
Exports 588.69 764.15 993.60 2,806.85 
Imports -579.80 -732.48 -944.60 -2,554.55 
Net 8.89 31.67 49.00 252.30 
Units: Exajouls (EJ) = 10^18 
Source: Liu et al. (2010) 
 
Table 6.2: SDA results (Liu et al., 2010) 
 1992-1997 1997-2002 2002-2005 
Direct primary energy efficiency -86.4 -60.6 4.7 
Primary energy consumption structure -5.3 -4.7 0.3 
Structure of intermediate inputs -18.1 1.6 12.9 
Structure of exports 3.9 3.1 1.8 
Scale of exports 205.8 160.7 80.4 
Total increment 100 100 100 
Source: Liu et al. (2010) 
 
The findings of Liu et al. (2010) indicate that from 1992 to 2005 China was a net 
exporter of energy and that the growth in energy embodied in exports was almost 
entirely due to the growth in the value of exports, though they identify a slight shift 
toward energy intensive sectors in each sub-period.  
The rest of this section adds to this body of literature on the energy content of 
trade, focusing on the period since China’s post-WTO membership trade boom. As 
with earlier chapters, structural decomposition analysis (SDA) is used to analyse 
the changing relationship between China’s trade and its energy use. As usual the 
first step is to define a modified energy identity, in this case for the energy 
embodied in net exports: 
 (6.1) 
The notation depicting time is dropped from Equation (6.1) for simplicity but each 
term refers to the same single year.!Enx is the total quantity of energy embodied in 



















net exports, identifies the sector, Ex represents energy embodied in exports, X
represents the value of exports,P is the population, Em  represents energy 
‘mitigated’ through imports, and M represents the value of imports. Equation (6.1) 
says that energy embodied in net exports is equal to the energy intensity of each 
sector multiplied by each sector’s share of exports multiplied by the total value of 
exports, minus the energy intensity of each sector multiplied by each sector’s share 
of imports multiplied by the value of imports. While the production, consumption 
and investment energy identities are related to matters of sustainable development, 
the trade energy identity is also related to the geographic separation of production 
from consumption of energy-intensive products. 
As with other chapters the change in embodied energy use between years is 
decomposed separately for energy embodied in exports and energy ‘mitigated’ 
through imports according to the following general decomposition equation: 
 (6.2) 
given the following definitions: 
is the total effect: the ratio of total embodied energy in year to year  
is total embodied energy consumption in year for imports and exports.  
is total embodied energy consumption in year  for imports and exports. 
Dij is the intensity effect for imports and exports. 
Dsj is the structural effect for imports and exports. 
Dcj is the quantity per capita effect for imports and exports. 
Dpj is the population effect for imports and exports. 
Dropping terminology specifying exports or imports (for simplicity), each of the 
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China’s total energy consumption, the amount of energy required to produce all of 
China’s output in 2002, was approximately 36,000 PJ, rising to 56,000 PJ by 2007. 
However, the total final energy use, the amount of energy required to supply final 
consumption (including household, government, investment and exports after 
adjusting for changes in inventories) was considerably lower: 26,000 PJ in 2002 
and 40,000 in 2007. Figure 6.6 summarises some of the key results of this chapter, 
in relation to total final energy use. The first pair of columns shows the energy 
embodied in exports of non-energy goods as a share of China’s total energy 
consumption in the corresponding year. In 2002, non-energy exports accounted for 
19 per cent of China’s energy use for total final consumption, rising to almost 24 
per cent by 2007. This is in contrast to energy mitigated through imports, which fell 
from 20 per cent in 2002 to 17 per cent in 2007. According to these estimations, 
China went from being a very minor net importer of embodied energy to being a 
moderate net exporter. In other words, in 2002 non-energy net trade flows allowed 
China to avoid a very small amount of energy use, but by 2007 non-energy net 
trade flows imposed an additional energy-use burden on China, accounting for 
around 6.4 per cent of China’s energy use embodied in total final consumption, or 
4.5 per cent of China’s total energy use. 
In direct energy trade, China was already a net-importer in 2002, but only 
moderately so: 12 per cent of China’s energy use for final consumption was 
exported directly as energy-fuels (more than half as coal and almost one third as oil 
and gas) while imports provided 17 per cent of the energy required for total final 
consumption (12 per cent of total energy use in China), almost entirely in the form 
of petroleum imports. 
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Figure 6.6: Energy in trade flows relative to total final energy use 
Note: Values are per cent of total final energy use (the sum of total energy use for all 
consumer groups) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The trends can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.7, the data for which come from 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)’s Energy Data 2010. 
While the units reported by the NDRC are not consistent with the IO analysis, the 
figure reveals the extent to which oil imports dominated other direct energy trade 
as well as how effectively the government contained coal exports, which peaked in 
2003 at 94 Mt before falling back to just 22 Mt by 2009. 
A significant part of the fall in China’s direct energy exports over the five-year 
period to 2007 was a response to central government initiatives aimed at 
increasing the domestic availability of energy fuels. The measures appear to have 
been successful, as China’s direct energy exports fell from 9 per cent of total 
energy use in 2002 to less than 5 per cent in 2007, though the importance of 
government intervention relative to changes in China’s competitive and 
comparative advantage is not easy to determine. Figure 6.7 makes clear that the 
majority of the fall in direct energy exports was obtained through reduced coal 
exports. Comparing Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 supports this conclusion, since direct 
exports of petroleum and natural gas, coke and electricity all increased marginally 
over the period.  
While China managed to reduce the amount of energy it exported directly as 
energy-fuels, the amount of energy used to produce Chinese exports rose 
dramatically over the period so that by 2007 China’s non-energy exports embodied 
a substantial amount more energy than was mitigated by non-energy imports 
(2,500 PJ, or 4.5 per cent of China’s total energy use).  Energy embodied in non-
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energy exports almost doubled, to 9,300 PJ. During the same period energy 
‘mitigated’ through imports rose by less than one fifth, to 6,800 PJ. The result was 
that China’s non-energy trade went from acting as a source of net energy-use 
mitigation in 2002 (though a small one) to a substantial source of demand for 
Chinese energy use by 2007. 
Figure 6.7: China's coal and oil import and export volume (million tons) 
 
Note: Units are not specified beyond “t”. Tons of Standard coal equivalent is the assumed 
unit.  
Source: NDRC, Energy Data 2010 (2010) 
 
Energy*use*and*exports*
Energy can be exported either directly as an energy fuel or indirectly, embodied in 
a non-energy good or service. The values of direct, embodied and total energy 
exports of each fuel type for 2002 are summarised Table 6.3 and for 2007 in Table 
6.4. Direct energy exports in 2002 were considerable at 3,200 PJ, though 
substantially lower than embodied exports at 5,000 PJ. The discrepancy expanded 
over the five years to 2007 as direct energy exports shrank to 2,700 PJ and 
embodied energy exports grew to 9,300 PJ.  
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Direct exports (PJ) 1,826 968 389 35 3,218 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
6.9 14.4 25.9 2.9 8.9 
Embodied exports (PJ) 2,222 2,231 281 344 5,078 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
8.3 33.1 18.7 28.3 14.1 
Total exports (PJ) 4,048 3,199 670 378 8,296 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
15.2 47.4 44.7 31.2 23.0 
Note: total fuel consumption is the estimate of fuel use required to produce total Chinese 
output 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 













Direct exports (PJ) 1,126 1,035 465 52 2,678 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
2.6 12.5 22.4 2.6 4.8 
Embodied exports (PJ) 3,764 3,953 825 752 9,294 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
8.6 47.7 39.7 37.4 16.6 
Total exports (PJ) 4,889 4,988 1,290 804 11,972 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
11.2 60.2 62.2 40.0 21.4 
Note: total fuel consumption is the estimate of fuel use required to produce total Chinese 
output 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The change in exports of energy from China over the five years following WTO 
membership can be calculated from Tables 6.3 and 6.4. While total energy exports 
grew at a relatively modest average annual rate of 7.6 per cent, the growth of 
energy embodied in non-energy exports was much higher, at an average annual 
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rate of 12.9 per cent. The next section decomposes the change in energy 
embodied in exports using SDA.  
 
Structural*decomposition*analysis*
Exports of energy from China increased by almost 50 per cent over the five years 
to 2007. This is expressed in equation form below, where Dexptot is the ratio of total 
energy exports in 2007:2002, VexpT is the total energy exported in 2007, and Vexp0 is 
the total energy exported in 2002, measured in PJ. 
 (6.4) 
 
Separating the direct energy consumption from the embodied energy consumption 





Energy embodied in non-energy exports grew faster than energy embodied in any 
other final-use category studied in this thesis, embodying almost twice as much 
energy in 2007 as in 2002. This compares with an increase of around half for 
energy embodied in government services, around a third for energy embodied in 
urban household consumption, and almost no change in energy embodied in rural 
household consumption. Only energy embodied in investment came close to 
growing as rapidly as that embodied in exports.  
The change in exports of embodied energy can be decomposed into changes in 
energy intensity , export patterns  per capita export quantity , and 
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where the values of are given by the formula established in Equation (6.3). 
Consistent with previous chapters, interpreting the values of is relatively simple: 
a value of 1 implies zero impact, a value between 0-1 implies the factor contributed 
to a decline in embodied fuel consumption (for example: 0.80 implies a 20 per cent 
decline) and a value greater than 1 implies that that factor contributed to an 
increase in embodied fuel consumption (for example: 1.10 implies a 10 per cent 
increase). 
The results of the SDA are presented in Table 6.5. The first row presents estimates 
of the intensity effect: the amount by which energy embodied in non-energy 
exports would change if only China’s production processes had been allowed to 
alter, but the quantity and composition of exports had been held constant between 
2002 and 2007. The results estimate substantial energy savings due to changes in 
the production process, with the estimated reduction in coal use greatest by a 
substantial margin.  













Fuel intensity: !! 0.56 0.63 0.87 0.72 0.62 
Export structure: !! 1.11 1.04 1.25 1.12 1.09 
Exports per capita: !! 2.62 2.60 2.61 2.61 2.61 
Population: !! 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Total: !!"! 1.67 1.74 2.89 2.15 1.80 
Error: -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The second row of Table 6.5 shows changes in the export bundle (the structural 
effect). The results show that China’s export bundle in 2007 contained more energy 
intensive products than the 2002 bundle, driving an estimated 9 per cent increase 
in energy embodied in exports. In contrast to the structural shift in domestic 
consumption that moved toward oil and gas intensive sectors, the change in the 




observed shift of exports intensive in petroleum and natural gas was relatively 
modest.  
The export pattern resulted in a move toward energy-intensive products. This was 
largely due to the increase in exports of products from three sectors: rolling of steel 
(059), manufacture of communication equipment (082) and manufacturing of 
computers (084). In the five years after WTO membership, exports of rolled steel 
rose from 0.4 to 3.3 per cent of Chinese exports while exports of communication 
equipment rose from 1.5 per cent to 5 per cent and exports from the computer 
manufacturing sector rose from less than 1 per cent to almost 10 per cent of 
China’s exports in 2007. No other sectors expanded their share of Chinese exports 
as substantially as these three sectors.  
The expansion of these sectors’ share of China’s total exports came primarily at 
the expense of the share of exports from three sectors: manufacture of other 
electrical machinery and equipment (081), manufacture of other electronic 
equipment (087.1) and wholesale and retail trades (108). The details of energy use 
in these six key sectors are summarised in Table 6.6.  
While the SDA results estimate a modest increase in energy embodied in exports 
due to the structural effect, the estimated impact of the quantity effect is very large, 
at 2.61. The implication is that the growth of China’s exports per capita following 
WTO membership contributed to an increase in energy embodied in exports of 161 
per cent. If the growth in total exports is considered, rather than exports per capita 
(calculated by multiplying the quantity and population effects) the result is 2.68. 
This implies that the quantity effect of China’s export boom almost tripled the 
quantity of energy embodied in exports over five years. In relative terms, this is the 
single largest component of growth in China’s energy use. The next largest 
decomposed source of energy use growth was the quantity of investment, with an 
estimated quantity effect per capita of 2.03. The effect was somewhat restrained by 
improvements in the energy intensity of exported sectors exceeding the 
improvements of non-exported sectors, but this does not undermine the final 
analysis: the importance of China’s export boom to understanding its energy boom 
cannot easily be overstated.  
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Rolling of steel (059) 
2002     11 
Embodied in exports (PJ) 12 8 3 1  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 102 69 26 12  
2007     312 
Embodied in exports (PJ) 231 258 87 40  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 74 83 28 13  
Manufacture of other electrical machinery and equipment (081) 
2002     159 
Embodied in exports (PJ) 98 87 13 21  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 62 55 8 13  
2007     168 
Embodied in exports (PJ) 68 75 14 18  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 40 45 8 10  
Manufacture of communication equipment (082) 
2002     50 
Embodied in 
exports (PJ) 
11 13 2 2  
Intensity (GJ / 
10,000 RMB) 
23 25 3 5  
2007     480 
Embodied in 
exports (PJ) 
139 160 31 34  
GJ per 10,000 
RMB 
29 33 6 7  
 
Manufacture of computers (084) 
2002     239 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 30 34 3 5  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 127 140 13 19  
2007     928 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 269 290 56 66  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 29 31 6 7  
Manufacture of other electronic equipment (087.1) 
2002     67 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 148 159 15 23  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 134 144 13 20  
2007     11 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 4 5 1 1  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 38 44 9 9  
Wholesale and retail trades (108) 
2002     67 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 72 66 6 12  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 26 24 2 4  
2007     401 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 66 101 7 12  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 16 25 2 3  




As is the case with China’s exported energy, China imports energy both directly as 
an energy fuel and indirectly, embodied in a non-energy good or service. Because 
of the unique interpretation of energy in imports in the context of single-country 
IOA it does not make sense to think of direct energy imports and mitigated energy 
use due to non-energy imports as additive. Direct energy imports measure energy 
that is actually used in China, despite originating abroad. This is distinct from 
energy-use mitigated by importing non-energy goods. Therefore, the values of 
direct and embodied energy in imports of each fuel type for 2002 are summarised 
in  Table 6.7 and for 2007 in Table 6.8 but ‘total’ energy in imports is not reported.  
Direct energy imports were already considerable in 2002 at 4,400 PJ (almost two 
thirds of the petroleum and natural gas required for China’s total output was 
imported), substantially higher than direct energy exports, and grew rapidly, 
approaching 10,000 PJ by 2007. These results are in accordance with those in 
Figure 6.7, which shows China’s annual oil and coal imports and exports from 1995 
to 2009. Taking just the two data points from the IO tables indicates that direct 
energy imports grew at an astonishing average annual rate of 17.5 per cent, 
doubling every 4 years, very close to the average annual growth rate of 16.3 per 
cent using the NDRC yearly data depicted in Figure 6.7.  
The change in energy mitigated through imports over the five years following WTO 
membership can be calculated from  Table 6.7 and Table 6.8.  In 2002, energy 
mitigated through imports of non-energy use was 5,400 PJ, slightly larger than the 
energy embodied in China’s exports. China’s imports of non-energy products grew 
over the five years but at a much slower rate than energy embodied in exports, 
such that by 2007 mitigated energy use approached 6,800 PJ, considerably less 
than the 9,300 PJ embodied in exports. The average annual growth rate of 
mitigated energy use due to non-energy imports was a modest 4.7 per cent. The 
next section decomposes the change in embodied energy consumption using SDA.  
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Direct imports (PJ) 236 4,184 14 8 4,442 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
0.9 62.1 0.9 0.7 12.3 
Mitigated energy due to 
import (PJ) 
2,367 2,282 362 381 5,392 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
11.1 11.7 12.5 13.6 14.9 
Note: total fuel consumption is the estimate of fuel use required to produce total Chinese 
output 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 













Direct imports (PJ) 1,097 8,787 50 15 9,949 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
2.5 106.1 2.4 0.8 17.8 
Mitigated energy due to 
import (PJ) 
2,583 2,905 706 590 6,784 
(per cent of total fuel 
consumption) 
5.9 35.1 34.0 29.4 12.1 
Note: total fuel consumption is the estimate of fuel use required to produce total Chinese 
output 




As was explained at the beginning of this section on energy use and imports, direct 
and indirect energy ‘imports’ are not additive, therefore the growth factor of ‘total’ 
energy imports is not reported. Instead, only the growth factor of mitigated energy 
use due to imports is reported. This can be expressed in equation form below, 
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where Deimp is the ratio of total energy mitigated through imports in 2007:2002, 
measured in PJ. 
 (6.8) 
This compares with a growth factor of 1.83 for energy embodied in exports. The 
change in energy mitigated through imports can be decomposed into changes in 
energy intensity , import patterns  per capita import quantity , and 
population Dp( ) , such that: 
 (6.9) 
 where the values of are given by the formula established in Equation (6.3).  
The results of the SDA are presented in Table 6.9. Because of the unique concept 
of energy mitigated through imports, interpretation of the SDA results for imports is 
slightly different to SDA results of other final use categories. The first row presents 
estimates of the intensity effect. The intensity effect is an estimate of the change in 
energy that would be required for China to produce the imported goods were they 
to be produced domestically. The total intensity effect was 0.55, implying a 45 per 
cent reduction in the energy intensity of imported sectors. Importantly, this refers to 
a change in China’s production processes, not a change in the production 
processes of the producing countries. In this sense, the amount of energy 
‘mitigated’ through imports fell by 45 per cent because Chinese production 
processes improved their energy-efficiency in the importing sectors by that 
amount. As has been observed in results from Chapters 4 and 5, the intensity effect 
had the greatest impact on coal, with China’s coal intensity of imported sectors 
falling by 52 per cent of the five years. The intensity effect of imported sectors had 
only marginally less impact on petroleum and natural gas, with a 46 per cent 
reduction in the intensity with which China would have required those fuels to 
produce its import bundle domestically. The intensity effect had much greater 





= 6,7845,392 = 1.26
Di( ) Ds( ) Dc( )
Dtot =
VT
V 0 = DiDsDcDp
Dx
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First, the exposure to international competition experienced by importing sectors 
has provided a strong incentive to China’s producers to reduce costs, including the 
costs of energy and other intermediate inputs. Since the intensity effect has had 
the second greatest impact on exporting sectors, this hypothesis could be 
expanded to include the international competition faced by Chinese exporters. If 
this hypothesis were correct, it would suggest a policy prescription in direct 
opposition to that offered by Zhao and Hong (2008), who recommend China restrict 
the export of energy intensive sectors as a means of reducing the net export of 
embodied energy. Such a prescription not only ignores alternative policy objectives 
but takes a short-sighted approach toward the objective of reducing energy 
consumption: it trades less energy use now for improved energy efficiency 
permanently. The policy prescription suggested here is that encouraging trade (not 
only, but especially imports) across a wide range of sectors could be an effective 
means of reducing the energy intensity of domestic production. This policy 
recommendation is even stronger in the context of China’s climate change 
commitments since the most GHG intensive fuel types appear to be most 
responsive to trade exposure. 
The second (and most likely much more important) factor relates to China’s foreign 
trade and investment policies, which specifically target technology transfer into 
China. A common practice for the large multinational companies that account for 
the largest proportion of global trade is to establish a presence in countries at both 
ends of a trade flow. Chinese laws regarding foreign companies registering in 
China are designed to strongly encourage technology transfer to Chinese firms, 
either by requiring a joint venture with an existing Chinese firm or requiring specific 
technology transfer strategies for wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE). Since 
traded sectors attract the majority of joint ventures and WFOEs, this approach 
almost certainly contributes to the substantial differential in the improvement of 
energy intensity in traded sectors compared with primarily domestic sectors. 
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Fuel intensity: !! 0.48 0.54 0.85 0.66 0.55 
Import structure: !! 0.98 1.03 0.99 1.03 1.01 
Imports per capita: !! 2.21 2.16 2.22 2.20 2.19 
Population: !! 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 
Total: !!"! 1.08 1.25 1.92 1.53 1.24 
Error: -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
The second row of Table 6.9 shows changes in the import bundle (the structural 
effect). The results show that changes in the import bundle had almost no net 
effect on the energy mitigated through imports. This is despite some substantial 
changes in the relative share of imports of particular sectors. Most notably, the 
manufacture of electronic components (085) increased from just under 10 per cent 
of imports in 2002 to almost 17 per cent in 2007. The manufacture of computers 
(084) also increased substantially, from less than half a per cent of imports to 
almost 5 per cent. The increase in the relative share of imports of these sectors 
came at the expense of several other sectors, most notably the manufacture of 
other electrical machinery and equipment (087.1) which fell from almost 6 per cent 
to just 1 per cent of imports. The energy content of these key sectors is 
summarised in Table 6.10. 
Imports grew substantially in China in the last decade (Figure 6.5) and the impact of 
import growth on energy use was also substantial. Table 6.9 shows the estimated 
quantity effect (imports per capita) on energy use in imports was 2.19. The 
implication of this result is that were China to have foregone imports and produced 
the import bundle domestically, the energy required to produce that bundle would 
have more than doubled over the five years due to the quantity effect alone. 
Another way to think of this is that the energy use mitigated by China increased by 
119 per cent over five years because of the increase of imports per capita. Taken 
as total imports (estimated by multiplying the quantity effect and the population 
effect) the impact was 2.26, an increase of 126 per cent.  
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Taken together, the rapid increase in imports and the rapid improvement in China’s 
energy intensity in import sectors, resulted in a more modest growth factor of 1.24. 
The implication is that China would have required 24 per cent more energy to 
produce the 2007 import bundle than would have been required to produce the 
2002 import bundle. Importing goods instead of producing everything domestically 
therefore saved China 24 per cent more energy in 2007 than it did in 2002,  
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Rolling of steel (059) 
2002     11 
Embodied in exports (PJ) 12 8 3 1  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 102 69 26 12  
2007     312  
Embodied in exports (PJ) 231 258 87 40  
GJ per 10,000 RMB 74 83 28 13  
Manufacture of other electrical machinery and equipment (081) 
2002     159  
Embodied in exports (PJ) 98 87 13 21  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 62 55 8 13  
2007     168  
Embodied in exports (PJ) 68 75 14 18  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 40 45 8 10  
Manufacture of communication equipment (082) 
2002     50  
Embodied in 
exports (PJ) 
11 13 2 2  
Intensity (GJ / 
10,000 RMB) 
23 25 3 5  
2007     480  
Embodied in 
exports (PJ) 
139 160 31 34  
GJ per 10,000 
RMB 
29 33 6 7  
 
Manufacture of computers (084) 
2002     239  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 30 34 3 5  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 127 140 13 19  
2007     928  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 269 290 56 66  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 29 31 6 7  
Manufacture of other electronic equipment (087.1) 
2002     67  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 148 159 15 23  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 134 144 13 20  
2007     11  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 4 5 1 1  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 38 44 9 9  
Wholesale and retail trades (108) 
2002     67  
Embodied consumption (PJ) 72 66 6 12  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 26 24 2 4  
2007     401 
Embodied consumption (PJ) 66 101 7 12  
Intensity (GJ / 10,000 RMB) 16 25 2 3  




The results of the SDA on imports and exports show that China’s trade 
transformation has substantially altered the relationship between energy use and 
economic growth in China. As a component of aggregate demand, the export 
market has not only grown in size phenomenally, but has also shifted toward a 
more energy-intensive bundle of goods. Conversely, a large and growing amount of 
energy that would otherwise have been used by China to meet aggregate demand 
has been mitigated through imports. The energy embodied in the production of 
China’s exports has grown far faster since 2002 than has the energy ‘embodied’ in 
imports. This provides evidence that China has also come to occupy a more energy 
intensive part of the international production process. The shift has not been 
without cost: by domestically using energy for exported products, China has 
assumed a higher burden of environmental degradation and resource consumption 
on behalf of other countries (Liu, Xi, Guo, & Li, 2010).  
It is fairly clear that trade has been one of the drivers of China’s growing energy 
use, and the explosion of trade following China’s entry to the WTO is a main 
contributor to the 2002 energy boom. This was not only because of the additional 
energy embodied in China’s net exports, but also because of the investment 
stimulated by the sudden increase in expected demand and the sudden increase in 
openness toward foreign investors.  
What are the implications for China’s energy future and its impacts on global 
energy-use? One consequence of the increased demand for energy has been 
China’s determined search for sources of energy imports, particularly petroleum 
imports, combined with a restriction on direct energy exports. As a result, China 
went from being a modest net importer of energy in 2002 to a major net importer of 
energy in 2007.  
As long as China continues to produce the energy intensive component of 
international supply chains, trade will constitute a major component of the 
aggregate demand for energy in China. However, this is a locational effect. At the 
global level exports are not a component of aggregate demand. China will not 
always fulfil the role of the world’s energy user. When China’s wages rise, domestic 
demand will increase, China’s low-wage production advantages will decrease, and 
China’s real exchange rate will rise. The combination of these effects is likely to 
 206 
lead to China importing much of what it currently exports, including many energy 
intensive products. The result will be the loss of one of the three main components 
of embodied energy demand in China, but the locational change of energy 
intensive production will have no direct impact on energy embodied in global 
aggregate demand. It is clear from the estimated structural effects of energy 
embodied in exports and imports that China is not at this important turning point 
yet, but it will come. The collapse of external demand in 2008 has hastened that 
moment.  
These results also have important implications for issues related to climate change. 
A large and growing part of China’s GHG emission intensive energy is used in the 
production of goods consumed outside of China. This has obvious implications for 
international climate change negotiations, but also has implications for unilateral 
climate change policies such as those legislated in Australia. The argument is often 
made in Australia that China’s emissions are so much greater and faster-growing 
than Australia’s that any mitigation achieved in Australia cannot have any serious 
impact on a global scale. The observation that a substantial portion of China’s 
emissions are embodied in exported goods suggests that changes in consumer 
behaviour in China’s export markets will have a substantial impact on emissions 
related to production in China.  
Therefore, market based policies in rich countries that import goods from China 
which embody GHG emissions can have a greater impact on emissions made in 
the production country than is often assumed, provided they change consumption 
patterns in a way that also affects imported products. Additionally, arguments that 
focus on China’s culpability for GHG emissions are undermined by results that 
demonstrate that the emissions, while produced in China, are embodied in goods 
consumed by people in countries such as Australia. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this chapter is that the scale of 
improvement in the energy intensity of traded sectors was so much higher than 
non-traded sectors. This suggests a potentially important implication for Chinese 
policy makers: expanding the number of sectors exposed to trade may 
considerably improve the energy intensity of China’s economy, particularly if China 
continues to make technology transfer a condition of investment. Foreign 
companies will, no doubt, resent such a condition and China will eventually find a 
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more subtle approach beneficial, but the evidence here appears to vindicate 
China’s approach so far. 
The thesis has now analysed the recent change in the relationship between 
economic growth and energy use by focusing on both the supply side and each 
component of the demand side (household consumption, government services, 
investment and trade) in turn. The final chapter ties the previous analysis together 
in order to give a sense of the relative importance of the findings of the thesis and 
to provide a comprehensive view of the implications of the recent stages of 
economic transformation in China for future energy use in China. !!!
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Chapter(7. Conclusion(
The economic and social transformation occurring in China is unprecedented. In a 
speech to AsiaLink, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard contrasted the British 
industrialisation covering a period of 70 years, from 1830 to 1900, and a population 
of millions in which the British GDP quadrupled, with the Chinese industrialisation 
covering a period of 30 years and a population of 1.3 billion in which the Chinese 
GDP grew by a factor of twenty (Gillard 2011). An important part of China’s 
unprecedented transformation is the growth in its use of energy, particularly since 
2002 when energy use entered a growth period above the already high growth 
trajectory. It has been the objective of this thesis to understand the drivers of 
China’s energy growth during the period since 2002. The thesis has addressed four 
key questions: why has China been consuming so much energy since 2002? Is 
China’s economy peculiar in its huge and rapidly growing consumption of energy 
or does it conform with the experience of other countries? Do the bewilderingly 
rapid changes to China’s economy alter the relationship between the economy and 
its use of energy and if so, how? What can we say about China’s energy future?  
Despite the importance of the energy issue, we still lack a full and sufficient 
understanding of how energy relates to economic growth. Stern (2011) presents six 
‘stylised facts’ relating energy consumption to economic growth but the six facts 
are deliberately broad, as they are intended to describe the broad patterns that are 
observable in all modern economies1. The largest part of the literature that focuses 
on the relationship between economic growth and energy consumption focuses on 
direct energy consumption. It is relatively easy to measure direct energy use and it 
is an important indicator for many issues including those relating to climate change 
commitments, national energy security concerns, local energy supply decisions, 
and geopolitical questions. The direct-use approach leads to the observation of the 
Kuznets’ curve for energy intensity. Chapter 1 observed that the Kuznets’ curve for 
energy intensity broadly exists in China, just as it exists in many other countries, 
and that China has been on the declining part of the curve since 1978. But the 
                                                
1 The six stylised facts identified by Stern (2011) are: 1: energy use per capita increases 
over time, 2: energy use per capita increases with GDP per capita, 3: energy intensity is not 
correlated with GDP per capita, 4. energy/capital is not correlated with GDP per capita, 5. 
energy intensity declines over time, 6. the energy cost share declines over time. 
 209 
direct-use approach struggles to explain why this should be so. Measures of direct 
energy consumption do not reveal much about the relationship between energy use 
and broader economic changes.  
Estimating indirect, or embodied, energy consumption makes it possible to 
determine how much energy is required to satisfy the demand of a particular group 
(such as urban households) or for a particular process (such as the construction of 
buildings). This is important when analysing the long-term demand issues that are 
at the centre of the thesis.  In a country such as China that is undergoing sustained 
economic transformation, understanding how energy use relates to the demand 
side of the economy is crucial.  
Understanding how energy relates to an economy undergoing transition such as 
China begins with analysing how energy is used in the production process. Chapter 
3 analysed the relationship between energy and production in the Chinese 
economy, particularly between the years 1997 and 2007. The results of this 
analysis quantified the importance of expanding output as a driver for energy use in 
China as well as the importance of changes to the production mix and the role that 
changes to the technology, or production processes, played in constraining the 
growth of energy use. These results established empirically the relationship 
between aggregate energy use and output, but showed that the relationship is not 
constant over time. This result acts as a foundation for the rest of the analysis in 
the thesis. 
The key to understanding how energy relates to economic growth is to analyse 
separately the relationships between energy use and the core components of the 
demand-side: consumption, investment, and trade. These relationships combine to 
make up the aggregate relationship between energy use and economic growth. 
Each of the Chapters 4, 5 and 6, considers one of these demand-side components 
of the overall energy use – economic growth relationship.  
Chapter 4 analysed the relationship between energy use and final consumption 
(including rural household and urban household final consumption as well as 
government service provision). The very rapid growth of urban household 
consumption is a prominent feature of this part of the story. As urban households 
have become richer their consumption preferences have moved toward 
manufactured products, with food and agricultural products occupying a smaller 
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share of their consumption bundle. On a per capita basis, however, the growth of 
government service provision generated an even greater relative increase in energy 
use than the growth of either rural or urban household consumption. A substantial 
change in the fuel mix was also detected. Though the fuel mix required for the 
production of both rural and urban household consumption bundles was heavily 
dominated by coal, the change in consumption patterns since 2002 favoured 
products intensive in petroleum and natural gas: gone are days when a visitor to 
Beijing would be shocked by the sea of bicycles, these are the days of being 
shocked by gridlock on 10 lane freeways and the consequent air pollution. 
Chapter 5 analysed the relationship between energy use and investment in fixed 
assets. The growth of energy use for investment in China has been astounding: the 
energy embodied in investment increased by 75 per cent over the five years since 
2002. Only a substantial reduction in the coal intensity of key sectors prevented 
that growth factor from being even higher. Chapter 5 identified the surge in 
investment as a very likely cause of the 2002 energy boom in China. It also 
revealed 29 manufacturing sectors as those most responsible for the growth in 
energy embodied in newly-created fixed assets. The construction sector was 
identified as a substantial driver of the growth of China’s energy use and though 
energy embodied in construction grew less quickly than energy embodied in those 
29 manufacturing sectors, construction provided a steadier, more constant source 
of growth for China’s energy use. Construction is therefore a better explanatory 
factor of China’s high growth trend over the whole decade, rather than of the 2002-
2005 hyper-boom in energy use.  
Energy for investment, as with consumption, is dominated by coal, but, as with 
consumption the substantial progress in coal efficiency relative to progress in oil 
and gas efficiency, means the growth of petroleum and natural gas as an energy 
fuel for fixed asset investment has far outpaced the growth of coal. The importance 
of investment for China’s use of coke, specifically, is even greater than its impact 
on energy use generally: investment was responsible for three quarters of the coke 
used in China and the construction sector was responsible for half the coke used in 
investment. 
Chapter 6 analysed the relationship between energy use and trade. The export 
boom, intensified by China’s accession to the WTO, resulted in a dramatic growth 
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in the quantity of energy embodied in goods produced for export. While the other 
side of China’s trade boom, an increase in imports, acted to mitigate a large 
amount of the energy use that would have otherwise occurred in China, the overall 
effect was for China to occupy a more energy-intensive part of the global 
production chain. 
 
Throughout the thesis, results from each chapter have been presented separately 
from each other, as growth rates. Table 7.1 summarises the results presented 
throughout the thesis, providing a useful comparison of the relative importance of 
each of the components (consumption, investment and trade) of the energy use – 
economic growth relationship. It shows the estimated level of change measured in 
petajoules (PJ) caused by changes in fuel intensity, structure of 
consumption/investment/trade, level of consumption/investment/trade per capita 
and changes in the population for rural households, urban households, government 
services, investment, exports and imports, and presents the total effects for China 
as a whole. 
Table 7.1: Summary of SDA results: total energy 
(PJ) RHH UHH Gov Inv Exp Imp Total 
2002 Embodied energy 
consumption 1,519 4,123 2,132 7,421 5,078 5,392 20,272 
Fuel intensity: !! ;426 ;1,449 ;486 ;1,515 ;3,385 ;3,668 %7,261 
Structural effect: !! 170 482 215 ;153 617 49 1,331 
Per capita 
consumption: !! 405 1,852 1,174 7,078 6,695 4,763 17,204 
Population: !! ;107 796 70 279 181 158 1,219 
Total change 42 1,680 974 5,688 4,109 1,303 12,493 
Error ;2 ;117 ;6 ;2 ;107 ;89 %234 
2007 Embodied energy 
consumption 1,563 5,920 3,112 13,111 9,294 6,784 32,999 
Note: RHH = rural households; UHH = urban households; Gov = government 
services; Inv = Investment in fixed assets; Exp = exports; Imp = imports 
Total does not include imports. It is the sum of RHH, UHH, Gov, Inv and Exp 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
These results are equivalent to the additive form of the log-mean Divisia index 
(LMDI). The ready conversion between the multiplicative and additive forms of the 
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LMDI was put forward in Chapter 2 as one of the justifications for selecting the 
LMDI approach.  
Table 7.1 shows a number of interesting results. First, the scale of the growth of 
China’s economy is clearly the biggest driver of overall energy use. Changes in the 
per capita level of household consumption, government service provision and 
investment in fixed assets would have, ceteris paribus, led to an increase in China’s 
energy use of more than 17,000 PJ over five years from a starting point of only 
slightly more than 20,000 PJ: almost doubling China’s total energy use in five 
years. But Table 7.1 also indicates what type of per capita consumption growth 
drove the majority of the 17,000 PJ increase. Chapter 4 showed that the growth of 
per capita consumption drove up energy embodied in rural household consumption 
by 30 per cent, while Table 7.1 shows that that the change is relatively minor in 
relation to other demand-side changes, at just 405 PJ. Conversely, the 45 per cent 
growth of energy embodied in urban household consumption generated by 
changes in the per capita consumption level equated to almost 2,000 PJ – almost 
50 per cent more than the growth in energy embodied in government services 
owing to an expansion of the per capita quantity of service provision. Even 
combining rural and urban households, the impact of growth in total household 
consumption on energy use was dwarfed by the per capita increase in both 
investment and exports. The per capita increase in investment required an 
additional 7,078 PJ, greater even than the 6,695 PJ of additional energy required 
by China’s export boom.  
Second, the structural effects were less significant but not negligible, resulting in 
1,331 PJ of additional energy demand. The largest share of the additional energy 
demand that can be attributed to changes in demand patterns are due to changes 
in the export structure, which resulted in an additional 617 PJ (almost half the 
growth in energy use resulting from the structural effect). Urban household 
consumption patterns were also very important, accounting for 482 PJ (more than 
one third). Structural change resulted in an increase in energy use despite being 
one of the government’s main strategies to reduce energy use. This is a timely 
reminder that economies are not easy to guide – even when they are as dynamic as 
China’s.  
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Third, as discussed in Chapter 6, the intensity effect was much greater in the 
traded sectors than non-traded sectors. Although exports embodied less energy in 
2002 than combined rural and urban household consumption, the reduction in 
energy use due to changes in the production processes of exported sectors was 
almost twice the reduction due to changes in the production processes of products 
consumed by Chinese households. The improvement in energy efficiency of 
importing sectors was even greater than that of exporting sectors. 
Finally, with respect to the total impact on embodied energy of each component of 
aggregate demand, Table 7.1 shows that investment in fixed assets was the 
greatest growth-driver of China’s energy use over the period, accounting for almost 
half the total growth (5,688 of 12,493 PJ). The next greatest impact was due to net 
exports. Although changes to trade flows can essentially be considered as a matter 
of economic geography (the physical location of supply and demand) rather than 
changes to aggregate global demand, changes in trade patterns resulted in an 
additional 2,806 PJ of energy being used in China in 2007 compared with 2002. 
The impact of trade flows exceeded the impact of growing household consumption 
and government service provision combined: 1,722 PJ. 
Tables 7.2 to 7.5 break down the additive LMDI results presented in Table 7.1 
according to the impacts on each of the four main fuel types: coal, petroleum and 
natural gas, coke and non-thermal electricity. Here, the most important results are 
the differences between the impacts of the intensity and structural effects on coal 
compared with petroleum and natural gas. The intensity effect on coal embodied in 
final demand was a very substantial restraint, at -4,127 while the impact on 
petroleum and natural gas was much less, at -2,497. Although China has large 
quantities of domestic coal reserves, technological changes in recent years have 
been most heavily biased against coal use.  
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Table 7.2: Summary of SDA results: coal 
 RHH UHH Gov Inv Exp Imp Total 
2002 Actual 734 1,711 626 3,872 2,222 2,367 9,166 
Intensity ;297 ;848 ;199 ;1,082 ;1,702 ;1,798 %4,127 
Structural 40 43 35 ;216 313 ;46 215 
Per capita 176 670 326 3,517 2,815 1,964 7,505 
Population ;47 288 20 139 76 65 476 
Total 
change %127 153 182 2,357 1,502 185 4,068 
Error 4 ;57 ;1 0 ;39 ;31 %94 
2007 Actual 604 1,922 809 6,229 3,764 2,583 13,328 





Table 7.3: Summary of SDA results: petroleum and natural gas 
 RHH UHH Gov Inv Exp Imp Total 
2002 Actual 633 2,041 1,360 2,586 2,231 2,282 8,851 
Intensity ;101 ;505 ;279 ;204 ;1,408 ;1,567 %2,497 
Structural 119 425 171 ;6 131 87 840 
Per capita 186 1,008 760 2,610 2,872 1,989 7,437 
Population ;49 433 46 103 78 66 610 
Total 
change 154 1,362 697 2,503 1,673 576 6,389 
Error ;6 ;49 ;4 ;1 ;50 ;46 %109 
2007 Actual 792 3,452 2,061 5,090 3,953 2,905 15,349 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 7.4: Summary of SDA results: coke 
 RHH UHH Gov Inv Exp Imp Total 
2002 Actual 59 146 55 551 281 362 1,092 
Intensity ;5 ;16 4 ;118 ;71 ;81 %206 
Structural 10 8 4 37 111 ;5 170 
Per capita 14 69 34 542 484 410 1,144 
Population ;4 30 2 21 13 14 63 
Total 
change 15 91 45 483 536 337 1,170 
Error 3 ;5 0 0 ;7 ;7 %10 
2007 Actual 71 243 100 1,034 825 706 2,272 





Table 7.5: Summary of SDA results: non-thermal electricity 
 RHH UHH Gov Inv Exp Imp Total 
2002 Actual 92 225 91 412 344 381 1,164 
Intensity ;21 ;72 ;11 ;97 ;174 ;199 %375 
Structural 6 5 5 27 58 12 101 
Per capita 25 98 53 399 500 378 1,075 
Population ;7 42 3 16 14 13 68 
Total 
change 3 74 50 345 398 204 869 
Error 0 ;6 0 ;1 ;10 ;5 %18 
2007 Actual 96 304 141 757 752 590 2,051 





Conversely, the structure of demand has shifted more toward petroleum and 
natural gas than it has shifted toward coal, although the shift was positive in both 
cases. The result of these two changes is that while in 2002 the largest single 
source of energy embodied in final demand was coal (contributing 9,166 PJ 
compared with 8,851 PJ from petroleum and natural gas), by 2007 this was no 
longer the case. By that time 15,349 PJ of petroleum and natural gas were 
embodied in final demand compared with 13,328 PJ of coal. Although this still 
represents a substantial increase in coal embodied in final demand, the relative 
shift is important. Sadly, from an environmental point of view, non-thermal 
electricity still contributed just 2,051 PJ.  
One reason for the difference in the impact on coal compared with oil and gas was 
the role of urban households. In 2007 the amount of coal embodied in urban 
household consumption was just 153 PJ more than in 2002 but the amount of 
additional embodied oil and gas was 1,362 PJ. This has important implications for 
China’s future fuel mix since urban household consumption is likely to be a key 
driver of future energy growth due to urbanisation.  
 
Chapter 1 posed four central questions. The second question asked, is China’s 
economy is peculiar in its huge and rapidly-growing consumption of energy, or 
does it conform with the experiences of other countries when they were at similar 
stages of economic development? The analysis of the thesis has shown that 
China’s consumption of energy is not necessarily peculiar, but rather can be seen 
as broadly conforming with the experiences of other countries when they were at 
similar stages of economic development. China’s economy broadly conforms to 
expectations based on theoretical literature and literature discussing observations 
from other countries at similar stages of development with regard to the 
relationship between economic growth and energy consumption. It is only the scale 
of China’s economy, and to an extent, the pace of change, that is substantially 
different from other countries’ experiences. The sheer size of China combined with 
the gap between the global frontier and China’s economy at the beginning of the 
reform period means that China’s industrialisation is bigger and faster than that of 
earlier industrialising countries, but it can still be explained in similar ways.  
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The third question asked, how do the bewilderingly rapid changes to China’s 
economy alter the relationship between the economy and its use of energy? 
Evidence of this impact has been presented throughout the thesis and again in this 
chapter. The relative importance of different components of aggregate demand 
with respect to derived demand for energy, the changing structure of household 
consumption, investment in fixed assets and trade flows all result in changes in the 
relationship with energy use: not just in the aggregate quantity of energy used but 
also in the fuel mix. In addition, the different rates of technological progress in 
different sectors have changed the relationship between economic growth and 
energy use in profoundly important ways, especially by improving the energy 
efficiency of traded sectors much more than non-traded sectors. 
Perhaps the main contribution of the thesis, however, relates to the first question, 
which asked, why has China’s consumption of energy grown so rapidly since 
2002? The simplest way to answer this question is to identify three short-term 
factors that reversed the progress of energy efficiency between 2002 and 2005, 
and three long-term factors that will continue to drive energy use for much longer. 
The short-term, or acute factors are all related to China’s WTO membership. China 
experienced an export boom in manufactured goods and a large quantity of 
additional energy was required to produce those goods. The export boom was 
essentially a positive demand side shock: China’s producers had to respond by 
increasing capacity and the sudden increase in investment in fixed assets in the 
manufacturing sectors also embodied large quantities of energy. In addition, 
China’s policy makers embraced market ideology with, perhaps, a little too much 
vigour in 2001, relaxing many non-market measures designed to reduce energy 
use.  
These three acute factors are revealed most strongly in the results presented in 
Table 3.4 that show the importance of the quantity effect of production on China’s 
energy use beginning in 2001, as well as the lack of improvement in the energy 
intensity of China’s production between 2001 and 2003. Additionally, Tables 7.1 to 
7.5 show the importance of the expansion of China’s exports and investments as 
the two greatest drivers of energy use in China since 2002. Chapter 5 
demonstrated that the majority of investment growth since 2002 was in the 
manufacturing sector, supporting the conclusion that much of the investment that 
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drove China’s energy use was itself a response to the increased demand for 
exports following China’s WTO membership. 
The long-term, or chronic, drivers of China’s energy use identified in the thesis are 
urbanisation, household consumption and a resumption of policy- and market-
driven technological progress. Identifying and weighing the relative significance of 
these factors is one of the main contributions of the thesis. Trade would also count 
as a long-term driver of China’s energy use, and has certainly been identified as a 
key driver of energy use since 2001, except for the fact that the outlook for trade 
following the global financial crisis and European debt crisis is not bright due to the 
state of demand outside of China. 
Implications8for8China’s8energy8future8
The final question this thesis set out to answer is, what are the implications for 
China’s energy future? The drivers of the growth of China’s energy use have a lot of 
momentum. Despite the collapse of external demand that occurred outside the 
period covered by the SDA in this thesis, China has a very robust set of domestic 
assets that have the potential to drive continued growth for years2 to come – 
notably the large population that is yet to urbanise and the still low wage conditions 
that are only now beginning to change in the coastal parts of China. While these 
are often described as challenges for China, they also provide the greatest 
potential for future growth. The 12th Five-Year Plan offers a new direction for 
China’s economy and the relationship between economic growth and energy use.  
So far, consumption has been a relatively small part of China’s GDP, relative to 
investment and trade. This is consistent with other ‘rapid-catch-up’ economies. 
The implication is that consumption is not currently the main driver of energy use. 
Urbanization, however, is one of the key driving forces of the Chinese economy. 
Urban per capita incomes have grown faster than rural per capita incomes even 
while urban populations have exploded and rural populations shrunk. The 
continued urbanization will see greater emphasis on consumption of products 
embodying petroleum and lesser emphasis on direct consumption of cheap, dirty 
                                                
2 How many years is a debated point, but it is the author’s opinion that the factors 
discussed provided good foundations for strong economic growth to last another two 
decades, barring any major crises. 
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coal. Chapter 4 showed that urban household per capita consumption embodied 
more than three times the amount of energy than rural household per capita 
consumption. The higher energy needs of urban households relative to rural 
households combined with the long process of urbanization still ahead of China 
mean household consumption is one factor that will continue to drive substantial 
energy use well into the future. 
Linking the 2002-2005 hyper-boom in energy use to the sudden increase in fixed 
asset investment and exports of 29 manufacturing sectors implies a repeat boom is 
unlikely. The growth of trade not only embodied much higher quantities of energy in 
products for export but was also one of the key drivers of the investment boom, at 
least in the 29 manufacturing sectors. The sudden increase in trade that stimulated 
the expansion of output was largely due to China joining the WTO – something that 
is, obviously, a one-time event.  
While the 2002-2005 level of energy-use growth may not be repeated, as long as 
China continues to produce relatively energy-intensive components of international 
supply chains, trade will be a major driver of energy use in China. Chapter 6 
explained that this is a locational effect: at the global level exports are not a 
component of aggregate demand and China will not always fulfill the role of the 
world’s energy user. If China’s current efforts to increase the wage share of GDP 
are successful, domestic demand will increase. But China’s existing comparative 
advantage will also change since it is based on low wages, and the real exchange 
rate will rise. The current locational effect of trade could be reversed if China began 
to import much of what it currently exports, thus reducing the role of (or even 
ending) one of the three main components of embodied energy demand in China. 
But, as discussed in Chapter 6, such a reversal of the locational effect of trade will 
have no direct impact on energy embodied in global aggregate demand. This 
transition has not yet occurred, but it will. 
The prospects for trade as a driver of growth in China seem bleak at present, since 
the US economy is yet to recover from the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
European economies seem to be in a process that may take some years to resolve. 
A comparison of Tables 7.2 and 7.3 reveals that, contrary to the general trend, 
trade resulted in greater growth of coal consumption compared with oil and gas 
consumption. It is possible that this was a repercussion of stricter pollution controls 
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in China’s export markets than in China itself. Whatever the reason, the implication 
is that a decline in the rate of export growth will impact on coal demand in China 
disproportionately to oil and gas demand.  
The other major finding related to trade was the high rate of technological progress 
in the traded goods sectors. If China’s trade growth slows substantially, will this 
result in a decline in the rate of technological transfer? Such an outcome is 
certainly possible, but it may not necessarily be a bad outcome for China. China is 
currently attempting to reduce the role of imitation or adaptation and increase the 
role of innovation in its technological development. This is being driven across a 
broad spectrum of Chinese society from people who asked, in response to his 
passing, “where was the ‘Chinese Steve Jobs’?” to the architects of the 12th Five-
Year Plan who instigated one of the greatest R&D investments in history. A decline 
in technological transfer driven by slower trade growth may provide space for a 
greater role for China’s domestic innovation.  
Excluding trade, the other two major drivers of China’s recent energy-use growth 
have been investment in fixed assets and urban household consumption.  
On investment, Chapter 5 showed that more than half of the energy growth came 
from investment in construction. Given the very large number of rural Chinese who 
would still like to migrate to cities, and the consequent need to build many more 
cities, this driver of energy use is likely to persist well into the future, possibly for 
another 15-20 years. As China reaches developed country urbanization rates, 
replacement of existing structures is likely to dominate construction of new 
structures and the growth of energy embodied in construction should slow 
considerably. 
The other portion of investment in fixed assets that resulted in substantial energy-
use growth recently was investment in China’s manufacturing capacity. Prospects 
for continued investment in manufacturing are more complex. Labour in China’s 
coastal provinces is already becoming too expensive for the type of very low-
margin manufacturing that has driven growth there over recent years. And China is 
producing some 5.3 million university graduates each year (NBSC 2011, 20-2) who 
aspire to employment that utilizes their skills and knowledge rather than their 
labour. It is likely that the coastal provinces will see an increase in the importance 
of their service sectors relative to both agricultural and industrial sectors. Although 
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much of the manufacturing base is likely to migrate inland in search of cheaper 
labour the overall growth of investment in manufacturing could be substantially 
lower in the decade ahead compared with the decade past (Cai and Wang 2010). 
On household consumption, much depends upon the rate of wage growth. 
Outsiders have been encouraging China to ‘shift to a consumption driven growth 
model’ for some time. A point often ignored is that this is only possible if 
households have disposable income with which to consume. The government is 
pursuing many reforms designed to reduce the household propensity to save, such 
as public income and health insurance, affordable housing and other forms of 
welfare. These may increase per capita household consumption with 
commensurate impacts on embodied energy use (that will likely be 
disproportionately weighted toward petroleum). But increasing per capita 
disposable income will be the most important change associated with increasing 
household consumption. Household consumption has been only a modest driver of 
energy use since 2002 but when income levels do finally grow, experience from 
Asia’s other catch-up economies suggests they are likely to grow quite suddenly. 
Garnaut contends that “most observers will be surprised by how quickly China 
catches up now that it has entered the turning period” (Garnaut 2010). The impact 
on final demand and the energy required to supply it (especially oil) may be equally 
sudden and given the population of China, it will have enormous consequences.  
China’s energy future carries very important strategic implications. Hundreds of 
millions of Chinese people are now aspiring to higher standards of living. Meeting 
those aspirations will inevitably require ever more supplies of energy. This will 
provide tremendous opportunity for profit on the part of supplying nations such as 
Australia. But even if the associated geopolitical issues are managed well, the 
environmental impacts are likely to be as challenging. Even though China’s fuel mix 
has shifted substantially toward oil rather than coal, this has been the result of 
more rapid growth in oil consumption than coal consumption, not the result of 
declining coal consumption. Coal consumption will almost certainly continue to 
grow in China, driven especially by investment in construction and manufacturing 
capacity (particularly if China’s manufacturing base is re-located inland over the 
next decade) and the production of manufactured goods. Figure 6.7 shows that 
China became a net importer of coal in 2008, despite producing more than half of 
the world’s coal output in 2010 (IEA 2011, 14). Similarly, as China continues to 
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urbanize, additional oil use (largely for private and public transport) will continue to 
cause damage to China’s urban air quality. 
Understanding the drivers of China’s energy-use growth is crucial if it is to be 
managed so as to ameliorate the problems associated with energy use while still 
ensuring the Chinese people can realize their aspirations toward an easier, 
healthier, more comfortable and more fulfilling life.  
Future8research8
As always, the more we learn the more we realise we don’t know. This thesis raises 
many more questions than it answers. A few of the most important are discussed 
here. 
Regional8divergence8
Understanding regional differences in energy consumption, especially in respect to 
household consumption, is a very important part of this story. Chapter 3 showed 
how China’s provinces are hugely diverse. Analysing the impact of the different 
consumption patterns of households in different provinces at different stages of 
development would have some important advantages. In particular, observations of 
the trajectory of energy embodied in the urban households in China’s richest 
provinces could guide expectations for energy embodied in the future consumption 
bundle of household in provinces that are yet to become as rich. If the embodied 
energy trajectory of household consumption in China’s richest provinces was in the 
opposing direction to the poorer provinces then that would certainly have 
significant implications for China’s energy future. Similarly, patterns of investment 
can be better understood and predicted if regional divergence is fully taken into 
account. Trade patterns also depend on underlying economic conditions such as 
factor endowments that are regionally diverse. A greater focus on regional 
divergence could improve the analysis of energy use in all dimensions of the 
economy, including production, consumption, investment and trade. 
Import8component8of8exports8
The story of the energy content of trade told in Chapter 6 is incomplete. The 
treatment of imports needs improvement to reflect the actual energy content of 
 223 
imports rather than the counterfactual concept of ‘mitigated energy use’. The 
approach adopted in the thesis has been chosen because it provides the maximum 
exploitation of the data available. It does not account for the fact that a large 
portion of China’s exports include imported components as well as would be 
preferred. Improving the analysis of energy in trade flows is an important part of 
understanding China’s place in the world. It has significant implications for 
international negotiations on a range of issues, not least of which is climate change. 
It also provides an important part of the context in which countries determine their 
policies toward China. Making further improvements in this direction should be a 
high priority. 
Electrification8
The approach taken in the thesis focuses on primary fuel use. One of the big 
changes in China’s energy story relates to electricity, or power generation. 
Changes in the electricity generation sector have important implications for the fuel 
mix that could not be addressed in the thesis but nonetheless should be covered in 
future research. 
GHG8emissions8
The approach adopted in the thesis can relatively easily be extended to consider 
implications for GHG emissions. This has not been done here because the focus of 
the thesis is elsewhere but it would be a relatively simple extension to further the 
relevance of the research to broader implications at low marginal cost. 
Future8availability8of8energy8resources8
The scale of energy resources that will be required, even in the near future, brings 
into question the availability of such resources. If the global energy system 
continues to rely on fossil fuels such as coal and oil or even uranium, the continued 
economical supply of those resources cannot be taken for granted. Whether there 
exists a substantial risk that supply constraints pose a serious limit to China’s and 
the world’s continued economic growth is a question that needs addressing. 
The8future8role8of8renewable8energy8
This thesis has shown that the key drivers of China’s overall energy demand are 
likely to continue driving energy use in China for many years. This thesis has not 
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specifically considered the drivers of renewable energy. In the context of limited 
supplies of fossil fuels and the stress placed on the climate system by GHG 
emissions, the role of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, geothermal 
and others becomes increasingly important and needs more attention. In China, the 
importance of de-carbonising the energy supply cannot be over-stated. 
The8role8of8technological8progress8
The thesis identified technological progress as the main constraint on the 
expansion of energy use in China’s economy. More work is required to identify 
ways the government and the private sector can increase the rate of technological 
improvement so as to hasten the reduction in energy intensity of the Chinese 
economy. 
The8role8of8the8energy8pricing8system8
IOA makes assumptions that exclude the role of prices in the economy. Clearly 
price plays a very important role in economic decision-making. China’s factor 
markets, and the energy sector in particular, are renowned for having complicated 
pricing systems with heavy government influence. Additional research is needed on 
the role that price reform can play in moving China toward a more energy efficient 
future. 
Lifestyle8analysis8
The household consumption analysis presented in Chapter 4 can be taken further 
with proper lifestyle analysis. According to Baiocchi et al. (2010), “’Lifestyle 
analysis’ provides a systemic view of the entire socio-technological system that 
links consumption and induced production activities together in one analytical 
framework.” Applying such analysis to Chinese households could provide valuable 





Much more needs to be done if the inexorable relationship between economic 
growth and energy use is not to hinder the aspirations of the future Chinese people 
or to render those aspirations unsustainable in the long term. If there is one lesson 
to learn above all from this study, it is that the relationship between energy and the 
economy is complex and dynamic, and even more so in a country such as China 
that is undergoing a period of major economic transformation. Understanding that 
relationship requires a nuanced approached that accommodates the variations and 
transformations. Getting China’s energy story wrong could have repercussions that 








China Input-Output Table 2002 China Input-Output Table 2007 
Farming, Forestry, 
Animal Husbandry, 
Fishery & Water 
Conservancy 
 
Farming 01001 Farming 001 
Forestry 02002 Forestry 002 
Timber and bamboo harvesting and 
transport 
02003 
Animal husbandry 03004 Animal husbandry 003 
Fishery 04005 Fishery 004 
Services in support of agriculture 05006 Services in support of agriculture 005 
Mining and Washing of 
Coal  
Mining and Washing of Coal 06007 Mining and washing of coal 006 
Extraction of Petroleum 
and Natural Gas 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 07008 Extraction of petroleum and natural gas 007 
Mining and Processing 
of Ferrous Metal Ores 
Mining of ferrous metal ores 08009 Mining of ferrous metal ores 008 
Mining and Processing 
of Non-Ferrous Metal 
Ores 
Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 09010 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 009 
Mining and Processing 
of Non-metal Ores  
Mining of salt 10011 Mining and processing of non-metal ores and other 
ores 
010 
Mining of Other Ores Mining of other ores 10012 
Processing of Food from 
Agricultural Products 
Processing of grains and cereals 13013 Grinding of grains 011 
Processing of animal feed 13014 Processing of forage 012 
Processing of vegetable oils 13015 Refining of vegetable oil 013 
Processing of sugar 13016 Manufacture of sugar 014 
Slaughter and processing of meat 13017 Slaughtering and processing of meat 015 
Other food processing and manufacturing 03019 Processing of Aquatic products 016 
Processing of other foods 017 
Manufacture of Foods 
 
Other food processing and manufacturing 03019 Manufacture of convenience food 018 
Manufacture of flavouring and ferment products 020 
Manufacture I of other foods 021 




Beverages Manufacture of beverages 13018 Processing of soft drinks and purified tea 023 
Production of other beverages 15021 Manufacture of liquid milk and dairy products 019 
Manufacture of Tobacco Manufacture of tobacco 16022 Manufacture of tobacco 024 
Manufacture of Textiles Cotton and synthetic spinning, dying and 
finishing 
17023 Spinning and weaving, printing and dyeing of 
cotton and chemical fibre 
025 
Wool spinning, dying and finishing 17024 Spinning and weaving, dyeing and finishing of 
wool 
026 
Hemp and silk spinning and finishing 17025 Spinning and weaving of hemp and tiffany 027 
Producing of spinning equipment 17026 Manufacture of textile products 028 
Manufacture of knitwear and baskets 17027 Manufacture of knitted fabric and its products 029 
Manufacture of Textile 
Wearing Apparel, 
Footwear, and Caps 
Manufacture of clothes, shoes and hats 18028 Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, footwear 
and caps 
030 
Manufacture of Leather, 
Fur, Feather and 
Related Products 
Manufacture of leather, fur and feather 
products 
19029 Manufacture of leather, fur, feather (down) and its 
products 
031 
Processing of Timber, 
Manufacture of Wood, 
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, 
and straw products 
Processing of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm 
and straw products 
20030 Processing of timbers, manufacture of wood, 
bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products 
032 
Manufacture of Furniture Manufacture of furniture 21031 Manufacture of furniture 033 
Manufacture of Paper 
and Paper Products 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 22032 Manufacture of paper and paper products 034 
Printing, Reproduction of 
Recording Media 
Printing, reproduction and recording 23033 Printing, reproduction of recording media 035 
Manufacture of Articles 
For Culture, Education 
and Sport Activity 
Stationary and cultural products 24034 Manufacture of articles for culture, education and 
sports activities 
036 





Processing of Nuclear 
Fuel 
Processing of petroleum and nuclear fuel 25036 Processing of petroleum and nuclear fuel 037 
Coking 25037 Coking 038 
Manufacture of Raw 
Chemical Materials and 
Chemical Products 
Manufacture of raw chemicals and chemical 
products 
26038 Manufacture of basic chemical raw materials 039 
Fertilizer products 26039 Manufacture of fertilizers 040 
Agricultural and farm chemical products 26040 Manufacture of pesticides 041 




products similar products 
Synthetic products 26042 Manufacture of synthetic materials 043 
Manufacture of specialised chemical 
products 
26043 Manufacture of special chemical products 044 
Manufacture of daily use chemical products 26044 Manufacture of chemical products for daily use 045 
Manufacture of 
Medicines 
Manufacture of medicines 27045 Manufacture of medicines 046 
Manufacture of 
Chemical Fibres 
Manufacture of synthetic chemical fibres 28046 Manufacture of chemical fibre 047 
Manufacture of Rubber Manufacture of rubber 29047 Manufacture of rubber 048 




Manufacture of cement, lime and gypsum 31049 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 050 
Manufacture of products of cement and plaster 051 
Manufacture of brick, stone and other building 
materials 
052 
Manufacture of glass and glass products 31050 Manufacture of glass and its products 053 
Manufacture of ceramic products 31051 Manufacture of pottery and porcelain 054 
Manufacture of fireproof products 31052 Manufacture of fire-resistant materials 055 
Manufacture of non-metal mineral products 31053 Manufacture of graphite and other non-metallic 
mineral products 
056 
Smelting and Pressing 
of Ferrous Metals 
Iron smelting 32054 Iron smelting 057 
Steel production 32055 Steel making 058 
Steel pressing 32056 Rolling of steel 059 
Production of ferrous alloys 32057 Smelting of ferro-alloy 060 
Smelting and Pressing 
of Non-ferrous Metals 
Smelting of non-ferrous metals 33058 Smelting of non-ferrous metals and manufacture 
of alloys 
061 
Pressing of non-ferrous metals 33059 Rolling of non-ferrous metals 062 
Manufacture of Metal 
Products 
Manufacture of metal products 34060 Manufacture of metal products 063 
Manufacture of General 
Purpose Machinery 
Manufacture of boilers and engines 35061 Manufacture of boiler and prime mover 064 
Manufacture of metalworking machinery 35062 Manufacture of metalworking machinery 065 
Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery 
35063 Manufacture of lifters 066 
Manufacture of pump, valve and similar machinery 067 
Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 068 
Manufacture of Special 
Purpose Machinery 
Manufacture of agricultural specialised 
machinery 
36064 Manufacture of special purpose machinery for 





Manufacture of other specialised machinery 36065 Manufacture of special purpose machinery for 
mining, metallurgy and construction 
069 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery for 
chemical industry, processing of timber and non-
metals 
070 
Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 072 
Manufacture of 
Transport Equipment 
Manufacture of transport equipment 37066 Manufacture of railroad transport equipment 073 
Manufacture of cars 37067 Manufacture of automobiles 074 
Manufacture of car components 37068 
Manufacture of ships 37069 Manufacture of boats and ships and floating 
devices 
075 
Other transportation manufacturing 37071 Manufacture of other transport equipment 076 
Manufacture of Electrical 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
Manufacture of electrical machinery 39072 Manufacture of generators 077 
Manufacture of equipments for power transmission 
and distribution and control 
078 
Manufacture of wire, cable, optical cable and 
electrical appliances 
079 
Manufacture of household appliances 39073 Manufacture of household electric and non-electric 
appliances 
080 






and Other Electronic 
Equipment 
Manufacture of communication equipment 40075 Manufacture of communication equipment 082 
Manufacture of radar and broadcasting equipment 083 
Manufacture of computers 40076 Manufacture of computer 084 
Manufacture of electrical components 40078 Manufacture of electronic component 085 
Manufacture of home audio visual 
equipment 
40079 Manufacture of household audiovisual apparatus 086 
Manufacture of other electrical equipment 40077 Manufacture of other electronic equipment 087 





and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and 
office work 
Manufacture of measuring instruments 41081 Manufacture of measuring instruments 088 
Manufacture of cultural and office 
equipment 
41082 Manufacture of machinery for cultural activity & 
office work 
089 






Other manufacturing 42084 
Recycling and Disposal 
of Waste 
Disposal of waste 43085 Scrap and waste 091 
Production and 
Distribution of Electric 
Power and Heat Power 
Production and supply of electrical and 
heating power 




Distribution of Gas 
Production and supply of heating gas 45087 Production and distribution of gas 093 
Production and 
Distribution of Water 
Production and supply of water 46088 Production and distribution of water 094 





Rail passenger transport 51090 Transport via railway 096 
Rail freight transport 51091 
Road transport 52092 Transport via road 097 
Urban public transport 53093 Urban public traffic 098 
Water-based transport 54094 Water transport 099 
Air passenger transport 55095 Air transport 100 
Air freight transport 55096 
Pipeline transport 56097 Transport via pipeline 101 
  Loading, unloading, portage and other 
transport services 
102 
Storage 58098 Storage 103 
Postal services 59099 Post 104 
Other Information transmission services 60100 Telecom & other information transmission services 105 
Computer services and software 61101 Computer services 106 
Software industry 107 
Wholesale, Retail Trade 
and Catering Service 
Retail and wholesale trade 63102 Wholesale and retail trades 108 
Hotel accommodation 66103 Hotels 109 
Restaurants, bars, cafes etc 67104 Catering services 110 
Other Financial services 68105 Banking, security, other financial activities 111 
Insurance 70106 Insurance 112 
Real estate 72107 Real estate 113 
Rental accommodation 73108 Leasing 114 
Business services 74109 Business services 115 




Scientific research 75111 Research and experimental development 117 
Specialised and other technical services 76112 Professional technical services 118 
Services of science and technology exchanges and 
promotion 
119 
Geological surveys 78113 Geological prospecting 120 
Water conservation and management 79114 Management of water conservancy 121 
Management of environmental resources 
and public facilities 
80115 Environment management 122 
Management of public facilities 123 
Residential and other services 82116 Services to households 124 
Other services 125 
Teaching and education 84117 Education 126 
Hygiene and health 85118 Health 127 
Public safety and welfare 86119 Social security 128 
Social welfare 129 
Art and culture and film and television 
broadcasting 
88120 Journalism and publishing activities 130 
Broadcasting, movies, televisions and audiovisual 
activities 
131 
Cultural and art activities 132 
Sports 91121 Sports activities 133 
Entertainment 92122 Entertainment 134 
Public management and social organisation 93123 Public management and social organization 135 
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Appendix B: Notes on matrix algebra 
Some important notes on matrix algebra relevant to the equations presented in this thesis are presented here: 
1. Post multiplication of a matrix by creates a column vector whose elements are the row sums of the matrix (Miller and Blair 2009, 12) 
2. Pre-multiplication of a matrix by creates a row vector whose elements are the column sums of the matrix (Miller and Blair 2009, 12) 
3. A ‘hat’ over a vector denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements of the vector along the main diagonal, eg:  (Miller and Blair 
2009, 20) 
4. Post multiplication of a matrix,  by a diagonal matrix, , creates a matrix in which each element in column  of  is multiplied by in . (Miller 
and Blair 2009, 20) 





















M dˆ j M dj dˆ
M dˆ−1 j M dj dˆ
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Appendix C: Data sources for industrial value added 
 Agriculture Industry Construction Services 
1995 China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
2007 (NBSC 2008, 6-1) 
CSY1996 (NBSC 1997, 12-11) CSY2010 (NBSC 
2011, 2-1) 
CSY2010 (NBSC 
2011, 2-6) 1996 CSY1997 (NBSC 1998, 12-11) 
1997 CSY1998 (NBSC 1999, 13-11) 
1998 CSY1999 (NBSC 2000, 13-8) 
1999 CSY2000 (NBSC 2001, M06) 
2000 CSY2001 (NBSC 2002, 13-5) 
2001 CSY2002 (NBSC 2003, 13-5) 
2002 CSY2003 (NBSC 2004, 13-5) 
2003 CSY2004 (NBSC 2005, 14-3) 
2004 No data available 
2005 CSY2010 (NBSC 2011, 2-11) CSY2006 (NBSC 2007, 14-4) 
2006 CSY2007 (NBSC 2008, 14-2) 
2007 CSY2008 (NBSC 2009, 13-2) 
Note: CSY = China Statistical Yearbook  
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Appendix D: Value added by sector (1995-2007) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 
GDP 60,793.70 71,176.60 78,973.00 84,402.30 89,677.10 99,214.60 109,655.20 120,332.70 135,822.80 184,937.40 216,314.40 265,810.30 
Primary Industry 12,135.80 14,015.40 14,441.90 14,817.60 14,770.00 14,944.70 15,781.30 16,537.00 17,381.70 22,420.00 24,040.00 28,627.00 
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery 
and Water Conservancy 
12,135.80 14,015.40 14,441.90 14,817.60 14,770.00 14,944.70 15,781.30 16,537.00 17,381.70 22,420.00 24,040.00 28,627.00 
Secondary Industry 28,679.50 33,835.00 37,543.00 39,004.20 41,033.60 45,555.90 49,512.30 53,896.80 62,436.30 87,598.10 103,719.50 125,831.40 
Industry                                                  24,950.60 29,447.60 32,921.40 34,018.40 35,861.50 40,033.60 43,580.60 47,431.30 54,945.50 77,230.80 91,310.90 110,534.90 
Mining and Quarrying 2,982.48 3,327.41 3,744.65 3,809.68 3,936.95 5,010.41 4,787.87 4,731.45 5,272.51 9,457.15 11,248.50 12,814.65 
Mining and Washing of Coal  976.74 1,126.90 1,190.08 1,067.63 939.61 919.21 1,074.77 1,321.19 1,507.48 3,090.06 3,596.53 4,434.99 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 1,532.62 1,633.51 1,931.72 2,105.64 2,392.10 3,482.41 3,105.61 2,784.59 3,125.06 5,150.32 6,002.12 6,091.86 
Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 66.99 92.73 98.22 96.21 88.20 98.23 111.19 123.99 191.29 456.30 589.62 877.10 
Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal 
Ores 
185.27 199.10 222.46 197.48 209.62 220.34 218.11 216.78 232.46 457.48 679.32 919.16 
Mining and Processing of Non-metal Ores 218.51 271.02 298.93 196.54 196.83 193.29 192.94 204.82 213.13 300.11 379.10 488.46 
Mining of Other Ores 2.33 4.15 3.24 146.17 110.59 96.94 85.24 80.09 3.09 2.89 1.81 3.09 
Manufacturing                                             19,833.90 23,787.62 26,250.61 26,635.72 28,025.26 31,064.35 34,324.74 37,826.85 44,606.09 61,230.36 72,623.93 88,747.52 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 810.51 1,171.78 1,305.21 1,209.60 1,266.95 1,316.79 1,453.28 1,599.54 1,918.85 2,937.83 3,501.11 4,384.11 
Manufacture of Foods 344.47 477.26 589.19 576.72 572.98 655.50 695.14 795.84 872.91 1,249.95 1,471.04 1,757.97 
Manufacture of Beverages 576.94 752.60 931.01 964.80 974.13 975.66 988.48 1,020.14 1,041.55 1,246.11 1,442.80 1,778.84 
Manufacture of Tobacco 999.54 1,246.23 1,375.72 1,572.76 1,483.45 1,475.24 1,681.53 1,954.52 2,058.95 2,203.93 2,385.88 2,756.40 
Manufacture of Textile 1,465.94 1,711.07 1,866.21 1,805.51 1,857.74 2,006.57 2,134.50 2,255.65 2,494.97 3,466.59 3,973.22 4,640.47 
Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, 
Footwear, and Caps 
566.65 735.57 775.10 855.33 841.41 933.29 1,058.57 1,072.52 1,199.32 1,519.07 1,838.44 2,139.06 
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and 
Related Products 
328.72 458.15 485.96 484.96 471.63 510.17 602.67 658.34 773.80 1,010.37 1,175.89 1,398.01 
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, 
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products  
155.14 235.83 284.06 199.79 220.99 248.34 296.76 307.52 347.70 546.55 687.34 972.96 
Manufacture of Furniture 92.07 130.94 148.69 136.06 129.65 149.54 180.88 200.31 239.41 411.76 502.38 610.77 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 379.11 541.66 566.36 566.02 591.29 650.47 730.52 820.66 891.66 1,226.50 1,390.02 1,646.05 
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 200.97 279.99 313.47 324.27 329.17 317.48 375.33 388.90 437.65 495.41 559.20 653.44 
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education 
and Sport Activity 
148.77 199.42 218.53 250.50 233.15 244.82 276.70 294.01 327.04 406.24 466.14 523.71 
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Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing 
of Nuclear Fuel 
915.88 920.52 1,006.86 938.13 981.50 1,242.23 1,358.83 1,443.18 1,684.67 2,120.10 2,320.21 2,924.64 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and 
Chemical Products 
1,538.17 1,955.69 1,988.51 1,958.39 2,023.63 2,231.95 2,463.32 2,677.62 3,225.37 4,698.79 5,412.73 6,931.95 
Manufacture of Medicines 431.84 587.27 687.73 768.33 856.20 999.28 1,111.35 1,199.84 1,340.90 1,636.69 1,812.76 2,159.36 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibres 331.20 320.79 350.16 327.66 419.98 466.28 341.67 356.54 386.34 519.22 605.73 764.39 
Manufacture of Rubber 225.77 310.08 350.41 360.46 336.93 345.21 381.96 420.55 484.09 636.96 716.81 905.63 
Manufacture of Plastics 367.22 533.72 598.47 628.78 644.90 732.15 838.43 929.86 998.67 1,360.93 1,673.19 2,018.21 
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 1,468.32 1,736.17 1,849.66 1,613.54 1,670.62 1,776.22 1,864.30 1,962.47 2,288.72 3,004.11 3,665.64 4,579.35 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 1,718.50 1,643.30 1,713.69 1,744.03 1,797.92 2,048.26 2,353.91 2,586.84 3,695.30 6,180.54 7,022.54 8,505.92 
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 492.88 504.35 520.17 589.82 673.57 808.23 909.44 900.10 1,180.46 2,064.48 3,206.26 4,228.44 
Manufacture of Metal Products 626.45 807.63 863.54 895.02 899.20 960.78 1,097.28 1,209.30 1,270.58 1,811.70 2,231.69 2,842.89 
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 1,092.82 1,195.65 1,328.29 1,236.93 1,236.60 1,325.40 1,494.71 1,657.53 2,081.07 3,174.27 3,809.07 4,823.32 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 733.24 856.02 911.40 861.49 857.64 915.87 979.75 1,123.80 1,319.25 1,799.05 2,302.28 2,896.67 
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 1,313.66 1,528.21 1,681.12 1,917.28 1,984.16 2,086.60 2,513.19 3,129.77 3,790.77 4,098.17 4,946.15 6,586.37 
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Equipment 
985.21 1,219.17 1,369.77 1,561.06 1,667.24 1,941.40 2,120.53 2,278.11 2,647.78 3,823.86 4,629.88 5,716.90 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, 
Computers and Other Electronic Equipment 
1,036.09 1,091.37 1,508.07 1,989.48 2,241.60 2,875.93 3,130.60 3,623.93 4,556.96 6,121.92 7,102.59 7,483.59 
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and 
Machinery for Cultural Activity and Office 
Work 
199.96 237.42 248.36 299.00 300.10 337.93 365.97 386.04 582.34 784.42 970.44 1,098.52 
Manufacture of Artwork and Other 
Manufacturing 
287.85 399.77 414.90 0.00 460.93 486.74 525.13 573.44 455.03 610.71 707.54 866.56 
Recycling and Disposal of Waste 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.96 64.12 94.96 153.03 
Electric Power, Gas and Water Production 
and Supply 
2,134.22 2,332.57 2,926.13 3,573.00 3,899.30 3,958.84 4,468.00 4,873.00 5,066.90 6,543.28 7,438.47 8,972.73 
Production and Distribution of Electric Power 
and Heat Power 
1,992.37 2,167.38 2,719.25 3,328.09 3,595.04 3,670.95 4,147.86 4,550.88 4,718.73 6,119.44 6,930.31 8,337.59 
Production and Distribution of Gas 5.09 0.00 17.80 25.08 60.93 50.04 70.98 76.33 98.58 143.92 192.21 289.60 
Production and Distribution of Water 136.76 165.19 189.08 219.83 243.33 237.85 249.15 245.79 249.59 279.92 315.95 345.54 
Construction                                              3,728.80 4,387.40 4,621.60 4,985.80 5,172.10 5,522.30 5,931.70 6,465.50 7,490.80 10,367.30 12,408.60 15,296.50 
Tertiary Industry 19,978.50 23,326.20 26,988.10 30,580.50 33,873.40 38,714.00 44,361.60 49,898.90 56,004.70 74,919.30 88,554.90 111,351.90 
Transport, Storage and Post  3,244.30 3,782.20 4,148.60 4,660.90 5,175.20 6,161.00 6,870.30 7,492.90 7,913.20 10,666.20 12,183.00 14,601.00 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 4,778.60 5,599.70 6,327.40 6,913.20 7,491.10 8,158.60 9,119.40 9,995.40 11,169.50 13,966.20 16,530.70 20,937.80 
Hotels and Catering Services 1,200.10 1,336.80 1,561.30 1,786.90 1,941.20 2,146.30 2,400.10 2,724.80 3,126.10 4,195.70 4,792.60 5,548.10 
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Financial Intermediation 2,798.50 3,211.70 3,606.80 3,697.70 3,816.50 4,086.70 4,353.50 4,612.80 4,989.40 6,086.80 8,099.10 12,337.50 
Real Estate 2,354.00 2,617.60 2,921.10 3,434.50 3,681.80 4,149.10 4,715.10 5,346.40 6,172.70 8,516.40 10,370.50 13,809.70 
Others                                                    5,602.90 6,778.30 8,423.00 10,087.30 11,767.70 14,012.40 16,903.30 19,726.70 22,633.90 31,488.00 36,579.10 44,117.70 
Source: see Appendix C. 
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Appendix E: 29 key manufacturing sectors 
Manufacture of furniture 033 Manufacture of generators 077 
Manufacture of metal products 063 Manufacture of equipment for power transmission and distribution and control 078 
Manufacture of boiler and prime mover 064 Manufacture of wire, cable, optical cable and electrical appliances 079 
Manufacture of metalworking machinery 065 Manufacture of household electric and non-electric appliances 080 
Manufacture of lifters 066 Manufacture of other electrical machinery and equipment 081 
Manufacture of pump, valve and similar machinery 067 Manufacture of communication equipment 082 
Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 068 Manufacture of radar and broadcasting equipment 083 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery for agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery 071 Manufacture of computer 084 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery for mining, metallurgy and 
construction 069 Manufacture of electronic component 085 
Manufacture of special purpose machinery for chemical industry, 
processing of timber and non-metals 070 Manufacture of household audio-visual apparatus 086 
Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 072 Manufacture of other communication equipment 087.2 
Manufacture of railroad transport equipment 073 Manufacture of measuring instruments 088 
Manufacture of automobiles 074.1 Manufacture of machinery for cultural activity & office work 089 
Manufacture of boats and ships and floating devices 075 Manufacture of artwork and crafts 090.1 




Adda, J. & Cooper, R. (2003) Dynamic Economics: Quantitative Methods and 
Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Al-Iriani, M. (2006) “Energy-GDP relationship revisited: an example from GCC 
counties using panel causality”, Energy Policy, v34 n17 pp3342-3350. 
Andreosso-OʼCallaghan, B. & Yue, G. (2000) “An analysis of structural change in 
China using biproportional methods”, Economic Systems Research, v12 n1 
pp99-111. 
Ang, B. & Choi, K. (1997) “Decomposition of aggregate energy and gas emission 
intensitites for industry: a refined divisia index method”, The Energy Journal, 
v18 n3 pp59-74. 
Ang, B. & Lee, S. (1994) “Decomposition of industrial energy consumption: some 
methodological and application issues”, Energy Economics, v16 i2, pp83-
92. 
Ang, B. & Liu, N. (2007) “Handling zero values in the logarithmic mean Divisia index 
decomposition approach” Energy Policy, v35 i1 pp238-246. 
APCO Worldwide (2010) China's 12th five-year plan: how it actually works and 
what's in store for the next five years.  
Armstrong, S. (2011/12/11) “China's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership”, 
East Asia Forum. 
Athukorala, P-C., Fukao, Y. & Yuan, T. (2009) “Economic transition and labour 
market integration in China” in R. Garnaut, L. Song, & W. T. Woo, China's 
New Place in a World in Crisis. The China Update v9, Canberra: ANU E 
Press. 
Aziz, J. & Duenwald, C. (2001) “China's provincial growth dynamics”, IMF Working 
Paper, WP/01/03, Washington.  
 239 
Baiocchi, G., Minx, J. & Hubacek, K. (2010) “The impact of social factors and 
consumer behavior on carbon dioxide emissions in the United Kingdom: a 
regression based on input-output and geodemographic consumer 
segmentation data”, Journal of Industrial Ecolog, v14 i1 pp50-72. 
Barboza, D. (2010/0/07) “As China’s Wages Rise, Export Prices Could Follow”, The 
New York Times. 
Barnes, D. & Floor, W. (1996) “Rural energy in developing countries: a challenge for 
economic development”, Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 
v21 n1 pp497-530. 
Barnett, S. & Brooks, R. (2006) “What's driving investment in China?” IMF Working 
Paper, WP/06/265, Washington. 
Baumol, W. & ten Raa, T. (2002) “Wassily Leontief: in appreciation”, Journal of 
Economic and Social Measurement, v26 i1 pp1-10. 
Bayoumi, T., Tong, H. & Wei, S. (2011) “The Chinese corporate savings puzzle: a 
firm-level cross-country perspective” NBER Working Paper Series n16432. 
Beenstock, M. & Willcocks, P. (1981) “Energy consumption and economic activity 
in industrialized countries: the dynamic aggregate time series relationship”, 
Energy Economics v3 i4 pp225-232. 
Birnie, A. (1930) An Economic History of Europe 1760-1939. Methuen & Co Ltd, 
London. 
Bloomberg News (2010/06/06) “Wage Increases in China to Damp Capital 
Spending, BofA Merrill Lynch Says”. Bloomberg News. 
Bolt, A. (2011/06/11) “China's focus on old king coal to expose Labor carbon folly”, 
Herald Sun. 
Boyd, G. & Roop, J. (2004) “A note on the Fisher Ideal Index decomposition for 
structural change in energy intensity”, The Energy Journal, v25 n1 pp87-
101. 
BP (2010) Statistical Review of World Energy.  
 240 
Bradsher, K. (2011/05/31) “As Wages Rise in China, Trading Companies Face 
Higher Costs”, The New York Times. 
Bryson, B. (2003) A Short History of Nearly Everything, Black Swan. 
Bullard, C. & Herendeen, R. (1975) “Energy impact of consumption decisions”, 
Proceedings of the IEEE, v63 n3 pp484-493. 
Cai, F. & Wang, M. (2010) “Urbanisation with Chinese characteristics”, in R. 
Garnaut, J. Golley, & L. Song, China: the Next Twenty Years of Reform and 
Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Cai, F., Wang, D. & Yue, Q. (2009) “Flying geese within borders: how does China 
sustain its labour intensive industries?”, in R. Garnaut, L. Song, & W. T. 
Woo, China's New Place in a World in Crisis, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Cai, P. Y. (2009/06/12) “Chinese media's response to the Rio-Chinalco deal”, East 
Asia Forum. 
Cengel, Y. & Boles, M. (1989) Thermodynamics: An Engineering Approach, 
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York. 
Chenery, H. (1960) “Patterns of industrial growth”, The American Economic Review, 
v50 n4 pp624-654. 
Chenery, H. (1955) “The role of industrialization in development programs”, The 
American Economic Review, v45 n2 pp40-57. 
Chenery, H. & Clark, P. (1959) Interindustry Economics, John Wily & Sons, inc. New 
York. 
Chenery, H. & Watanabe, T. (1958) “International Comparisons of the Structure of 
Production”, Econometrica, v26 n4 pp487-521. 
Chenery, H., Robinson, S. & Syrquin, M. (1986) Industrialization and Growth: a 
Comparative Study, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Cheng, B. & Lai, T. (1997) “An investigation of co-integration and causality between 
energy consumption and economic activity in Taiwan”, Energy Economics, 
v19 pp435-444. 
 241 
Christ, C. (1955) “A review of input-output analysis”, Input-Output Analysis: An 
Appraisal, Studies in Income and Wealth, v18, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Christian, D. (2011) Retrieved 2011/07/15 from Big History Project: 
www.bighistoryproject.com. 
Christian, D. (2009) “Contingency, Pattern and the S-curve in Human History”, 
World History Connected, v6 n3. 
Cramer, J. (2003) The Origins and Development of the Logit Model, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Demurger, S., Sachs, J., Woo, W., Bao, S., Chang, G. & Mellinger, A. (2002) 
“Geography, Economic Policy, and Regional Development in China”, Asian 
Economic Papers , v1 n1 pp146-197. 
DFI International (1998) US Commercial Technology Transfers to the People's 
Republic of China, US Bureau of Export Administration. 
Diamond, J. (1998) Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody For the 
Last 13,000 Years, Vintage, London. 
Dickinson, S. (2011/04/13) “China's 12th five year plan: a necessary revisiting (part 
1)”, China Law Blog. 
Dickinson, S. (2011/03/03) “China's 12th Five Year Plan: A Preliminary Look”, China 
Law Blog. 
Dietzenbacher, E. & Hoen, A. (1998) “Deflation of input-output tables from the 
user's point of view: a heuristic approach”, Review of Income and Wealth, 
s44 n1 pp111-122. 
Dietzenbacher, E., & Los, B. (2000) “Structural decomposition analysis with 
dependent determinants”, Economic Systems Research, v12 n4 pp497-514. 
Dietzenbacher, E., & Los, B. (1998) “Structural decomposition techniques: sense 
and sensitivity”, Economic Systems Research, v10 n4 pp307-324. 
 242 
Diewert, W. (1988) “The early history of price index research”, NBER Working Paper 
Series, 2713. 
Divisia, F. (1926) “L'indice monétaire et la théorie de la monnaie”, Revue 
d'économie politique, v60 n1 pp49-81. 
Dong, Y., Ishikawa, M., Liu, X. & Wang, C. (2010) “An analysis of the driving forces 
of CO2 emissions embodied in Japan-China trade”, Energy Policy, v38 n11 
pp6784-6792. 
Druckman, A. & Jackson, T. (2009) “The carbon footprint of UK households 1990-
2004: A socio-economically disaggregated, quasi-multi-regional input-
output model”, Ecological Economics, v68 pp2066-2077. 
Drysdale, P. (2009/06/07) “Australia needs to get its act together on China, and 
fast”, East Asia Forum. 
Drysdale, P. (1988) International Economic Pluralism, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. 
Feenstra, R. (2004) Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey. 
Fiaschi, D. & Signorino, R. (2003) “Consumption patterns, development and 
growth: Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Thomas Robert Malthus”, The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, v10 n1 pp5-24. 
Fisher, I. (1922) The Making of Index Numbers, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 
and New York. 
Fleisher, B., Fearn, R. & Ye, Z. (2011) “The Lewis model applied to China: editorial 
introduction to the symposium”, China Economic Review, v22 n4 pp535-
541. 
Fridley, D. & Aden, N. (2008) China Energy Databook 7.0. Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, Environmental Energy Technologies Divisions: China 
Energy Group, Berkeley. 
Garbaccio, R., Ho, M. S. & Jorgenson, D. (1999) “Why has the energy-output ratio 
fallen in China?”, The Energy Journal, v20 n3 pp63-91. 
 243 
Garnaut, R. (2007) “Linking markets for Chinese growth”, in R. Garnaut & L. Song 
(Eds.), China: Linking Markets for Growth, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Garnaut, R. (2010) “The turning period in China's economic development: a 
conceptual framework and new empirical evidence”, in R. Garnaut, J. 
Golley, & L. Song, China: the Next Twenty Years of Reform and 
Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Garnaut, R. (1999) “Twenty years of economic reform and structural change in the 
Chinese economy, in R. Garnaut & L. Song, China: Twenty Years of Reform. 
Asia Pacific Press, Canberra. 
Garnaut, R. & Song, L. (2006) The Turning Point in China's Economic Development. 
Asia Pacific Press, Canberra. 
Gillard, J. (2011) Speech to the AsiaLink and Asia Society Lunch, Melbourne.  
Golley, J. (2010) “Prospects for diminishing regional disparities” in R. Garnaut, J. 
Golley & L. Song, China: the Next 20 Years of Reform and Development, 
ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Golley, J. & Meng, X. (2011) “Has China run out of surplus labour?”, China 
Economic Review, v22 pp555-572. 
Golley, J. & Song, L. (2010) “Chinese economic reform and development”, in J. 
Golley & L. Song, China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and 
Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Greening, L., Davis, W., Schipper, L. & Khrushch, M. (1997) “Comparison of six 
decomposition methods: application to aggregate energy intensity for 
manufacturing in 10 OECD countries”, Energy Economics, v19 pp375-390. 
Grossman, G. & Krueger, A. (1994) “Economic growth and the environment”, NBER 
Working Paper Series, n4634. 
Grossman, G. & Krueger, A. (1991) “Environmental impacts of a North American 
free trade agreement”, NBER Working Paper Series, n3914. 
GTAP (2011) Retrieved 2011/07/20 from 
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v7/default.asp 
 244 
Guan, D., Peters, G. & Weber, C. (2009) “Journey to world top emitter: an analysis 
of the driving forces of China's recent CO2 emissions surge”, Geophysical 
Research Letters, v36. 
Harris, D. (2011/09/20), “Moving on out to China's interior. Why things go slowly”, 
China Law Blog. 
Herrerias, M. J. & Orts, V. (2010) “Is the export-led growth hypothesis enough to 
account for China's growth?”, China & World Economy, v18 n4 pp34-51. 
Hoekstra, R. & van den Bergh, J. (2003) “Comparing structural and index 
decomposition analysis, Energy Economics, v25 pp39-64. 
Hoekstra, R. & van den Bergh, J. (2002) “Structural decomposition analysis of 
physical flows in the economy”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 
v23 pp357-378. 
Hofman, B. & Kuijs, L. (2007) “Rebalancing China's Growth”, Conference Paper: 
China's Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. 
Houghton, K. (1995) PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra. 
Houthakker, H. (1957) “An international comparison of household expenditure 
patterns, commemorating the centenary of Engel's law”, Econometrica, v25 
n4 pp532-551. 
Hoy, M., Livernois, J., McKenna, C., Rees, R. & Stengos, T. (2001) Mathematics for 
Economics (2 ed.). The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Huang, J. (1993) “Industrial energy use and structural change”, Energy Economics, 
v15 pp131-136. 
Huang, Y. (2001) China's last steps across the river: enterprise and banking reforms, 
Asia Pacific Press, Canberra. 
Huang, Y. & Wang, B. (2010) “Rebalancing China's economic structure”, in R. 
Garnaut, J. Golley & L. Song, China: the  Next Twenty Years of Reform and 
Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
 245 
Hudson, E. & Jorgenson, D. (1974) “US energy policy and economic growth, 1975-
2000”, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, v5 n2 
pp461-514. 
Hurst, L. (2012) “West and central African iron ore: a lesson in the contestability of 
the iron ore market”, EABER Working Paper Series, n72. 
IEA (2010/07/20) China overtakes the United States to become world largest energy 
consumer, retrieved 2010/09/29 from 
http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479 
IEA (2005) Energy Statistics Manual, International Energy Agency, Paris. 
IEA (2011) Key world energy statistics, International Energy Agency, Paris. 
Jorgenson, D. (1984) “The role of energy in productivity growth”, The American 
Economic Review, n2 pp26-30. 
Jorgenson, D., & Wilcoxen, P. (1993) “Energy, the environment, and economic 
growth”, Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, v3. 
Junsong, W. & Canfei, H. (2009) “Technological progress, structural change and 
China's energy efficiency”, Chinese Journal of Population, Resources and 
Environment, v7 n2. 
Kahrl, F.,& Roland-Holst, D. (2008) “Energy and exports in China”, China Economic 
Review v19 pp649-658. 
Kendrick, J. (1961) Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
Knight, J. & Ding, S. (2010) “Why does China invest so much?” University of Oxford 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, n441. 
Kraft, J. & Kraft, A. (1978) “On the relationship betwen energy and GNP”, Journal of 
Energy and Development, v3 pp401-403. 
Krugman, P. & Obstfeld, M. (2006) International Economics: Theory & Policy (7th 
ed.), Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston. 
 246 
Kuznets, S. (1973) “Modern economic growth: findings and reflections”, The 
American Economic Review, v63 n3 pp247-258. 
Kuznets, S. (1957) “Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations: II. 
industrial distribution of income and labor force”, Economic Develoment 
and Cultural Change, v5 n4 pp1-111. 
Kuznets, S. (1958) “Quantitative aspects of the economic growth of nations: III. 
industrial distribution of income and labor force by states, United States, 
1919-1921 to 1955”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, v6 n4 
pp1-128. 
Lackner, K. & Sachs, J. (2005) “A robust strategy for sustainable energy”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, n2. 
Layman, B. (2004) “CGE modelling as a tool for evaluating proposals for project 
assistance: a view from the trenches”, Western Australian Department of 
Treasury and Finance Research Paper. 
Lee, J. (2000) “Changes in the source of China's regional inequality” China 
Economic Review, v11 n3 pp232-245. 
Lee, K. & Oh, W. (2006) “Analysis of CO2 emissions in APEC countries: a time-
series and a cross-sectional decomposition using the log mean Divisia 
method”, Energy Policy, v34 pp2779-2787. 
Lenzen, M. (2011) “Aggregation versus disagregation in input output analysis of the 
environment”, Economic Systems Research, v23 n1 pp73-89. 
Lenzen, M., Wier, M., Cohen, C., Hayami, H., Pachauri, S. & Schaeffer, R. (2006) “A 
comparative multivariate analysis of household energy requirements in 
Australia, Brazil, Denmark, India and Japan”, Energy, v31 pp181-207. 
Leontief, W. & Ford, D. (1972) “Air pollution and economic structure: empirical 
results of input-output computations”, in A. Brody & A. Carter, Input-Output 
Techniques, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 247 
Leontieff, W. (1951) The Structure of the American Economy 1919-1939: an 
empirical applicaiton of equilibrium analysis. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Levine, M. (2009) “China energy and greenhouse gas issues”, China US Energy 
Efficiency Alliance, Portland.  
Lewis, W. (1954) “Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour”, 
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, v22 pp139-191. 
Liang, Q., Fan, Y. & Wei, Y. (2007) “Multi-regional input-output model for regional 
energy requirements and CO2 emissions in China” Energy Policy v35 
pp1685-1700. 
Lin, J. Y. (2010) “New structural economics: a framework for rethinking 
development”, Policy Research Working Paper, n5197. 
Lin, X. (1996) China's Energy Strategy: economic structure, technological choices, 
and energy consumption, Praeger, London. 
Liu, A. (1998) “Sources of structural change and output growth of China's 
economy: 1987-92”, Economics of Planning, v31 pp95-116. 
Liu, H., Xi, Y., Guo, J. & Li, X. (2010) “Energy embodied in the international trade of 
China: an energy input-output analysis”, Energy Policy, v38 pp3957-3964. 
Liu, Z. (2005) “Institution and inequality: the hukou system in China”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, v33 pp133-157. 
Lu, N. (2011/02/14), East and West China Competing for Workers, retrieved 
2011/02/14 from China.org.cn: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-
02/11/content_21898950.htm. 
Ma, C. & Stern, D. (2008) “China's changing energy intensity trend: a 
decomposition analysis”, Energy Economics, v30 pp1037-1053. 
Ma, K. (2006/03/23) The 11th Five-Year Plan: targets, paths and policy orientation, 
retrieved 2011/02/14 from NDRC News: 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20060323_63813.htm 
 248 
Maddison, A. (1998) Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, OECD, 
Paris.  
Mai, Y., Adams, P. & Dixon, P (2009) “China’s growing demand for energy and primary 
input – terms of trade effects on neighbouring countries”, Centre of Policy Studies 
and the Impact Project General Paper, nG-196 
Mai, Y., Dixon, P. & Rimmer, M. (2010) “CHINAGEM: a Monash-styled dynamic CGE model 
of China”, ”, Centre of Policy Studies and the Impact Project General Paper, nG-201 
Malthus, T. (1798) An essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the future 
Improvement of Society, J. Johnson, London. 
Mankiw, G. (2003) Macroeconomics (5th ed.), Worth Publishers, New York. 
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. & Green, J. (1995) Microeconomic Theory, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Maslow, A. (1943) “A theory of human motivation”, Psychological Review, v50 
pp370-396. 
Maslow, A. (1943) “Preface to motivation theory”, Psychosomatic Medicine, v5 
pp85-92. 
McKay, H. (2011) “China's turbulent half decade”, in J. Golley & L. Song, Rising 
China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
McKay, H., Sheng, Y. & Song, L. (2010) “China's metal intensity in comparative 
perspective”, in R. Garnaut, J. Golley & L. Song, China: the Next Twenty 
Years of Reform and Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
McKibbin, W. (2006) “Growth, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in China”, 
in R. Garnaut & L. Song, The Turning Point in China's Economic 
Development, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
McKinsey Global Institue (2009) Preparing for China's Urban Billion, McKinsey & 
Company. 
 249 
Meng, X. & Bai, N. (2007) “How much have the wages of unskilled workers in China 
increased? Data from seven factories in Guangdong” in R. Garnaut & L. 
Song, China: Linking Markets for Growth, ANU E Press, Canberra. 
Miller, R. & Blair, P. (2009) Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions (2nd 
ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Minx, J., Baiocchi, G., Peters, G., Weber, C., Guan, D. & Hubacek, K. (2011) “A 
‘carbonizing dragon’: China's fast growing CO2 emissions revisited”, 
Environmental Science & Technology, v45 n21 pp9144-9153. 
Moore, J. (1978) “A measure of structural change in output”, Review of Income and 
Wealth, v24 i1 pp105-118. 
NBSC (1997) China Statistical Yearbook 1996, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (1998) China Statistical Yearbook 1997, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (1999) China Statistical Yearbook 1998, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2000) China Statistical Yearbook 1999, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2001) China Statistical Yearbook 2000, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2002) China Statistical Yearbook 2001, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2002) Input Output Tables of China 2002, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2003) China Statistical Yearbook 2002, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2004) China Statistical Yearbook 2003, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2005) China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2004, National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2005) China Statistical Yearbook 2004, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2006) China Statistical Yearbook 2005, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2007) China Statistical Yearbook 2006, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2007) Input Output Tables of China 2007, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
 250 
NBSC (2008) China Energy Statistical Yearbook. National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2008) China Rural Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2008) China Statistical Yearbook 2007, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2009) China Energy Statistical Yearbook. National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistical Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2009) China Statistical Yearbook 2008, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2010) China Statistical Yearbook 2009, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NBSC (2011) China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2010, China Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
NBSC (2011) China Statistical Yearbook 2010, China Statistics Press, Beijing. 
NDRC (2010) Energy Data 2010, Beijing. 
Obama, B. (2009/02/05) Remarks of President Barack Obama: promoting the 
recovery plan with Secretary Chu. 
OECD (2011) Quarterly growth rates of real GDP, change over previous quarter, 
retrieved 2011/02/12 from OECD.StatExtracts: 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350. 
Orlik, T. (2011) Understanding China's Economic Indicators: translating the data 
into investment opportunities, FT Press Science, New Jersey. 
Orlik, T. (2011/12/19) Why predicting China's economic growth is so hard, retrieved 
2011/12/19 from The Wall Street Journal: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/12/19/why-predicting-
china%E2%80%99s-economic-growth-is-so-hard/?mod=WSJBlog. 
Pedroni, P. & Yao, J. (2006) “Regional income divergence in China”, Journal of 
Asian Economics, v17 n2 pp294-315. 
 251 
Perkins, D. (2012) “Rapid growth and changing economic structure: the 
expenditure side story and its implications for China”, China Economic 
Review v23 i3 pp501-511. 
Peters, G. (2008) “From production-based to consumption-based national emission 
inventories”, Ecological Economics, v65 pp13-23. 
Peters, G. & Hertwich, E. (2008) “CO2 embodied in international trade with 
implications for global climate policy”, Environmental Science and 
Technology, v42 n5 pp1401-1407. 
Peters, G., Weber, C. & Liu, J. (2006) “Construction of Chinese energy and 
emissions inventory”, Reports and Working Papers from Norweigian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU) Industrial Ecology Programme 
(IndEcol), n4, Oslo. 
Peters, G., Weber, C., Guan, D. & Hubacek, K. (2007) “China's growing CO2 
emissions - a race between increasing consumption and efficiency gains”, 
Environmental Science and Technology, v41 n17. 
Pettis, M. (2011/12/04) “How do we know that China is overinvesting?”, 
EconoMonitor. 
Phillips, A. (2011/05/09) “Chindia and the challenges of energy security and 
strategic stability”, East Asia Forum. 
Phylipsen, D., Blok, K. & Bode, J.W. (2002) “Industrial energy efficiency in the 
climate change debate: comparing the US and major developing countries”, 
Energy for Sustainable Development, v6 n4 pp30-45. 
Planck, M. (1945) Treatise on thermodynamics, Dover Publications Inc, New York. 
Poncet, S. (2005) “A fragmented China: measure and determinants of Chinese 
domestic market disintegration”, Review of International Economics, v13 n3 
pp409-430. 
Ricardo, D. (1817) On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, John 
Murray, London. 
Roach, S. (2011/02/24) “China's turning point”, Project Syndicate. 
 252 
Rodrik, D. (2007) One Economics, Many Recipes, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Roman, Z. (1969) “A note on measuring structural changes”, Review of Income and 
Wealth, v15 i3 pp265-268. 
Rose, A. & Casler, S. (1996) “Iput-output structural decomposition analysis: a 
critical appraisal”, Economic Systems Research, v8 n1 pp33-62. 
Rose, A. & Chen, C. (1991) “Sources of change in energy use in the US economy, 
1972-1982: a structural decomposition analysis”, Resource and Energy 
Economics, v13 i1 pp1-21. 
Rostow, W. W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Rothman, D. (1998) “Environmental Kuznets curves - real progress or passing the 
buck? A case for consumption-based approaches”, Ecological Economics, 
v25 pp177-194. 
Sachs, J. (2005) The End of Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen in Our Lifetime, 
Penguin Books, London. 
Schäfer, A. (2005) “Structural change in energy use”, Energy Policy, v33 i4 pp429-
437. 
Schurr, S. (1960) Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975: an economic study 
of its history and prospects, Resources for the Future, Baltimore. 
Schurr, S. (1984) “Energy use, technological change, and productive efficiency: an 
economic-historical interpretation”, Annual Review of Energy, v9 pp409-
425. 
SETC (2003) The 10th Five-Year Plan for Energy Conservation and Resources 
Comprehensive Utilizatio,. State Economic and Trade Commission, 
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=5389. 
Smith, A. (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Project Gutenberg. 
 253 
Solow, R. (1956) “A contribution to the theory of economic growth”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, v70 i1 pp65-94. 
Song, L. (2006) “Regional development in China”, APSEG Working paper, n32. 
Song, L. & Sheng, Y. (2007) “China's demand for energy: a global perspective”, in 
R. Garnaut & L. Song, China: Linking Markets for Growth. ANU E Press, 
Canberra. 
State Council Information Office (2011) White Paper on The Socialist System of 
Laws with Chinese Characteristics, Beijing: 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/201110/t1036784.htm. 
State Council of China (2007) China's Energy Conditions and Policies. State 
Council of the People's Republic of China, Information Office. 
Steenhof, P. (2006) “Decomposition of electricity demand in China's industrial 
sector”, Energy Economics, v28 pp370-384. 
Stern, D. (1993) “Energy and economic growth in the USA: a multivariate 
approach”, Energy Economics, v15 i2 pp137-150. 
Stern, D. (2011) “Energy and economic growth: the 'stylized facts'”, Crawford 
School of Economics and Government: Foundation Seminars, ANU, 
Canberra. 
Stern, D. (2011/11) “Energy and economic growth: the 'stylized facts'”, Stochastic 
Trend. 
Stern, D. (2004) “The rise and fall of the environmental Kuznets curve”, World 
Development, v32 n8 pp1419-1439. 
Sun, W., Yang, X. & Xiao, G. (2011/03/01) Understanding China's high investment 
rate and FDI levels: a comparative analysis of the return to capital in China, 
the United States, and Japan”, Journal of International Commerce and 
Economics, v3 i1. 
Swan, T. (1956) “Economic growth and capital accumulation”, Economic Record, 
v32 i2 pp334-361. 
 254 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th ed.) (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
The White House (2012/04/11) Fact Sheet: Obama administration announces 
additional steps to increase energy security.  
Toman, M. & Jemelkova, B. (2003) Energy and economic development: an 
assessment of the state of knowledge, Resources for the Future. 
United Nations (1999) “Handbook of input-output table compilation and analysis”, 
Studies in Methods: Handbook of National Accounting, F (74). 
USCC (2011) Going Out: an Overview of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
Wang, H. (2011/02/26) “China coal mine deaths fall 'but still remain high'”, 
AsiaOneNews. 
Wang, W., Mu, H., Kang, X., Song, R. & Ning, Y. (2010) “Changes in industrial 
electricity consumption in China from 1998 to 2007”, Energy Policy, v38 i7 
pp3684-3690. 
Wang, Y. & Chandler, W. (2009) “The Chinese nonferrous metals industry - energy 
use and CO2 emissions”, Energy Policy, v38 i11 pp6475-6484. 
Weber, C., Peters, G., Guan, D. & Hubacek, K. (2008) “The contribution of Chinese 
exports to climate change”, Energy Policy, v36 i9 pp3572-3577. 
Westerlund, J., Edgerton, D. & Opper, S. (2010) “Why is Chinese Provincial Output 
Diverging?” Journal of Asian Economics, v21 i4 pp333-344. 
Winchester, S. (2011/10) “How fast can China go?”, Vanity Fair. 
World Bank (2011) World Development Indicators.  
Xinhua (2011/03/05) “Key targets of China's 12th five-year plan”, Xinhuanet.com. 
Yan, Y. & Yang, L. (2010) “China's foreign trade and climate change: a case study 
of CO2 emissions”, Energy Policy, v38 i1 pp350-356. 
Yang, D. (2002) “What has caused regional inequality in China?”, China Economic 
Review, v13 i4 pp331-334. 
 255 
Yuan, J., Kang, J., Zhao, C. & Hu, Z. (2008) “Energy consumption and economic 
growth: evidence from China at both aggregated and disaggregated levels”, 
Energy Economics, v30 i6 pp3077-3094. 
Yuan, X. & Zuo, J. (2011) “Transition to low carbon energy policies in China - from 
the five year plan perspective”, Energy Policy, v39 i6 pp3855-3859. 
Zhang, M. & Wang, W. (2011) “Analysis of China's energy utilization for 2007”, 
Energy Policy, v39 i3 pp1612-1616. 
Zhang, X. & Cheng, X. (2009) “Energy consumption, carbon emissions and ecnomic 
growth in China”, Ecological Economics, v68 i10 pp2706-2712. 
Zhao, X. & Hong, D. (2008) “The effect of the international trade on energy 
consumption in China”, International Conference on Management Science 
and Engineering, 15th Annual Conference Proceedings. 
Zhao, Z. (2010) International Input Output Conference. 
Zhou, N., Levine, M. & Price, L. (2010) “Overview of current energy-efficiency 
policies in China”, Energy Policy, v38 i11 pp6439-6452. 
 
 !
